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Why do we need to address the high and rising health care 
expenditures?
Health care expenditures have been rising rapidly. In high-income countries, the rate of growth 
in health care expenditures has continuously exceeded the rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product 
(GPD)1. This also holds for the Netherlands. It implied that an increasing share of GDP was spent on 
health care, to over 10% in 20162. At the time of writing, several economies have seen a decline in 
the growth rate of health care expenditures3, 4, but it remains to be seen whether this is a structural 
change or a mere consequence of the economic recession.  
  Recent work suggested that rising health care expenditures may actually be a good thing. 
Cutler and McClellan5 showed for a number of conditions that the benefits of technological progress, 
as measured in life-years gained, far outweigh its costs. Apart from that, Hall and Jones6 posited that 
as one gets wealthier, investing in additional life-years by increasing medical spending might at some 
point become more attractive than increasing consumption within a year.
  One may not want to leave the level of health care spending and its growth curve as they 
are, however. A significant portion of health care expenditures can be classified as wasteful spending. 
In their report Tackling Wasteful Spending on Health, the OECD categorizes ‘waste’ into wasteful 
clinical care, operational waste, and governance-related waste7. Governance-related waste refers to 
administrative processes that can be organized more efficiently, but also to instances of fraud and 
corruption. Operational waste refers to instances in which a patient could have been equally well, or 
even better served, using fewer resources, for example by substituting specialist care for primary care 
or by subscribing a generic version of a medicine, rather than the branded original. Wasteful clinical 
care comprises unnecessary care from a medical perspective, but also instances related to not having 
received the right care (e.g. preventable hospital admissions). In this thesis, we focus on two specific 
measures to lower the occurrence of the latter two: clinical and operational waste. 
Clinical and operational waste are significant drivers of health care expenditures. An example of 
clinical waste within the domain of pharmaceutical care, the HARM study8 and its successors, show 
that in the Netherlands, about half of the medication-related hospital admission in people over 65 
years of age were potentially avoidable.  As for operational waste, it was shown that there is still 
substantial variation among GPs in the proportion of (preferred) generic medicines prescribed within 
classes of multisource products9. 
  The presence of clinical and operational wasteA suggests that patients receive care for which 
it holds that the benefits of receiving it do not outweigh associated harms or costs, or for which 
it holds that alternatives are available that compare favorably with the procedure at hand. Verkerk 
et al.10 define this as ‘low-value care’ (in their typology they classify these instances of clinical and 
operational waste as ineffective and inefficient care). De-implementation of low-value care would 
A  Henceforth denoted as ‘waste’, and used interchangeably with ‘low-value care’ (see section).
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imply that we increase patient value per euro (dollar) spent. In the remainder of this thesis, this is 
what we refer to when we talk about ‘increasing value’. 
Increasing value first requires that we understand the main drivers of spending on low-value care. 
Apart from causes like having a poor infrastructure (in terms of, for example, suboptimal schooling 
or organization), the OECD report identifies instances in which financial incentives are not aligned 
with health system goals as primary drivers of waste in health care markets7. ‘Financial incentives’ 
are monetary cues that reward particular behaviors or efforts, and they are abundant in health care 
systems. In the Dutch health care systemB, characterized as a ‘managed competition’ in which health 
insurers compete over insurance enrollees in terms of the insurance plan value that results from 
their contracts with providers, one can find financial incentives in all submarkets. Figure 1 provides 
a graphical, stylized, depiction of the Dutch health care system. In the next section, we discuss both 
supply- and demand-side incentives within this system.





Figure 1: A graphical depiction of the Dutch Health Care Market.  
 
 NOTES: Consumers purchase health insurance on the Health Insurance Market. On this submarket, health insurers  
  compete with each other. In order to attract more consumers, they need to contract care providers that are valued by    
  consumers. They do so on the Health care purchasing market. On the Health care provision market, consumers choose   
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NOTES: Consumers purchase health insurance on the Health Insurance Market. On this submarket, health 
insurers compete with each oth r. In order to attract more consumers, they need to contract care provid rs that 
are val ed by consumers. T y do so on the Health care purchasing market. On the Health care provision market, 
consumers choose among the providers that are contracted by the health insurer.
B In this thesis, the term “Dutch health care system” refers to the Dutch health care system for curative care.
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Supply-side and demand-side incentives to lower wasteful spending
A feature of health care markets is that the price insured patients pay for receiving treatment, 
often differs from the actual price paid to the provider. For example, in a managed competition, 
insurance enrollees pay a monthly premium and, absent any forms of cost-sharing (a point to which 
we return below), care is free at the margin. This distorts the process of considering the value of 
a course of treatment. It also suggests that there are at least two strategies for lowering spending 
by cutting down on wasteful care: changing demand- or supply-side incentives11.  Within the scope 
of this dissertation, demand-side incentives are defined as financial incentives that let consumers 
share in the costs of their treatment (figure 1 – market for health care provision). Examples include 
deductibles, no-claim refunds, and coinsurance rates. These demand-side incentives are incorporated 
in the insurance plan. Supply-side incentives are defined as financial incentives that attach financial 
consequences to particular physician behaviors, thereby aligning individual physicians’ goals with 
those of “a larger organization”,  such as a health insurer or a health care organization12 (figure 1 
– health care purchasing market). These incentives are incorporated into physician contracts, and 
therefore determine physician payment. They may do so in many different ways (see Berenson13 for a 
typology). For example, a provider might derive most of his revenue from a fee-for-service payment 
structure, in which an active, and volume-oriented treatment style is rewarded14, but might at the 
same time be subject to additional, smaller, incentive payments that reward the achievement of 
particular outcomes13.   The supply-side incentive we study is the shared savings model, under which 
providers share in expenditure savings relative to an expenditure benchmark, given that they have not 
compromised on quality. The demand-side incentives we study are the deductible and the no-claim in 
health insurance. These studies form part A and B of this dissertation respectively, and therefore this 
introductory chapter is split up accordingly. 
Our choice of studying the shared savings model, out of the abundance of alternative payment 
models available, was based on two reasons. First, at the time of writing (November 2010), US 
Congress had just enacted the Affordable Care Act (March), which paved the way for a large national 
shared savings program (called the ‘Medicare Shared Savings Program’). At that time however – even 
though there had been small-scaled shared savings pilots in the past – no empirical evaluations existed 
that could quantify a causal link between participating under a shared savings model and outcomes 
(such as spending or quality of care), and explain the associated mechanisms. Therefore, this empirical 
question was (and is) urgent – with only a handful of empirical evaluations being published by the end 
of 2017. Second, in contrast with other (emerging) incremental payment models, such as bundled 
payment or performance-based pay – which tend to focus on specific clinical areas – the accountability 
implied by shared savings models is often much larger. Providers participating under a shared savings 
model are typically held accountable for total health care costs, conditionally on achieving satisfactory 
performance on a number of quality indicators15, 16. This extended accountability implied by these 
models seems to be congruent with a global trend and desire to shift or extend accountability from 
payers to providers. At the time of writing, such a paradigm shift could be observed in a number of 
countries, among which were the US, UK (the establishment of clinical commissioning groups) and the 
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Netherlands (interest in creating payment models that support population management).  
The data that we obtained out of this research on shared savings programs, also allowed us to 
study consumer responses to deductibles and no-claim rebates as well. Our choice of studying these 
forms of patient co-payments was therefore partly pragmatic. Yet, this research is more fundamental 
in nature, as we try to gauge the fundamental parameters of choice rather than evaluating a particular 
policy. This is ongoing research, and this thesis contains the results of a first study, in which we 
investigate whether people’s choices are influenced by the framing of the cost sharing incentive.
Supply-side incentives for lowering wasteful spending: payment 
models and shared savings arrangements
Payment systems as drivers of health care expenditures
We define payment systems as the way in which payers of health care allocate their funds 
between providers of care17, 18. How payers of health care obtain this funds in the first place, is a matter 
of financing instead. 
The view that payment systems play an important role in the inefficient rise of health care 
expenditures is widely supported19-21. This suggests that payment systems could also play a role in 
bending the cost curve by lowering waste. A large number of payment systems exists. Broadly, they 
can be characterized along dimensions of risk, such as the number of variables for which providers 
are at risk (e.g. quality, services within a care episode, the number of care episodes)14, the type of 
variables (inputs such as effort, or outputs such as health)22 and the timing of payment (retrospective 
or prospective)23. Table 1 depicts common base payment systems, and incremental payment systems14.
   With ‘risk’, we mean that the outcome of a particular variable has an effect on a provider’s 
income, with increasing risk being reflected by a greater variability in outcomes. Thus, risk is thought 
of as the joint of the probability that a specific event occurs, and its consequences in terms of provider 
income. Note that it is not necessarily the case that adding additional variables to the provider’s 
payment model, increases risk. This depends on the correlation between events. We refer to adding 
additional variables as increasing the ‘dimensionality’ of risk instead. 
Payment system Characterization
Base payment systems Systems that form a physician’s primary source of revenue
Fee-for-service
A single reimbursement is set for each service delivered. Reimbursements are 
commonly set on a prospective base (e.g. as issued by a government, or as 
negotiated between a health insurer and a care provider). The provider is at 
risk for the costs of the processes and the number of processes within each 
service14. 
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A single reimbursement is set for each episode-of-care delivered, which con-
sists of the total set of inpatient and outpatient care per episode, typically 
delivered by the provider (e.g. total inpatient and outpatient hospital care)24 
. Apart from the costs and the number of processes within each service, the 
provider is now also put at risk for the number and type of services delivered 
within an episode-of-care14.
Capitation
A single reimbursement is set for each time period a patient is served. Provid-
ers under capitation receive fixed payments for each patient per time period 
(month, quarter, year) irrespective of the care provided. Capitation fees may 
be adjusted to case-mix. The provider is now also at risk for the number of 
care episodes14.
Salary
Under a salary, providers do not incur the marginal costs of production, 
neither do they receive its benefits. Payments may be a simple linear function 
of hours worked. 
Incremental payments
Additional rewards or penalties for specific purposes, that comprise a small 
portion of physician revenues and complement a physician’s base payment
Quality bonuses
Providers receive payments for achieving predefined performance targets 
with respect to quality, as in current pay-for-performance programs 25.
Shared savings payments
Providers share in savings generated with respect to an expenditure 
benchmark.
Table 1: Examples of common payment systems and their characterization
Payment systems and their role in health care reforms
Payment systems serve multiple purposes. Rather than being viewed solely as a mechanism 
for funding the costs associated with organizing and delivering health care treatment (e.g. labor and 
capital costs), they are believed to influence a physician’s choices regarding the organization and 
delivery of treatment26. This becomes apparent when we assume that physician behavior is at least in 
part driven23 by financial incentives such as profit maximization or the desire to reach a target income. 
Under different payment systems, different behaviors will lead to these outcomes. In general, fee-
for-service and episode-of-care payments reward an active style of treatment, either by incentivizing 
to increase volumes or lowering thresholds for treatment, whereas capitation payments and salary 
reward a more conservative or passive style of treatment14. If we expect different payment systems 
to elicit different behavioral responses, payment systems may also serve the purpose of aligning the 
diverging interests of payers and providers of care27. Later on in this chapter (“Shared savings programs 
for Patient-Centered Medical Homes”), as well as in chapters 2 and 4, we are more explicit about the 
role of shared savings models in aligning physician interests with those of payers of care, within the 
context of a fee-for-service base payment system.
Only over the past few decades, medical care reform has devoted more attention to payment 
systems, behavioral responses and possible inefficiencies inherent to prevailing systems of paying 
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care providers. Cutler28 identifies three waves of international health care policyC . At the start of the 
previous century, the medical profession was still in its infancy and the financial risk of illness largely 
centered around the loss in income rather than in incurring the costs of treatment28 – if the illness could 
be cured at all. Advances in antibiotic therapies (among others the invention of penicillin in the late 
1920s), and the onset of their large-scale production in response to World War II, caused the medical 
profession to transcend its limited role in curing diseases. A first wave of post-war health care reforms 
was therefore mainly preoccupied with realizing universal coverage and ensuring equal access to care. 
In the Netherlands, mandatory coverage was introduced during World War II by the German occupier. 
Schut29 writes that in this era, there were either no demand or supply-side incentives to limit spending. 
Combined with rapid technological progress, the share of GDP spent on health care rose quickly. By 
the 1970s, the Dutch health care sector had turned in to one of the largest sectors of the Dutch 
economy. Accordingly, the Dutch government expressed its concerns over its rapid rate of growth and 
the potential impact this would have on the sustainability of the overall social insurance program30. 
As a response, the government imposed a variety of caps on the total (per-diem, fee-for-service) 
expenditures charged by hospitals and specialists29. Over the course of this policy, the implied rationing 
of care became more visible to the patients (e.g. waiting lists) and, like in other countries, a public 
backlash ensued28, 29, leading to a third wave of health care reforms in which governments abandoned 
tight expenditure caps to adopt a more “pluralistic view of ways to limit medical spending (p. 899)” 
instead28. This pluralistic approach to limiting spending entails the introduction of financial incentives 
on a variety of submarkets. Examples of incentives are market competition and patient cost-sharing, 
which were also introduced in the Netherlands. A third set of financial incentives within this approach 
is targeted at the provider community, implemented through contract innovation. For example, in the 
early 2000s, pay-for-performance programs have been implemented in both in the UK31 and the US32. 
In these kind of programs, providers received additional payments tied to performance on a range of 
quality dimensions. The Netherlands implemented a bundled payment approach to diabetes in 2007. 
Under this approach, health insurers pay so-called ‘care groups’ a fixed quarterly fee per (enrolled) 
diabetes patient, covering the full range of diabetes care services (both primary and secondary care). 
In order to provide these services, ‘care groups’ either employ or subcontract other providers. The 
financial and clinical accountability these care groups assume, exceed organizational boundaries33. 
Shared savings programs15, 16, as a last group of provider incentives, also introduces accountability 
for overall spending and quality, by allowing providers to share in savings against expenditure targets 
conditionally on quality performance. Shared savings programs form the scope of this dissertation.
Shared savings programs and early results
In the 1990s, US federal policy was concerned with lowering the rate of growth in Medicare 
expenditures (Medicare is a social insurance program people aged 65 and up). To that aim, the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HCFA) sponsored research on contract innovation. It was recognized 
that physicians lacked formal accountability for total spending, even though they were considered to 
be among the key decision makers in the health care system34. Until then, payment reform was mainly 
C Although the Netherlands are not part of his analysis, Schut writes that these waves can be observed in Dutch 
health care policy.
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targeted at individual sectors (e.g. the design of a prospective payment system for hospital care and 
a physician fee schedule based on time and resource intensity), and lacked the incentives that would 
align the interests of provider organizations across sectors. There were no clear financial incentives for 
individual providers to manage patient care across the continuum of services, by coordinating care or 
by helping the patient in navigating the health care system35.
The researchers sponsored by the HCFA proposed a payment reform that introduced lump sum 
bonus payments for improving efficiency across the continuum of care34, 35. This proposal was built 
around so-called Group-Specific Volume Performance Standards (GVPS)34. This term was an allusion 
to the “Medicare Volume Performance Standard (MVPS)” : a cap on the rate of growth for national 
physician expenditures. In case aggregate expenditures increased the MVPS all physicians were 
penalized, irrespective of their relative performance. The basic idea behind the GVPS was to instead 
set provider-specific expenditure targets – based on overall historical expenditures and a county-level 
growth trend – and to let providers share in savings relative to their targets34. Their proposal laid the 
basis for the first national shared savings program: the US Physician Group Practice Demonstration36. 
Under the Physician Group Practice Demonstration (2005-2010)36, ten large physician groups 
assumed accountability for the total health care expenditures of patients assigned to them. 
Accountability implied that physician groups could share in savings relative to an expenditure target. 
Part of the shared savings payments were made conditionally on achieving predefined quality targets. 
Like envisioned under the GVPS proposal, the shared savings program complemented the fee-for-
service payment system instead of replacing it. Thus, individual providers still continued to bill under 
Medicare, but could receive bonus payments for meeting expenditure and quality targets as defined 
under the program. 
The Medicare Shared Savings Program (2012 – to date) (MSSP) was modeled after the Physician 
Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration. As laid out in the Final Rule15, participation under the program 
is open to a wide range of provider configurations, including group practices, networks of individual 
providers, hospitals and partnerships between physician group practices and hospitals. Apart from 
a number of changes in the payment methodology, the MSSP differed from its predecessor in the 
sense that it introduces two-sided risk: participating providers are now also at risk of overspending 
the benchmark. Currently, the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is testing a similar 
payment model under the Pioneer program, in which provider organizations participate that have 
already gained experience in assuming accountability. An important difference between the MSSP and 
the Pioneer program, is that the latter program includes a higher sharing rates of savings and losses.
A third shared savings program is the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC)16 (2009 – to date) 
launched by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts, a US health insurer. Under the program, providers 
are paid fee-for-service, and these expenditures are debited against an annual global budget. Deficits 
or surpluses are shared with participating providers. In the updated AQC model37, the net sharing rate 
depends on a provider’s performance on a number of quality measures. 
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What these programs have in common, is that participating providers are held accountable for 
the rise in health care expenditures covering the full spectrum of services in the insurance carrier’s 
line of business. Accountability is shaped through defining an expenditure target, and evaluating 
providers’ performance against this target. Similarly, throughout this dissertation, by shared savings 
program we refer to “a payment model in which participating providers share in savings against an 
overall expenditure target”.
Overall, the results of these programs are promising. Under the PGP Demonstration, all participants 
met at least 90% of all quality goals and shared savings payments amounted to 31,7 million US dollars 
in the fourth performance year38. Among participating group practices, there was a wide variation in 
expenditure savings however, and, when adjusted for pre-existing expenditure trends, savings were 
no longer statistically significant39. The first-year results of the MSSP also showed positive results in 
terms of expenditure savings and quality improvement40. Furthermore, for the initial cohorts, savings 
continue to grow each year (for the 2014 cohort, savings have not yet been significantly different from 
0)41.  
Both the AQC and the Pioneer program have been extensively studied in the literature. Song 
et al.42 used a difference-in-differences approach to analyze spending and quality trends under the 
AQC. Under such an approach, one compares the post-intervention change in spending and quality 
for the intervention group with that of the control group – the identifying assumption being that 
pre-intervention trends in both groups are similar43. Song et al. reported a post-intervention drop 
in quarterly spending growth of $62.21 (-6.8%) per enrollee and greater improvements in quality. 
McWilliams et al.44 reported significant first-year savings for ACOs participating under the Pioneer 
program (-1.2%). They also compared performance across groups of ACOs and found that savings were 
higher for ACOs residing in high-spending areas and those whose mean spending was above average. 
Surprisingly, ACOs that were financially integrated with hospitals did not realize significantly more 
savings. Nyweide et al.45 also reported drops in expenditure growth rates for Pioneer ACOs, and found 
that this trend also continued in the second performance year. Both studies reported significant, but 
small improvements in quality.
Studies evaluating the impact of these shared savings programs reported that expenditure 
savings were driven by reductions in inpatient spending39, 44, 45, outpatient spending42, 44, the number of 
procedures, imaging services and tests42, 45. Reductions in spending were caused by both lower prices 
and volumes42. Regarding the former, under shared savings programs providers have an incentive to 
refer patients to less costly providers or less costly modalities of care. For example, providers may refer 
patients to community hospitals instead of teaching hospitals39, or substitute outpatient care in office 
settings for the hospital outpatient department44. Regarding volumes, an interesting pattern found 
in the evaluation of the Pioneer program, is the drop in all-cause 30-day readmission rate and the 
rise in the number of post discharge physician visits – suggesting that Pioneer ACOs are able to lower 
readmission rates by improving the quality of post-discharge care45. 
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As many different provider configurations are free to enroll in shared savings programs, an 
interesting question is which configuration or, more broadly, which kind of organization has generated 
the largest amount of savings thus far. As opposed to hospital-led ACOs, physician-led ACOs would 
face stronger incentives to cut back on hospital care, because hospital care would not be a revenue 
center to them 12. Yet, several hurdles have been identified that would place physician-led ACOs at a 
relative disadvantage, among which are, supposedly, the lack of managerial strength (e.g. the ability 
to organize themselves in larger groups and cooperate in an administrative and fiscal sense), and the 
financial resources to invest in information technology necessary for monitoring performance and 
identifying areas for improvement46. However, a recent survey of ACOs suggest that the majority of 
them is physician-led, with an additional 33% led jointly by physicians and hospitals47. Interestingly, in 
terms of care management and IT capabilities, these physician-led ACOs were performing equally well 
or even better than hospital-led ACOs. Also in terms of savings, physician-led ACOs outperform others. 
Independent physician groups – without financial ties to hospitals – have generated the largest savings 
in both the 2012 and 2013 cohorts of the MSSP48. Also in terms of the shared savings payments earned 
(note that this is different from actual savings), physician-led ACOs have outperformed others49. An 
evaluation of the Pioneer program, too, suggests that financial integration between hospitals and 
groups of physicians, is not a necessary requirement for achieving savings50.  
Although, on average, beneficiaries whose providers are enrolled in a shared savings program, 
witnessed a drop in expenditures, we know that there is variation in performance between participating 
ACOs49. As explained in the above, these differences in performance can be partly related to provider 
configuration, capabilities, etc. Apart from that, there is regional variation in performance51, and 
ACOs with higher baseline spending seem to outperform those with lower baseline spending41, 50. 
This indicates that, potentially, there are a lot of moderating factors at work, and suggests that for 
some subgroups of ACOs, realizing savings under prevailing shared savings models, might prove too 
ambitious. The underlying danger is that providers participating in these groups of ACOs, may or need 
to resort to other methods of realizing savings, such that they can recoup their investments (which 
could be substantial52). One option mentioned in the literature, is risk selection53, 54, which we define 
as a provider’s actions to change the composition of its population ex ante, with the intent to increase 
its relative standing against the benchmark ex post. In theory, risk selection poses a threat to the 
financial sustainability of shared savings programs, because, essentially, shared savings payments are 
no longer tied to true savings efforts. In order to lower the threat of risk selection, proposed changes 
to prevailing shared savings models receive wide scrutiny, and are often judged in terms of ‘type-2 
errors’: the probability that true savings efforts go unrewarded. This can happen when additional 
requirements need to be met in order for providers to actually receive a share of the savings they 
generated (e.g. providing data on a large number of quality indicators, savings thresholds, etc.), when 
methods of assigning patients to providers result in only a small overlap between assigned and treated 
patients 55, or when spending benchmarks are too challenging (essentially when little attention is paid 
to contextual factors, or when risk adjustment is virtually absent53). Recently, the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, proposed to transition the expenditure benchmarks of the Medicare Shared 
Savings program from provider’s own three-year historical expenditure average to a risk-adjusted 
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regional average56. This sparked debate about finding the right pace for implementing such a change, 
given that it could have large financial consequences for high-spending ACOs, and could, supposedly, 
cause them to terminate their participation in the program or avoid high-risk patients (risk selection). 
While the possibility of risk selection under a shared savings program has important consequences, it’s 
viability in practice has not been quantified yet. This is a topic that we address in this thesis. 
Shared savings programs for Patient-Centered Medical Homes
The programs described briefly in the previous section were targeted at large physician group 
practices (PGP Demonstration), networks or group practice arrangements of “Accountable Care 
Organization (ACO)” professionalsD (MSSP), large multispecialty group practices, independent practice 
associations and physician-hospital joint ventures (AQC)16. Assuming accountability for overall 
spending likely requires a strong system of primary care, modeled after the so-called Patient-Centered 
Medical Home (PCMH)57, 58. Table 2 includes key elements of the PCMH. Recent evaluations of PCMH 
demonstration projects59, 60 suggest that these models indeed can be successful in lowering cost 
trends and improving quality, and, as such, may contribute to providers’ saving potential under shared 
savings programs.
However, in a series of articles Bruce Landon and colleagues voiced concerns over the current 
approach to paying PCMHs57, 61. Current fee-for-service payment models may fall short in providing the 
additional resources necessary for organizing enhanced primary care. Also, the incentives that follow 
from such payment models may not be aligned with the core elements of the PCMH as in table2. For 
example, coordinating care beyond the PCMH is not explicitly rewarded in a system where physicians 
only receive fees for the services they provide themselves – in such a system, coordination is not a 
“profit center12”. To the extent that a lack of coordination causes duplication of services, the incentives 
following from fee-for-service payment may actually run counter to coordinating health care across 
the spectrum62.  
Edwards et al. (p. 1413) 57 wrote that “without meaningful payment reform that supports core 
primary care principles, primary care practices within [providers participating under shared savings 
programs] will continue to struggle to transform into [patient-centered] medical homes”. In order to 
improve the sustainability of the PCMH – also as a promising model of organizing enhanced primary 
care when assuming accountability for overall expenditures – Landon suggested to incorporate 
shared savings programs directly into PCMHs61. In this way, PCMHs can reinvest savings in support of 
enhanced primary care. Furthermore, the prospect of receiving savings in overall expenditures creates 
incentives to deliver this type of care61.  
For the Netherlands, a parallel can be drawn. Dutch general practitioners (GPs) – some of whom 
are working in a PCMH-like organization called ‘Gezondheidscentrum (in Dutch)’ – fulfill a central and 
D ACO professionals, as defined by § 425.10 of the final rule of the Medicare Shared Savings Program, constitute, 
among others: physician (assistants), nurse practitioners and clinical nurse specialists. Allowed provider configura-
tions are described in § 425.204 of the final rule.
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coordinating role in the health care system 63, yet, only a few value-based incentives follow from the 
GP payment system – which is a blend of capitation fees and fee-for-service payments. Dutch GPs 
are gatekeepers to specialist services, coordinate the provision of chronic care services, and are able 
to substitute some hospital services with primary care. As such, they can play an important role in 
addressing waste – not only in terms of the care they provide themselves (e.g. prescription drugs) but 
also in terms of care provided by others. This implies that when value-based incentives are lacking at 
the GP level, this may have important consequences for value delivered in other parts of the health 
care spectrum. Here too, shared savings payments derived from cutting down on waste elsewhere 
in the spectrum of care, can provide additional incentives for GPs to take on their coordinating role. 
In the first part of this thesis, we therefore investigate whether adding a shared savings model 
to the GP’s current payment system, is a viable strategy for increasing value in health care. In Chapter 
2 we design a shared savings model, and describe the features of a pilot project within which it was 
tested. In Chapter 3 we investigate a concern related to implementing shared savings models, namely 
that it encourages providers to engage in patient risk selection as a strategy to secure shared savings 
payments. In Chapter 4 we report on the first-year results of the shared savings pilot.
Joint Principles of the Patient-Centered Medical Home
Personal physician
Each patient has a personal physician who is a patient’s first point 
of contact and who provides continuous and comprehensive care
Physician directed medical practice
The personal physician leads a (multidisciplinary) team of care 
providers, who collectively take responsibility for the ongoing 
care of patients
Whole person orientation
The personal physician is responsible for providing for all 
the patient’s health care needs or taking responsibility for 
appropriately arranging care with other qualified professionals
Care is coordinated and/or integrated
The personal physician coordinates or integrates care across all 
elements of the complex health care system
Quality and safety
Quality and safety are hallmarks of the patient-centered medical 
home
Enhanced access
Enhanced access to care is available through systems such as 
open scheduling and expanded office hours
Payment
A payment structure reflecting the added value of a patient-
centered medical home
Table 2: Joint principles of the Patient-Centered Medical Home55
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Demand-side incentives for lowering wasteful spending: patient co-
payments and how their design influences medical decision-making
Moral hazard
Apart from the misalignment of financial incentives, an important source of waste in health 
care systems is moral hazard by insurance enrollees64. Within this context, moral hazard refers to 
the increase in health care consumption that is due to insurance coverage. This moral hazard can be 
explained by the fact that health insurance, in its most basic form, only consists of a monthly, fixed 
premium, which in turn implies that actual health care consumption becomes free at the margin. 
Health insurance thus lowers the effective price of care – to a price of ‘zero’ in its most basic form 
– and we expect that this drop in price increases demand beyond what it would have been, had the 
insurance enrollee been liable for the full cost of treatment. A large body of empirical research has 
documented this price elasticity of demand. For example, in the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment 
– a randomized, controlled trial in which the Medicaid insurance plan increased its expansion by 
lottery draws – insurance coverage was related to significant increases in health care65. 
Even though one might be tempted to relate this surge in demand to waste – after all, people 
apparently do not consume these services at their actual price, suggesting that the value of these 
services to them is lower than the costs of producing these services – this is ambiguous. According to 
Nyman66 moral hazard would only classify as being inefficient, in case patients receiving a prospective 
budget covering the expected cost of care, would consume less than those receiving a retrospective 
reimbursement equal to the actual costs of care.
Patient cost-sharing as a response to moral hazard
In general, the policy response to inefficient, wasteful, moral hazard, has been to complement 
basic health insurance with forms of patient cost-sharing, such that patients pay at least a part of their 
total health care expenditures themselves. As such, this increases the effective price of care, and, 
given the price elasticity of demand, people would consume less. Patients’ responses to these cost-
sharing schemes are the focus of the second part of this thesis.
Patient cost sharing can come in many forms. A deductible is a monetary amount insurance 
enrollees have to spend on health care first, before the health insurer starts covering their expenses. 
Under a no-claim rebate instead, a health insurer covers one’s expenses right away, but coverage will 
initially come at the expense of a yearend refund of the enrollee’s insurance premium. Under a co-
payment rate, a patient pays a portion of the bill, until the sum of (annual) co-payments has reached 
a specific limit. An insurance plan can be an amalgamate of different types of cost-sharing. An often 
studied insurance plan is the US Medicare part D plan, which covers prescription drug expenditures 
for those aged 65 and up. This plan includes multiple deductibles and co-payment rates (the second 
deductible is called a ‘donut hole’, under which an insurance enrollee essentially loses coverage in the 
expenditure range of $2510 - $5726)67 .  
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Effect of patient cost-sharing schemes on health care spending
Evaluations of patient cost-sharing schemes generally found that they limit health care spending. 
An influential study in this respect is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, initiated by the US 
federal government in 197468. This was a randomized experiment in which participating families were 
randomly assigned to different insurance plans. These plans differed from each other in terms of 
the co-insurance rate and the limit on out-of-pocket expenditures. The authors found elasticities of 
demand within the range of -0.20, suggesting that patient cost sharing lowers medical expenditures. 
Brot-Goldberg et al. 69 measure employee responsiveness to the introduction of a high-deductible 
plan, replacing the free health care plan within a particular firm, and found a spending reduction of 
about 13%. Shigeoka70 uses a regression discontinuity design to study the sharp reduction in cost-
sharing for Japanese men that turn 70. These men experience a drop in cost sharing of 60 to 80 
percent, compared with their 69-year old counterparts. The regression discontinuity design allows 
studying the differences in medical spending between those just over and under 70 years of age. At 
70 years of age, a jump in expenditures is observed corresponding to an elasticity of around -0.20 for 
both inpatient and outpatient services. ECORYS71 study Dutch cost-sharing policy, under which the 
deductible only applies to those who turn 18. Using a difference-in-difference design, they compare 
the two-year trend of expenditures between 17 year olds (who turn 18 in the second year), with those 
of 14-16 year olds. They found that in the absence of the deductible scheme, health care expenditures 
would have been 2.6 to 7.3 percentage point higher. Gerfin et al.72 use a regression discontinuity 
design to study the change in demand for health care around the start of a calendar year, when the 
deductible resets to its full amount. They found that individuals with a high deductible respond most 
strongly to this change, with an estimated drop in demand of 27%. 
The behavioral underpinnings of patient responses to cost-sharing schemes
Only recently, the empirical literature on patient cost-sharing schemes started to focus on 
what one could call the ‘behavioral underpinnings’ of a patient’s response to a cost-sharing scheme. 
These behavioral parameters are expected to play an important role in decisions to undergo medical 
treatment, because in complex environments, people tend to deviate away from the economics of 
rationality73. Uncovering these fundamental behavioral parameters allows us to abstract from current 
cost-sharing schemes, and simulate responses under fictional cost-sharing schemes. 
One illuminating example of research on this topic recognizes that it is not so clear what is meant 
by the ‘price of care’ when people are under a cost-sharing scheme, and goes on by asking to which 
‘price’ people respond74. The reason why it is unclear to which price people respond, is caused by the 
fact that cost-sharing schemes are often non-linear in nature. For example, under a deductible, the 
non-linearity in prices is implied by the fact that the first unit of care is covered by the deductible – 
hence the price of the marginal unit of care is 1 – whereas prices revert to 0 as soon as somebody 
has hit the deductible. And in that case, health care becomes free at the margin. This non-linearity in 
prices means that patients face different prices when having to make a decision on whether or not 
to consume care. The first price is the current price (or ‘spot price’), which, under a deductible, is the 
minimum of the remaining deductible and the costs of treatment. The second price is the end-of-year 
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price (or ‘future price’), which is the (expected) price of the last unit of care74. This end-of-year price 
is 0 when the patient will have hit the deductible by the end of the year. To a fully rational patient, 
the only relevant price is the end-of-year price75. For example, a fully rational patient who expects to 
undergo surgery in the middle of the year – causing her to hit the deductible anyway – will no longer 
be influenced by the high current price on January 1. For policy makers, knowing to which price(s) 
patients respond when under a cost sharing arrangement, is an important input for designing optimal 
cost-sharing schemes. For long, it has been common practice to quantify utilization responses against 
a single price, such as a change in the level of a deductible. However, recent empirical research rejects 
the idea of people responding to a single spot price only. For example, Aron-Dine et al.74 compared 
the health care utilization of patients who enter a deductible plan at different times in the year. They 
exploited the fact that, in the insurance contracts they studied, the deductible level is not tailored to 
join month (as it is in, for example, the Netherlands). As such, people that enroll later in the year face 
a similar spot price, yet their end-of-year price is higher because they face a lower probability of hitting 
the deductible. If people would only respond to the spot prices, one would not observe spending 
differences between people with different join months (correcting for e.g. seasonality in health care 
expenditures), yet, the authors found that joining a plan later in the year is indeed related to lower 
initial health care utilization. In a more direct specification, the authors found a significant, negative, 
relationship between the expected end-of-year price and initial health care utilization (both spending 
and the probability of having a claim).
The framing of patient cost-sharing schemes
In a concurrent project “Patient Cost Sharing and Medical Care Use” (joint work with Tobias Klein 
and Martin Salm), we build further upon this research. In this thesis, we report on our attempt to 
unravel a different fundamental parameter of choice behavior: the extent to which insured are loss-
averse. The presence of loss-aversion has implications for the design of patient cost-sharing schemes. 
It implies that insured respond more strongly to incentives framed as a loss than those framed as 
a forgone gain (assuming that their point of reference when evaluating the two, is their financial 
situation after having paid their monthly premium). Drawing a parallel with common cost-sharing 
schemes, this suggests that insured would respond more strongly to cost-sharing schemes that are 
framed as a deductible, rather than to a no-claim rebate – even when they might be actuarially similar 
(i.e. when the increase in total monthly premiums needed to finance the no-claim rebate, equals the 
deductible level). 
Loss-aversion is a central tenet in Prospect Theory76. Prospect Theory aims to explain why people, 
when confronted with decision problems, tend to deviate away from the rationality assumed by 
the hitherto dominant theory in decision-making, which was the expected utility model76. Decision 
problems, in which people have to choose among different prospects, can be framed in numerous, 
but otherwise similar, ways. Rationality implies that people’s preference should not change with the 
way a decision problem is framed. Yet, a large literature suggests that they actually are. For example, 
in their own lab experiments, Kahneman and Tversky76 asked students to choose among two policy 
options in case of an outbreak of a nation-wide disease. Each option contained one or more outcomes 
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and associated probabilities (e.g. option A will save 50% of the people for sure; under option B there is 
a 50% probability that everybody will be saved, but also a 50% probability that nobody will be saved.) 
In terms of expected outcome, these options were similar, yet a disproportionate number of students 
tended to favor the sure option (a pattern consistent with risk-aversion). Strikingly however, their 
preferences reversed when the options were framed in terms of how many lives were lost instead of 
saved (and students thus became risk-takers instead). Loss-aversion, as part of the Prospect Theory, 
can be an explanation for the irrational patterns we often observe. Camerer77 related a number of 
real-world irrational phenomena to Prospect Theory, including the high equity premium observed in 
financial markets, and the increased tendency of investors to dispose of stocks that are increasing in 
value, relative to those whose value is decreasing.
To be complete, there are two other cognitive traits besides loss-aversion, which, taken together 
form the heart of Prospect Theory78. The first is that people evaluate prospects against a neutral 
reference point (the status quo), and the second is that the value function of the prospects is concave 
for gains, and convex for losses. This latter trait implies that, when confronted with a loss, people tend 
to display risk-taking behavior, but become risk-averse when confronted with a forgone gain. 
Prospect Theory has also been used to predict patient behavior under different cost-sharing 
schemes. Johnson et al.79  compared the deductible and the no-claim rebate. They assumed that 
patients use the situation after having paid the premium as their point of reference, and, when 
deciding on whether or not to consume health care services, would consider the implied lower 
no-claim rebate as a forgone gain, and the implied deductible payment as a loss. Since people are 
predicted to respond stronger to losses than to gains of equal size, Johnson et al.’s79 line of reasoning 
would imply that health care spending would be lower under a deductible regime than under a no-
claim rebate. We formally tested these responses for a general population, by interacting people’s 
response to the current marginal price of care, with the type of cost-sharing regime they are under 
(the marginal price of care is 1 in case the patient has not yet exceeded the deductible or has hit 
the no-claim rebate, and 0 otherwise).  We exploited the fact that, in the Netherlands, both systems 
have been operative, albeit at different times. In a recent paper, Remmerswaal et al.80 found that for 
a subsample of those between 15 and 21 year-olds, those that turn 18 (and incur a deductible from 
then on), spent less compared to similar individuals who have been under a no-claim rebate (both 
policies apply only to people of and above 18 years of age). They discussed alternative explanations 
for this result – including Prospect Theory – but concluded that they are likely the result of liquidity 
constraints, which are more pronounced under a deductible. In our paper, we performed additional 
analyses that – taken together – allow us to interpret our results within the realms of Prospect Theory. 
We were also able to use data on a general population.
The presence of a framing effect, in the entire population or in parts of it, can have important 
implications for policy. Depending on the overall goals of the health care system, stronger or weaker 
responses to patient cost-sharing schemes may be desired. For example, if patient cost-sharing 
schemes are merely implemented to make people more aware of the costs or to increase solidarity 
with the healthy in a system in which premiums are community-rated, a weak response may be 
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preferred over a stronger one. 
Research aims
In part A, we developed a shared savings program and implemented this program within the 
current payment system of a Dutch chain of PCMHs (henceforth denoted as the “MENZIS shared 
savings program”). This was a two-year pilot. We discussed and motivated the design of the model 
and presented first-year results, which include the model’s impact on health care expenditures, quality 
and accessibility. The following two research aims can be formulated:
1. To design a shared savings program for Dutch PCMHs that incentivizes value-based care, by 
identifying and rewarding savings efforts in overall health care expenditures, with accuracy 
and statistical confidence;
2. To model and estimate changes in health care expenditures and quality in the first year 
of operating under the shared savings program, and to interpret these results in terms of 
patient value.
In part B, we studied patient responses to otherwise similar patient cost-sharing schemes, that 
differ in terms of their framing. More specifically, we tested for differences in patient responses to spot 
prices framed as a loss (as under a deductible) as opposed to spot prices framed as a forgone gain (as 
under a no-claim rebate). The following two research aims can be formulated:
1. To model and estimate patient responses to deductibles and no-claim rebates;
2. To investigate whether differences in patient responses to deductibles and no-claim rebates 
can be attributed to the implied differences in the framing of both incentives;
3. To investigate whether framing effects in patient cost-sharing incentives, if any, are more 
pronounced for particular subgroups in society.
Outline
Part A - In chapter 2, we provided a detailed description of the MENZIS shared savings program, 
while relating to the theoretical literature on incentive design. We also gave a detailed description of 
statistical methods one can use to obtain the parameters of expenditure benchmarks, and performed 
a ‘test run’ of the shared savings model, using pre-intervention data. In this chapter, we also described 
the underlying program and its implementation, the partners involved, and the project and support 
structures. In chapter 3, we discussed the concept of risk selection in shared savings programs and 
simulated several scenarios of risk selection in order to assess its viability as an alternative strategy for 
high spending providers to secure shared savings payments. In chapter 4, we reported on the first-year 
results of the MENZIS shared savings program.
   
 Part B - In chapter 5 (part B), we studied patient cost-sharing incentives. We tested for a response 
to the spot price of care, and whether this effect differs between patient cost-sharing schemes that are 
framed differently. In chapter 6 we discussed the main findings of the thesis and include an agenda for 
future research. Chapters 7 and 8 are summaries in English and Dutch respectively.
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Having a strong primary care setting contributes to the functioning of the health care system 81. 
Therefore, strengthening the primary care setting is a widely observed policy response to conditions 
that threaten the sustainability of a health care system. For example, several countries have introduced 
a gatekeeping system in order to manage the increased demand for specialist services 82, letting 
primary care physicians control access to secondary care providers.
To date, even countries that are considered to have a relatively strong primary care setting 
(like the UK and the Netherlands) 81, are looking for ways to address the needs of an ageing and frail 
population, in which the number of patients with co-morbid conditions rises83, 84. Government policies 
have geared towards fostering a whole-patient approach to primary care, meaning that patients are 
assigned a personal primary care physician who coordinates care across the continuum and substitutes 
for specialist care when appropriate85-87. 
However, current modes of paying primary care physicians (capitation, fee-for-service, salary)88 
may not be aligned well enough with these policy goals. These payment models neither provide the 
additional resources necessary for maintaining a whole-patient perspective, nor do they incentivize 
primary care physicians to act upon their role of managing costs and quality across the continuum of 
care 61. They may even run counter to these goals61, 89. Although financial micro-incentives (like pay-for-
performance) may be used to attain better costs and quality results, a recent survey by the Nuffield 
Trust suggested that these incentives tend not to stimulate change across the entire continuum of 
services but rather in narrow clinical areas90. Health care professionals proposed to develop risk-sharing 
arrangements that cover a wide(r) range of services, instead. Also from a theoretical perspective, 
introducing some form of risk-sharing in which the insurer shares the risk of achieving high costs 
or suboptimal value with providers, may help to align interests in a setting where interests tend to 
diverge27.
 Currently a variety of these arrangements are developed and piloted, including shared savings, 
bundled payment and global payment models14, 91. With over 400 participating provider groups and 8 
million covered beneficiaries92, the US Medicare Shared Savings Program receives wide scrutiny. Under 
a shared savings program payers hold providers accountable for the overall costs and quality of care 
for a predefined population of patients 93. Accountability goes beyond reporting about performance 
to actually share in savings in overall health care expenditures, once quality targets have been met. 
Providers can reinvest these savings in support of a whole-patient perspective. Furthermore, the 
prospect of receiving savings in overall expenditures incentivizes to actually deliver the enhanced 
primary care as envisioned by policy makers. Landon et al. argue that the financial incentives that 
E  Hayen, A. P., van den Berg, M. J., Meijboom, B. R., Struijs, J. N., & Westert, G. P. (2015). Incorporating shared 
savings programs into primary care: from theory to practice. BMC health services research, 15(1), 580
F  Hayen, A. P., van den Berg, M. J., Meijboom, B. R., Struijs, J. N., & Westert, G. P. Incorporating shared savings 
programs into primary care: from theory to practice - update. Preparing for submission to BMC Research Notes.
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follow from a shared savings program suit the needs of a strengthened primary care setting, and they 
urge to incorporate shared savings programs directly into enhanced primary care initiatives57, 61. 
In the Netherlands, Menzis, a large Dutch health insurer, started a pilot with a shared savings 
program for a group of primary care providers (primary care providers are hereafter referred to as 
“(pilot) providers”). This shared saving program included a one-sided payment model, which means 
that providers only share in savings and not in losses. The program was incorporated in the existing 
payment model, which is a mix of quarterly capitation fees and fee-for-service. The primary aim of 
this pilot is to lower spending growth without compromising on the quality of care. The approach is 
to reorient providers towards value-based care, or to otherwise provide financial support for such an 
orientation, by introducing the prospect of sharing in expenditure savings, conditional on achieving 
quality targets. 
In this chapter, we report on this pilot – in which we assisted. We describe a structured approach 
to designing shared savings programs for primary care, discuss pros and cons of alternative design 
choices, report on our experience in weighing alternative design choices in reaching a final decision, 
perform a test run, and discuss opportunities and challenges of operating a shared savings program 
within a managed competition. 
Shared savings programs
We distilled the designs of earlier shared savings models16, 94-98 into five overarching building 
blocks of shared savings models, which we use here to ease exposition (Figure 1): the definition of the 
scope of the program, the calculation of provider expenditures, construction of the benchmark against 
which expenditures are assessed, assessment of savings and the rules and conditions for sharing 
savings. We first provide a background to the building blocks in which we briefly outline the choices 
to be made. In the remaining sections we describe the pilot program, its shared savings program (in 
terms of the building blocks) and implementation. 
Figure 1: The five building blocks of the shared savings program and their elemen
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Risk-sharing under a shared savings program
Under a shared savings program, insurers share part of the risk of increasing expenditures with 
care providers. For instance, care providers who start investing in their infrastructure in order to 
generate savings, lose income when the shared savings payments are not enough to cover expenses. 
Assuming risk-aversion on the side of the primary care physicians, uncertainty surrounding the 
outcome (expenditure savings as determined by the model) is an important driver of behavior. In 
theory, uncertainty drives investment behavior (choosing low-risk, but low-return investments over 
high-risk high-return investments)99, but will also drive up the level of compensation in exchange 
for which the provider is willing to take on this risk27. From this, it follows that risk and uncertainty 
are important drivers of the program’s efficiency, and that they should be taken into account in the 
program design.
Building block 1: Definition of the scope of the program
A first step in designing a shared savings program is to decide on which patients and which health 
care services to include. These two together define the scope of the shared savings program. Providers 
only assume accountability for the patients and services under the scope of the program, and only 
savings made within the scope of the shared savings program count towards shared savings payments.
Patient population
A common way of defining the patient population is by assigning patients to providers based 
on some measure of health care usage. The general idea is that providers are held accountable for 
the overall costs and quality results of patients that have received care from them. One can choose 
between either prospective (based on a patient’s use of services in the prior year) or retrospective 
assignment of patients (based on a patient’s use of services in the performance year)55, and adopt 
a majority or plurality rule for assigning patients to providers. For example, in the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program, patients are assigned retrospectively to providers based on where they have received 
the plurality of primary care services in that year. 
 Methods of assigning patients to providers have elicited strong debate within US accountable 
care programs, as concerns were raised about the extent to which prevailing methods yield an accurate 
reflection of a provider’s patient population55. Under prospective assignment, some patients may 
actually not visit the provider during the performance year for reasons unrelated to health (e.g. when 
they move out of the area). Under retrospective assignment, not all patients that visit the provider 
during the performance year may be assigned in the end. Under both methods of patient assignment 
a provider’s cost-saving intervention may not be fully recouped, because the intervention may either 
not reach the patient (as could happen under prospective assignment), or because some patients who 
receive the intervention – and experience a drop in health care expenditures accordingly – will not 
be assigned to the provider in the end. In case these patients are assigned to benchmark providers 
instead, the investing provider may actually be harmed by its own investment.  
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In general, shared savings programs are targeted at a full set of services, which differs between 
programs depending on the payer involved and the line of business covered94. For example, the 
Medicare Demonstration Programs and its recent (Medicare) Shared Savings Program include the full 
set of services furnished under Medicare Parts A and B. The Alternative Quality Contract, launched 
by Blue Cross Blue Shield Massachusetts, includes all medical services Blue Cross pays for.
Building block 2: Calculation of provider expenditures
Provider expenditures are defined as the sum of claims payments made within the scope of 
the program, including co-payments. Provider expenditures are commonly expressed as average 
expenditures per year of insurance, which is obtained by annualizing patients’ health care expenditures 
and calculating a weighted average using patients’ length of enrollment as weights95, 100. Annualizing 
health care expenditures is typically done by simply dividing a patient’s health care expenditures over 
the fraction of the year he was enrolled with the provider. Potential downsides of extrapolating health 
care expenditures in this way, is that one does not take into account the seasonality in health care 
spending (e.g. seasonal influenza 101), that disenrollment could be related to (expected) spending, 
and that the costs of newborns and deceased are likely to be overestimated, the magnitude of which 
depends on the timing of the event (e.g. for those born in December, one would multiply health 
care expenditures by 12, while it seems highly unlikely that the high costs of neonatal care are good 
estimates for the level of spending throughout the remainder of the year). 
 High costs patient can have a profound effect on a provider’s expenditure average. Inasmuch as 
these outliers are unequally distributed across providers, and given the fact that it is yet impossible 
to predict who will be in the right tail of the spending distribution102, high cost patients pose a great 
risk to participating providers: As the upper tail of the spending distribution typically accounts 
for more than half of health care spending103, even a slight imbalance in the number of outliers 
assigned to participating providers can mask or artificially drive up savings efforts, which would be 
an important source of uncertainty for care providers. One can limit the effects cost outliers have on 
provider expenditure averages by defining an expenditure threshold. In case a patient’s costs exceed 
this threshold, the part above the threshold does not count towards provider expenditures. In the 
Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration Program, expenditures were capped at $100,000. 
In later versions of the program, expenditures were capped at the 99th percentile of expenditures. 
For specific subgroups, such as for patients with end-stage renal disease, different expenditure caps 
were defined such that it created a similar “exposure above group mean expenditures” 95. The cap on 
expenditures is implemented by truncating annualized expenditures.
Building block 3: Construction of the benchmark
Benchmark population and trending factor
In order to determine whether a provider has realized expenditure savings at the end of the 
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performance year, its expenditures are evaluated against a benchmark. There are several approaches 
to designing a benchmark. One approach is to design the benchmark such that it can be interpreted 
as the counterfactual of what health care expenditures would have been had the shared savings 
program not been implemented. Savings are then defined with respect to historical performance, 
which is trended forward to the performance year by extrapolating the provider’s growth trend. Such 
an approach was used in the early years of the Alternative Quality Contract, where this number served 
as an input for Blue Cross in negotiating budgets with participating Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMOs) 94. Another approach is to design the benchmark such that additional incentives for inefficient 
providers follow from it. An extreme example of such an approach would be to make the entire 
benchmark context-independent, by setting it equal to a (case-mix corrected) national or regional 
expenditure average – as proposed by the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services in 201656. In 
this case, some providers will only outperform the benchmark when they address built-in inefficiency 
first. Such an approach does introduce a substantial amount of risk and uncertainty however, since 
there appears to be substantial variation in efficiency between providers, and provider populations 
can of course differ in dimensions not taken into account by today’s risk-adjustment models53. 
Commonly, programs adopt a blended approach. They do use a provider’s historical cost average, 
but then trend this number forward by a regional (PGP Demonstration) or national (Medicare Shared 
Savings Program, PGP Transition Demonstration) growth trend94. However, the extent to which this 
really provides additional incentives for efficiency depends on the extent to which spending levels 
and growth rates are (positively) correlated104. If not, a highly inefficient provider – as measured by his 
current level of spending – receives a growth rate that outweighs his own. In that case, earning shared 
savings payments does not require any action on his side.
Risk adjustment
Shared savings programs commonly adjust the benchmark’s base and trending factor for changes 
in case mix 96, 98, 105.  For those programs adopting a blended approach to designing the benchmark, 
the historical expenditures that make up the benchmark’s base may reflect a patient population with 
a case mix different from the provider’s current population. Similarly, the patients assigned to control 
providers – whose changes in expenditures make up the benchmark’s growth trend – may differ in 
terms of case mix from those assigned to a participating provider. 
  
  Absent a correction for case mix, the composition of a population may play a too large 
role in determining savings (as determined by the model). The case mix correction needs a careful 
design, however. First of all, direct standardization of the provider and benchmark population is not 
suitable for determining a provider’s expenditure savings. Direct standardization gives a provider 
X’s expenditures had he served the average population, and will therefore not give an indication 
of realized savings. Rather one wants to calculate the expenditures of an average provider, had he 
served provider X’s population. Savings are then calculated by subtracting this number from provider 
X’s realized expenditures. Second, one must decide on the variables to adjust for. An intuitive approach 
is to add all variables that meaningfully explain variation in individual health care expenditures. This 
improves the prediction of the counterfactual. The problem with this approach is that some of these 
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variables’ values can be influenced by care providers, e.g. health status. Rather than removing these 
variables from the risk adjustment model a third choice is to decide on the timing of risk adjustment. 
This could be either prospective (using information as known prior to the start of the performance 
year) or concurrent (using performance year information) 106. In case of prospective adjustment, 
health cannot be influenced during the performance year.
Building block 4: Assessment of savings 
Provider expenditures are evaluated against the benchmark. Random variation in the incidence 
or progression of illnesses causes random fluctuations in health care expenditures. Accordingly, 
providers may outperform the benchmark by chance alone but also run the risk that true cost-saving 
efforts go unrewarded107. A general insight from microeconomics is that this kind of randomness 
lowers the strength of the incentive 108.    
 Public programs commonly hedge against paying ‘undeserved’ savings94, by requiring that the 
difference between benchmark and provider expenditures passes a minimum threshold level. In the 
PGP Demonstration and the Medicare Shared Savings Program, statistical techniques are applied to 
determine the confidence intervals on which the savings thresholds are based.
Building block 5: Rules and conditions for sharing savings
Sharing rate and shared savings payment limit
A final set of decisions concerns the sharing of savings between payer and provider. Contracts 
typically include a sharing rate94, e.g. that savings will be split evenly between the payer and provider. 
Public programs like the Medicare Shared Savings Program and the PGP Demonstration added a 
shared savings payment limit, expressed as a percentage of benchmark spending. Like the savings 
threshold, the presence of either a sharing rate or performance payment limit serves as a hedge 
against making undeserved shared savings payments94. Other motivations for their presence include 
the payer’s ability to recoup the losses associated with excess spending98, and the more general insight 
from the pay-for-performance literature that the marginal utility from receiving additional income is 
diminishing109 (which is an efficiency argument). 
Quality
As a means to further stimulate value-based provision of health care, accountable care programs 
commonly make the net sharing rate dependent on the quality of care 16, 96, 98. The sharing rate and 
shared savings payment limit, together determine the amount of savings eligible for sharing; the 
quality of the care provided determines the amount of shared savings payments made. 
The design of this element requires a choice on the dimensions of quality that will be 
monitored, the operationalization of the quality indicators, scoring, and how these scores will be tied 
to shared savings payments.
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The MENZIS shared savings program
Structure of the pilot and project members
The pilot includes Menzis, a large Dutch health insurer, and a national chain of primary care 
providers called ‘Arts en Zorg’ (henceforth denoted as AEZ). The project is led by a steering group, 
consisting of AEZ’s general director, and the health insurer’s primary care purchasing manager. The 
steering group makes decisions on matters related to the project (by consensus) and directs the 
activities of the project team. The project team’s reports are used as an input for the discussion. This 
team includes representatives from the health insurer, the care providers involved and the academic 
research team (the authors). In carrying out their activities, the project group’s members form and 
chair subcommittees, comprised of employees from a wide variety of departments (depending on the 
matter at hand, e.g. quality, data management and communication). 
The pilot providers
For evaluation purposes, the decision was made not to include all of the chain’s providers, neither 
was a random selection of providers deemed appropriate. First, a provider’s population size must be 
large enough to ensure a satisfactory level of statistical reliability of the cost and quality results 105. 
Second, the provider must be capable of assuming the accountability implied by the pilot program. 
A provider was deemed capable when it is able to (1) routinely collect data on the quality of care, 
as needed for the calculation of the net sharing rate (building block 5), (2) analyze these and other 
data such that opportunities for improvement can be identified, (3) create a forum where these 
opportunities are discussed with its affiliated care providers, and where business plans are made and 
implemented. Based on these requirements, three providers were selected for the first wave of the 
pilot. Table 1 provides relevant characteristics of the three pilot providers.
Implementation
The pilot runs from July 2014 to July 2016. For each building block, the research team mapped 
the full set of decisions that could be made, as well as potential consequences of each choice on 
statistical reliability and risk. Each building block was discussed in detail with both the health insurer 
and providers during joint meetings, and their contents were adjusted until consensus was reached. 
The research team made a number of site visits to explain the model in detail and to present baseline 
data on health care expenditures and quality. At each site, providers were involved in the choice of 
investments in infrastructure. Performance with respect to these interventions is a recurring theme 
during provider meetings. Participating providers also report their results to the steering group, who 
monitors performance on a quarterly basis. In the next section, we describe the pilot’s shared savings 
program. We structure the description of the program by figure 1’s building blocks. Each building block 
starts with the final design choice, followed by a discussion and motivation.
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Provider 1 Provider 2 Provider 3
Dimension
Total number of patients 
(December 2014)
7178 7494 10568
Number of PCPs 5 3 4
PCP compensation Salary
Capitation fee, fee-for-






























CVRM, primary and 
secondary
Asthma
Table 1: Characteristics of the pilot providers
The Shared Savings Model
Building block 1: Definition of the scope
Patient population
Patients are assigned to a pilot provider only and as long as they (1) take up health insurance from 
the pilot insurer and (2) are registered with one of its primary care physicians (PCPs). Thus, in case a 
patient withdraws from the PCP list, the expenditures incurred for medical care received after the 
withdrawal date no longer count toward a provider’s expenditures under the shared savings program. 
Regarding (1), we use the health insurer’s administrative database to identify its insured and use its 
claims database to identify capitation payments, which proxy for the PCP list (2).   
 In the Netherlands, all citizens are registered with a PCP 110. Patients are entitled to (a 
reimbursement of) non-acute non-incidental PCP care only when they are registered with the 
providing PCP. It is therefore straightforward to use PCP lists as the basis for assignment, as it is not 
expected that patients who are registered with a PCP will receive (non-acute non-incidental) PCP care 
from another provider. Furthermore, Dutch citizens typically maintain a long relationship with their 
PCP, which makes it easier to manage the population and allows for reaping the long term benefits of 
improving patient management. A national study 111 found that 60% has a treatment relationship of 
over 10 years. Only 9% has a treatment relationship of less than 2 years. People also tend to be loyal 
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with their health insurer; annual switching rates are low (4-7%) and about 75% have not switched 
insurer since the 2006 health insurance reforms 112. Thus, a stable patient population can be assumed. 
Out of the three options, using the GP list as the basis for defining accountability, posed the least risk 
for participating providers.  
  In order to limit the bias due to annualizing health care expenditures, we excluded the 
newborns and deceased (ex post) from the program.
Services included
The scope of the program includes all medical services for which the health insurer provides 
coverage under both mandatory and supplementary health insurance packages – essentially its full line 
of business – except dental care services. Patient expenditures count towards provider expenditures 
up to an amount of €22.500 ($25.376).
  Including a large number of services into the shared savings program is congruent with the 
pivotal role Dutch PCPs play in the health care system. Dental care was excluded from the scope of the 
program because patients do not need a referral card to visit a dentist. Neither did the pilot providers 
collaborated with dentists such that accountability could be assumed. Including this type of care thus 
would have introduced risk that could not have been adequately managed.
  The cut-off point of €22.500 protects providers against high health care expenditures that 
can be ascribed to exceptional individual cases that are beyond the influence of providers. This is 
desirable: the possibility that random shocks in health and expenditures cause true savings to go 
unrewarded dilutes incentive strength 108. The cut-off point was determined jointly with the insurer 
and provider. In terms of its place in the cumulative distribution of health care costs, our threshold is 
close to the one used in other programs96. 
Building block 2: Calculation of provider expenditures
Provider expenditures include both insurer and deductible payments, and are expressed as the 
person per-annum expenditure average. We first annualize individual expenditures and implement 
the cut-off point, and then calculate a weighted average over all assigned patients, using assignment 
length as weight 20. Formally, annualizing expenditures E (yielding ‘AE’) of a patient i assigned to 
provider p in pilot year t is done by: 
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Building block 2: Calculation of provider expenditures 
Provider expenditures include both insurer and deductible payments, and are expressed as the 
person per-annum expenditure average. We first annualize individual expenditures and implement 
the cut-off point, and then calculate a weighted average over all assigned patients, using assignment 
length as weight 20. Formally, annualizing expenditures E (yielding ‘AE’) of a patient i assigned to pro-
vider p in pilot year t is done by:  
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Expenditure savings within the domain of a patient’s deductible do not accrue to the health in-
surer. We nevertheless chose to include deductible payments in the definition of provider expendi-
tures, as a patient’s deductible choice only seems partly related to health and expectations regarding 
health care consumption113. In that case, excluding deductible payments from the calculation of pro-
vider expenditures implies that otherwise similar efforts in lowering expenditures would be evaluat-
ed differently – depending on the average deductible level across patient populations, which de-
pends on factors unobserved to the research team. Similar to the choice for a cut-off point, leaving 
out deductible payments would have introduced additional risk that could not have been managed 
by the care providers. 
Building block 3: Construction of the benchmark 
Benchmark population and trending factor 
A provider’s expenditure savings are evaluated against a benchmark. The benchmark consists of 
two parts. The first part is the provider’s historical pre-pilot three-year weighted average of provider 
 
And the weighted per-annum expenditure average over all assigned persons is given by: 
Equation 2
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health care consumption113. In that case, excluding deductible payments from the calculation of pro-
vider expenditures implies that otherwise similar efforts in lowering expenditures would be evaluat-
ed differently – depending on the average deductible level across patient populations, which de-
pends on factors unobserved to the research team. Similar to the choice for a cut-off point, leaving 
out deductible payments would have introduced additional risk that could not have been managed 
by the care providers. 
Building block 3: Construction of the benchmark 
Benchmark population and trending factor 
A provider’s expenditure savings are evaluated against a benchmark. The benchmark consists of 
two parts. The first part is the provider’s historical pre-pilot three-year weighted average of provider 
Expenditure savings within the domain of a patie t’s deductible o not accrue to the health insurer. 
We nevertheless chose to include deductible payments in the definition of provider expenditures, as 
a patient’s deductible ch ice only eems partly related to health and expectations re arding health 
care consumption113. In that case, excluding deductible payments from the calculation of provider 
expenditures implies that otherwise similar efforts in lowering expenditures would be evaluated 
differently – depending on the average deductible level across patient populations, which depends 
on factors unobserved to the research team. Similar to the choice for a cut-off point, leaving out 
deductible payments would have introduced additional risk that could not have been managed by the 
care providers.
Building block 3: Construction of the benchmark
Benchmark population and trending factor
A provider’s expenditure savings are evaluated against a benchmark. The benchmark consists of 
two parts. The first part is the provider’s historical pre-pilot three-year weighted average of provider 
expenditures WPAp , with larger weights attached to more recent years (0.1; 0.3; 0.6 respectively)
96. 
We refer to this part as the ‘ba e’ of the benchma k, and we denote the thr e base years by ‘base year 
(BY) 1,2 and 3’ with base year 3 being the most recent year. This is the year prior to the start of the pilot 
(baseline; “0” in subscripts). The second part of the benchmark is the growth in provider expenditures 
from baseline to the performance year of interest 1 +gct , for a control group of randomly sampled 
non-participating providers (N=50) in the region surrounding the pilot area.
  Formally, the benchmark for a pilot provider p in pilot year y=t  is denoted by:
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[(Provider expenditures (c,t)- provider expenditures (c,0)]
[provider expenditures (c,0)]  
In the implementation section we describe how the elements of the benchmark are obtained. 
 The historical expenditures that together form the base of the benchmark create a ‘starting 
position’ that should lie within reach for pilot providers. Additional incentives for cost containment 
for inefficient providers follow from making the growth rate context-independent. Research on goal 
setting theory suggests that performance increases in goal difficulty, up to the point where the diffi-
culty of the goal lies outside one’s ability 114. Following this research, it is expected that a combina-
tion of both approaches yields better performance (especially for low performers) than when the 
benchmark is shaped according to one approach only: outperforming the counterfactual might prove 
too easy, whereas a benchmark that does not take into account the particularities of the respective 
provider (e.g. its population), may not be within the provider’s reach. 
Risk adjustment 
The expenditures of base year 1,2 and 3 are expressed in terms of the provider’s case mix in the 
performance year. By doing so, these numbers reflect what historical expenditures would have been 
had the patient population been similar to the population in the performance year. Similarly, the 
growth trend is adjusted for case mix differences between control providers and the pilot provider, 
In which
Equation 4
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In the implementation s ction we describe how the elements of the benchmark are obtained.
The historical exp nditures at together form the ba e of the benchmark create a ‘starting 
position’ that should lie within reach for pilot providers. Additional incentives for cost containment 
for inefficient providers follow from making the growth rate context-independent. Research on goal 
setting theory suggests that performance increases in goal difficulty, up to the point where the difficulty 
of the goal lies outside one’s ability 114. Following this research, it is expected that a combination of 
both approaches yi lds etter performa ce (e p cially for low performers) han whe  the benchmark 
i  shaped acc ding to one approach nly: outperforming the count rfactual might prove too easy, 
whereas a benchmark that does not take into account the particularities of the respective provider 
(e.g. its population), may not be within the provider’s reach.
Risk adjustment
The expenditures of base year 1,2 and 3 are expressed in terms of the provider’s case mix in 
the performance year. By doing so, these numbers reflect what historical expenditures would have 
been had the p tient population been similar to the population in the performance year. Similarly, the 
growth trend is adjusted for case mix differences between control providers and the pilot provider, 
such that it reflects what the growth in health care expenditures would have been, had the control 
group been serving a population similar to the one served by the pilot provider.
  We adjust the benchmark for case mix differences in insurance choice, demographics and 
(historical) health, as they have explained variation in health care expenditures between providers 
before 115. We adjust for differences in demographics and insurance choice on a concurrent base, and 
prospectively adjust for differences in health 96. Adjusting on a prospective base means that we set its 
value equal to its level upon assignment and hold it fixed for the assignment period. 
  Concurrently adjusting for health status implies that care providers could inflate their 
benchmarks by upcoding diagnoses 96. Furthermore, concurrent adjustment for health status lowers 
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the incentive to prevent illness, in particular those conditions that are well-compensated. As a means 
to enhance incentives for prevention and cure, and lower the incentives for upcoding, we therefore 
adjusted for health status on a prospective base and use concurrent risk-adjustment for all other 
variables.
Building block 4: Assessment of savings 
The level of provider savings is determined by evaluating provider expenditures against 
the benchmark. We use statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether any observed difference 
in provider and benchmark expenditures is large enough to rule out randomness with statistical 
confidence. Our approach is to treat the estimated benchmark as a given, and to assess whether the 
provider’s performance is significantly lower than the benchmark. Thus, we calculate the standard 
error of the provider’s average annual spending (abbreviated to ‘SEM’, which is the standard error of 
a weighted mean, because we weighed observations based on their assignment length). Using this 
standard error of the mean, we can test whether provider expenditures are significantly lower than 
the benchmark, using a one-tailed t-test at the 95% confidence level. 
Building block 5: Rules and conditions for sharing savings
Sharing rate and shared savings payment limit
The health insurer and pilot providers agreed on a sharing rate and a shared savings payment 
limit, which are not reported here for reasons of confidentiality. The payment limit is based on a 
percentage of provider revenue.  
Quality
For the first wave of the pilot, quality is assessed on four domains: patient satisfaction, chronic 
care, drug prescription behavior and practice management. These domains were determined jointly 
with the pilot insurer and providers, based on beliefs of providers’ current span of accountability, 
data availability and reliability. The resulting domains predominantly reflect health care services that 
are delivered or coordinated by the pilot providers themselves. Nevertheless, these domains may be 
changed in later waves to include more specialist services, should pilot providers start engaging in 
formal contractual arrangements with specialist providers. 
 Within each domain, quality indicators are formulated and scored on a 0-100% scale such that a 
0% score and a 100% score reflect ‘worst’ and ‘best’ possible performance respectively. Performance 
on these scales is measured in absolute terms. Performance scales are subdivided into gates 16, and in 
passing a gate a provider receives 3 performance points for absolute performance. Figure 2 visualizes 




Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 44
Chapter 2
44
Figure  2: Earning points for absolute performance 
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Provider has a score of 40%. It 
passes gate 1 only and receives 
only 3 points accordingly 
Provider has a score of 89%. It 
passes three gates and receives 3 
x 3 = 9 points accordingly 
On top of earning performance points, providers can also earn points for improving their 
performance relative to last year. This has a similar system (Figure 3):
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Providers earn 1 point for passing a gate (implying a 1:3 ratio for improvement and absolute 
performance 116). In case a provider’s performance has declined more than 5% over the performance 
year, it receives no points for performance improvement, and loses all its points earned for absolute 
performance.  This should serve as a penalty for providers who try to lower expenditures by lowering 
quality. As scores change from year to year depending on population characteristics, we chose not 
to impose this penalty for declines smaller than 5%. Ultimately, the percentage of savings shared 
depends on the provider’s overall quality score. The overall quality score is obtained by first summing 
performance and improvement points over all indicators, by domain, and dividing it over the maximum 
score (16 per indicator) to obtain a domain average. Second, these domain averages are summed and 
averaged to obtain an overall quality score. In case a provider scores 60%, it will receive 60% of the 
sharing rate of savings, which, in case of a 50% sharing rate, is 30% of overall savings. 
Eijkenaar 109 provides an overview of the contributions done in the area of the design of quality 
payment programs. The incentives following from the “quality payment program” in the shared 
savings program (i.e. the savings a provider receives are related to the quality of the care provided), 
are targeted at the group (provider) level rather than at the level of the individual physician. According 
to Eijkenaar 109, this is preferred in case improvement needs collective action, which we believe holds 
in our setting where a multitude of disciplines cooperates in the treatment of a wide range of patients, 
and where quality is measured on dimensions related to, among others, chronic care and patient 
satisfaction. Moreover, pilot providers indicated that they refer to colleagues when these are known 
to have particular expertise in the field (e.g. dermatology).  
The performance goals are absolute rather than relative, to foster collaboration and sharing best 
practices with one another 16 – the pilot providers operate in each other’s vicinity. We define multiple 
targets (i.e. gates) and reward for both absolute performance and improvement such that, in principle, 
low performers are also incentivized 109. In later waves of the pilot, the level of the lower and upper 
targets may be adjusted up or downwards depending on the state of affairs, similar to what was done 
in the Alternative Quality Contract (data to do so already were not available on a national scale when 
the program was designed).  
Structural support
Accountable care programs aim to incentivize providers to alter their behavior, in particular those 
behaviors associated with managing a patient population. Realizing savings may thus require changing 
complex and entrenched behaviors. Furthermore, the shared savings payments to pilot providers are 
determined over a full year of care provision and over a care continuum which extends well beyond 
the providers’ own setting. 
Systematic reviews of the effectiveness of pay-for-performance programs suggest that these 
programs are most effective at changing “simple, discrete and time-limited ” behaviors 117, which, 
by their nature, may not be the behaviors that lead to significant or enduring savings by the end of 
the performance year. When targeted at complex and entrenched behaviors, pay-for-performance 
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programs seem most effective when accompanied by supportive strategies 117. During the pilot, 
providers receive support in a number of respects. For example, it was recognized that providers have 
incomplete data on their patients’ health care use and costs. This holds in particular for care delivered 
within other segments (such as specialist care). The pilot providers indicated that this prevented 
them from obtaining an adequate picture of their population’s health care consumption, which was 
deemed an essential input for redesigning population management. Complementing these data with 
appropriate benchmarks gave hints for improvement. 
The pilot providers were asked to indicate their data needs. Generally, these data were available 
at the health insurer (e.g. most expensive specialisms, hospital treatments, laboratory tests at the 
population level, health care usage of the most expensive patients). Benchmark data on hospital 
care (e.g. number of treatments per specialism and types of treatment per specialism (inpatient, 
outpatient, same day admission/discharge)) were obtained from the Dutch National Atlas of Public 
Health 118. Other benchmark data will be provided upon receiving data of the population of patient 
assigned to providers in the control group. The data analysts of the insurer, the pilot providers and the 
academic team were involved to ensure correct interpretation of the information. This process will 
repeated throughout the pilot, should data needs change. 
Implementation and test run for 2012 
Fictional case 
In the remainder of this chapter, we implement the shared savings model for the hypothetical 
performance year 2012 and perform a test run of building blocks 1-4 (we did not have data on the 
quality of care for this period, so we omit building block 5 in this test run).  
 
Data
We use Menzis’s claims and enrollment data from 2006 to 2012. For each year, we limited our 
sample to those patients who were enrolled at either the participating providers of AEZ, or the control 
group providers (N=50). We define enrollment as being on the GP list, as explained earlier. Because 
GP lists were not available to us, we proxied for these lists using claims of the quarterly capitation fees 
that each GP is allowed to bill for each person enrolled at his practice. All patients for whom the GP 
bills a capitation fee, are believed to be on his list for that period. 
The claims data contained very detailed info at the claims level. Apart from the size of the claim, 
from which we can calculate annual expenditures, the claims data also contain info on the type of 
care purchased. This is very detailed. For specialist care, we observe a DRG-like code that contains 
info on the diagnosis and the type of treatment (e.g. outpatient or inpatient care). Using this info, 
we can recreate so-called ‘Diagnosis Cost Groups’ 119, which are indicative of somebody’s health and 
likelihood of having high spending in the coming year. For prescription drug spending, we observe the 
product code, the therapeutic class to which a drug belongs, and the exact quantity purchased. Using 
this info, we computed the total number of defined daily doses purchased, using additional data from 
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the KNMP. Using the ATC-codes and total number of defined daily doses, we can classify patients into 
so-called “Pharmacy Cost Groups”, which are indicative of the presence of chronic illnesses such as 
COPD, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and the like 120. 
The administrative data contain data on enrollment length (needed to annualize spending), date 
of birth and gender.
General approach to obtaining the benchmark’s parameters
Recall that the benchmark of the shared savings model is the weighted average of a provider’s 
historical medical spending, multiplied by the performance year growth rate of control group spending. 
Essentially the benchmark is compiled from the health care expenditures of five different groups: the 
provider’s patient populations in the three years preceding the first performance year (3 groups), and 
the control group’s patient populations at baseline and the first performance year to determine the 
growth rate (2 groups). Both the historical expenditure average and the growth rate are corrected 
for case mix. This implies that the expenditures of each population (which we henceforth denote 
as ‘control groups’ to ease reading) are rescaled in such a way that they resemble the expenditures 
that would have been made, had the population been similar in terms of case mix to the provider’s 
population in its first performance year (henceforth denoted as ‘intervention group’) 121.  
In adjusting for case mix, we prospectively adjust for differences in health. A complicating factor 
is that for several patients, historical data on health are not available. There are several reasons for 
this, the most obvious being that the patient was not enrolled with the health insurer at the time. 
We therefore need to impute missing values for health first, before we can correct for differences 
in case mix. We impute missing values using a MICE algorithm (Multiple Imputation using Chained 
Equation) 122, which we discuss at length in the next section. Under multiple imputation, one exploits 
statistical relationships that are already present in the data, and estimates missing values using those 
relationships. By doing this multiple times – thereby creating multiple datasets – and averaging over 
the obtained estimates, one can take into account at least part of the uncertainty surrounding the 
estimation process 123.  
After having imputed the missing values for case mix, we proceed with correcting expenditures in 
all control populations for case mix. We do so using a propensity score matching technique 124, which we 
discuss at length below. In brief, under propensity score matching we assign a single score to patients 
from both the intervention and control group, based on their case mix. We subsequently select patients 
from each control population based on their match with somebody from the intervention group, and, 
correspondingly, drop patients from the control group who cannot be matched to somebody from the 
intervention group. As such, we are left with five control groups that, in terms of case mix, correspond 
to the intervention group. A final step in obtaining the benchmark’s parameters is now to calculate the 
average expenditures for each control population – using assignment lengths as weights (note that 
our benchmark formula (3) is essentially a collection of provider expenditure averages, weighted for 
assignment length).
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A ‘Multiple imputation using chained equations’ (MICE) algorithm for unbalanced panel 
data 
Our (potential) case mix variables relate to a patient’s age, gender, historical expenditures and 
historical health (table 6). As for the latter, we classify patients into Pharmacy Cost Groups and Diagnosis 
Cost Groups that, respectively, are indicative of chronic drug use (e.g. COPD, diabetes, depression) or 
chronic hospital care use (e.g. cancer, kidney dialysis), and we do so for all three years preceding the 
year of study. That is, for the patients in our 2009 control group, we record their presence in both cost 
groups from 2006-2008; for the patients in our 2011 control group, we do so for 2008-2010, etc. This 
implies that for every patient, we need at least 4 consecutive years of data. In case data are missing for 
a particular year, we need to impute these missing data. 
Multiple imputation is most commonly used for cross-sectional data, in which data on a patient’s 
observed variable A are used to impute a value for missing variable B (using the statistical relationship 
between both variables as displayed by the complete records). In our case, we have unbalanced panel 
data, which adds an interesting dimension to the imputation process: apart from using the patient’s 
complete values in other variables, we can also involve historical or, perhaps, future observed values 
of the missing value in our estimation of missing values. For example, in case Pharmacy Cost Group 
data are missing for person X in 2009, we can use his values for 2006-2008 and 2010-2012 in imputing 
a value for 2009, by observing how patterns of chronic diseases generally unfold in the complete 
records. As current statistical packages are not yet programmed such that this time dimension can be 
exploited under a MICE-routine, we transposed the data such that it mimics a cross-sectional data set 
(90 degrees counter-clockwise rotation). Instead of having a separate observation for each patient-
year combination, transposing the data yields one observation per patient, and different sets of 
variables (columns) for each year instead. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 depict this process. Now, we can directly 
program the probability of being chronically ill in 2011, as a function of being chronically ill in 2009, 
2010 and 2012, and the other variables.
Before rotation





Table 2: Data structure before rotation
After rotation
Person Chronically ill 2009 Chronically ill 2010 Chronically ill 2011 Chronically ill 2012
1 No No MISSING Yes
Table 3: Data structure after rotation
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Having organized the data, a next step is to consider which multiple imputation method is most 
suitable to the pattern of missing data at hand. Patterns of missingness can be either monotone or non-
monotone 123. A monotone pattern of missingness means that there is an ordering of variables, such 
that if a person has a missing value for one variable, he will have missing values for all ‘subsequent’ 
variables. In case we have 5 variables and 3 observations, an example of monotone missingness would 
look like (O=observed; M=missing): 
Variable 1 (complete) 2 3
Observation
1 O O O
2 O O O
3 O O M
4 O M M
Table 4: Data structure under monotone missingness
A monotone pattern of missingness greatly simplifies the imputation process. One orders the 
variables in terms of missingness, starting with the variable that has the least number of missing 
observations (variable 2), and predicts missing values based on the observations’ values of the 
complete variable(s) (variable 1), and the statistical relationship between variable 1 and variable 2. 
This relationship is obtained from the complete records (in blue). One then proceeds with predicting 
the missing values for variable 3, using data on the statistical relationships between variables 1/2 
and 3 (obtained from the underscored observations) and observed or estimated observations of 
variable 2 (in red) 125. Our data however, display a pattern of non-monotone missingness: patients 
can be enrolled with the health insurer in year t, leave in t+1, and re-enroll in t+2, etc. (this is only 
one explanation of the non-monotone pattern of missingness in our data). Under a pattern of non-
monotone missingness, all predictions are themselves based on predictions. If we ignore this fact, we 
essentially treat these predictions as if they were true, ignoring prediction variability and also create 
a certain model dependence. An iterative process of estimation and imputation ultimately allows the 
model parameters to be fully dependent on the observed data again, which is what we want 126. 
We use the MICE-technique to impute missing values for our case. The associated algorithm is an 
iterative process (i = 0, 1 ,2….), outlined below 126:
Algorithm 1




(obtained from the underscored observations) and observed or estimated observations of variable 2 
(in red) 125. Our data however, display a pattern of non-monotone missingness: patients can be en-
rolled with the health insurer in year t, leave in t+1, and re-enroll in t+2, etc. (this is only one explana-
tion of the non-monotone pattern of missingness in our dat ). Under a patter  of n-monotone 
missingness, all predictions are themselves based on predictions. If we ignore this fact, we essentially 
treat these predictions as if they were true, ignoring prediction variability and also create a certain 
model dependence. An iterative process of estimation and imputation ultimately allows the model 
parameters to be fully dependent on the observed data again, which is what we want 126.  
We use the MICE-technique to impute missing values for our case. The associated algorithm is an 
















In the first iteration (i=0), missing values for variables X1, X2…Xp are filled in by random draws 
with replacement from the complete observations 126. The next iteration starts with predicting the 
missings for the most observed variable (X1) using data of all the other variables, which include all 
variables with missings (X2 to Xp) and complete variables Z (the dependent variable is also part of this 
set). Based on the input from these variables, and their modeled relationship (g1) with the imputed 
variable, model parameters ϕ1 are obtained, from which the prediction for X1 follows. The algorithm 
then proceeds with estimating the second-to-most observed variable X2, using a similar set of varia-
bles and the imputed values for X1 that were obtained in the previous step. The iterative process is 
repeated until convergence is reached, meaning here that we pick a number of iterations that ex-
ceeds the typical length of a trend in the imputed values of a variable (recall that we want to get rid 
of model dependence). Trends can be visually examined by plotting the mean of imputed values 
against iteration numbers 123.   
We proceed by discussing our approach to variable selection and model selection, respectively 
referring to the characters X and g in the above algorithm.  
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In the first iteration (i=0), missing values for variables X1, X2…Xp are filled in by random draws 
with replacement from the complete observations 126. The next iteration starts with predicting the 
missings for the most observed variable (X1) using data of all the other variables, which include all 
variables with missings (X2 to Xp) and complete variables Z (the dependent variable is also part of this 
set). Based on the input from these variables, and their modeled relationship (g1) with the imputed 
variable, model parameters 




(obtained from the underscored observations) and observed or estimated observations of variable 2 
(in red) 125. Our data however, display a pattern of non-monotone missingness: patients can be en-
rolled with the health insurer in year t, leave in t+1, and re-enroll in t+2, etc. (this is only one explana-
tion of the non-monotone pattern of missingness in our data). Under a pattern of non-monotone 
missingness, all predictions are themselves based on predictions. If we ignore this fact, we essentially 
treat these predictions as if they were true, ignoring prediction variability and also create a certain 
model dependence. An iterative process of estimation and imputation ultimately allows the model 
parameters to be fully dependent on the observed data again, which is what we want 126.  
We use the MICE-technique to impute missing values for our case. The associated algorithm is an 
















In the first iteration (i=0), missing values for variables X1, X2…Xp are filled in by random draws 
with replacement from the complete observations 126. The next iteration starts with predicting the 
missings for the most observed variable (X1) using data of all the other variables, which include all 
variables with missings (X2 to Xp) and complete variables Z (the dependent variable is also part of this 
set). Based on the input from these variables, and their modeled relationship (g1) with the imputed 
variable, model parameters ϕ1 are obtained, from which the prediction for X1 follows. The algorithm 
then proceeds with estimating the second-to-most observed variable X2, using a similar set of varia-
bles and the imputed values for X1 that were obtained in the previous step. The iterative process is 
repeated until convergence is reached, meaning here that we pick a number of iterations that ex-
ceeds the typical length of a trend in the imputed values of a variable (recall that we want to get rid 
of model dependence). Trends can be visually examined by plotting the mean of imputed values 
against iteration numbers 123.   
We proceed by discussing our approach to variable selection and model selection, respectively 
referring to the characters X and g in the above algorithm.  
 are obtained, from which the prediction for X1 follows. The algorithm 
then proceeds with estimating the second-to-most observed variable X2, using a similar set of variables 
and the imputed values for X1 that were obtained in the previous step. The iterative process is 
repeated until convergence is reached, meaning here that we pick a number of iterations that exceeds 
the typical length of a trend in the imputed values of a variable (recall that we want to get rid of 
model dependence). Trends can be visually examined by plotting the mean of imputed values against 
iteration numbers 123.  
We proceed by discussing our approach to variable selection and model selection, respectively 
referring to the characters X and g in the above algorithm. 
Model building for MICE: variable selection
An important assumption underlying multiple imputation, is that the data are either missing 
completely at random, or missing conditionally on observed covariates 123. In our case, there are three 
underlying reasons for missing data:
1. Switching from or switching to a different health insurer;
2. Switching from or switching to a GP out-of-sample;
3. Dying during the year, in which case we are unable to determine to which Pharmacy Cost 
Group somebody belongs (e.g. in terms of the to al number of claims, somebody who dies 
in the first week of the year, might not be identified as a chronic user of a particular group 
of medicine, with chronic meaning that he purchased more than 180 defined daily doses).
The assumption we need to make, is that the variables we have in our data, are strong correlates 
of missingness. Research has shown that, apart from moving to a different area, switching GP or 
health insurer is correlated with health 111, 127 . The same holds for the latter condition, in which case 
we can use historical values of health in order to impute health in the year of death 128. Apart from 
including historical health in our imputation models, we developed so-called ‘auxiliary variables’, 
which relate to a person’s pattern of missingness 123. An advantage of using these auxiliary variables, 
is that we ultimately group people with similar patterns of missingness together. For example, we 
impute a switcher’s health using, among others, the health of switchers in the subsequent year – 
whose historical data are available. Adding these variables to the model allows us to capture some of 
the particularities associated with switchers. We developed four groups of auxiliary variables: (1) an 
indicator variable for whether a person was alive during the year (0 in case somebody (already) died, 
or was not born yet); (2) an indicator variable for whether a person was in the data, irrespective of 
whether he was observed for a full year; (3) the observed values for the imputation variables, with 
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zero corresponding to – among others – missingness; (4) observed values for variables we did not need 
to impute (expenditures, supplemental coverage yes/no), with zero corresponding to missingness. In 
case somebody is no longer alive, or is estimated to be no longer alive, we impute logical values for the 
missing values (e.g. zeroes for the number of chronic diseases).  
Model building for MICE: K-neighbor Predictive Mean Matching 
 As shown in algorithm 1, MICE uses univariate imputation models for each variable with 
missing observations, and the prediction equation is, in principle, fully conditional (meaning that all 
variables are included in the equation). Nevertheless, in some cases we removed variables from the 
prediction equation, when they had a (near) perfect correlation with missingness. Including these 
variables would lead to an over prediction of dead or unborn people, since, for these groups, those 
variables are ‘missing’ by construction. Table 5 lists all imputation variables and specifications. 
Imputation variable Specification
Number of Pharmacy Cost 
Group classification (2006-
2011) 
Non-missing variables - auxiliary variables for particular year; imputed 
conditionally on being alive in particular year
Diagnosis Cost Group 
classification (2006-2011)
Non-missing variables - auxiliary variables for particular year; imputed 
conditionally on being alive in particular year
Had expenditures > €22.500 
(2008-2011)
Non-missing variables - auxiliary variables for particular year; imputed 
conditionally on being alive in particular year
Did not incur health care 
expenditures (2008-2011)
Non-missing variables - auxiliary variables for particular year; imputed 
conditionally on being alive in particular year
Was alive (2010-2012)
Non-missing variables - auxiliary variables for particular year and 
all future years – Intervention/Control Group indicators; imputed 
conditionally on being alive at t-1
Complete variables Age, sex, year-of-birth indicator, intervention/control group indicators, auxiliary variables (see text)
Table 5: Imputation variables and specification under the MICE algorithm
All variables have a restricted range (e.g. they are non-negative, or cannot exceed a certain 
amount – such as the number of chronic diseases). This has important modeling implications: ideally 
we want our imputed values to lie within this restricted range so that they are interpretable (more 
generally – having assumed that the data are missing at random – we want our imputed values of the 
missing data to follow a distribution similar to the observed values). To this aim, we use predictive 
mean matching (PMM) within our MICE framework 129, 130. PMM is an algorithm by itself, in which 
missing values are imputed using real values from within the observed sample. In brief, under 
PMM one draws a match from the ‘donor pool’ (filled with complete observations), which serves 
as an estimate for the missing value at hand. The match from the donor pool is found using a linear 
regression model of the missing variable as a function of all the other variables (recall that MICE relies 
on fully conditional specifications), from which linear predictions of the missing variable are obtained. 
Matches are made based on the distance in predictions. A typical approach is to adopt a k-nearest 
neighbor approach, in which for each person with a missing value, the k-nearest neighbors are found 
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131. These are the donors for whom the linear prediction is closest to the person for whom we need 
to impute the missing value. Out of this donor pool, a donor is picked at random. This random draw 
from a donor pool, rather than picking the nearest neighbor, adds random variation to the imputation 
process, which is needed to arrive at ‘proper imputations’ 132 (for a discussion on why exactly we need 
this random draw in the final step of the algorithm to accomplish this, whereas other methods of 
imputation do not need this final step, the interested reader is referred to Morris et al. (2014), page 5) 
In our model, we pick a random match out of the 10 nearest neighbors 131.
Running the imputation model and assessing convergence 
We performed 4 imputations 123. Because multiple imputation can be computationally intensive, 
we programmed the imputation process in a parallel fashion 133. This means that chains of iterations 
start simultaneously, rather than sequentially. To ensure that each chain yields different results, we 
let each chain start from a different seed, which we programmed as a function of the chain number. 
For all imputed variables, convergence was reached within 100 iterations. Figure 4 provides an 
example of a trace plot for the imputed number of Pharmacy Cost Group classification in 2009. The 
figure shows that, for the first imputed dataset, trends in the imputed values do not last longer than 
100 iterations. 
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Figure 5 shows the trace plot where we added the other 3 datasets (N=4). The trace plot shows 
that, for all datasets, convergence is reached within 100 iterations. Furthermore, the 4 separate chains 
mix well, implying that there seems no dependence on the starting value after 100 iterations. This too 
is an indicator of convergence 134.
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Full results are available upon request. 
Having obtained 4 multiply imputed datasets, we obtain estimates of all missing values by 
calculating the average of the obtained values over all 4 datasets 135. We use this estimate in our 
subsequent analyses. 
Correcting the benchmark for case mix using propensity score matching
Since we now have a complete dataset (without missing values), we can proceed with obtaining 
the benchmark’s parameters. Recall that the benchmark of the shared savings model consists of a 
weighted average of participating providers’ historical health care expenditures, multiplied by a 
regional growth rate in the performance year. Both parameters need to be adjusted for case mix: the 
historical health care expenditure average needs to be rescaled to today’s population; the regional 
growth rate needs to be rescaled to the participating provider’s population. Without case mix 
correction, the underlying populations are not comparable, and growth rates or historical averages will 
fail to act as benchmarks. Our approach to case mix correction is based on propensity score matching 
136-138. The ultimate goal of propensity score matching is to approximate a counterfactual, by rescaling 
the control groups such that they resemble the intervention group’s population in terms of means and 
standard deviations of the case mix variables. Essentially, this is done by matching each case from the 
intervention group, to one or more counterparts from a control group. The expenditure average of 
the rescaled control group can then be interpreted as the expenditures the control group would have 
incurred, had its composition been similar to the intervention group 121. 
 Matching is based on the so-called “propensity score”. The propensity score is a balancing 
score, i.e. based on all case mix covariates, as a function of belonging to the intervention group (yes/
no) 137. The propensity score is obtained from the predicted values of a so-called logit model, in which 
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the probability of belonging to the intervention group, conditionally on case mix, is modeled as 139.
Equation 5




Since we now have a complete dataset (without missing values), we can proceed with obtaining 
the benchmark’s parameters. Recall that the benchmark of the shared savings model consists of a 
weighted average of participating providers’ historical health care expenditures, multiplied by a re-
gional growth rate in the performance year. Both parameters need to be adjusted for case mix: the 
historical health care expenditure average needs to be rescaled to today’s population; the regional 
growth rate needs to be rescaled to the participating provider’s population. Without case mix correc-
tion, the underlying populations are not comparable, and growth rates or historical averages will fail 
to act as benchmarks. Our approach to case mix correction is based on propensity score matching 136-
138. The ultimate goal of propensity score matching is to approximate a counterfactual, by rescaling 
the control groups such that they resemble the intervention group’s population in terms of means 
and standard deviations of the case mix variables. Essentially, this is done by matching each case 
from the intervention group, to one or more counterparts from a control group. The expenditure 
average of the rescaled control group can then be interpreted as the expenditures the control group 
would have incurred, had its composition been similar to the intervention group 121.  
 Matching is based on the so-called “propensity score”. The propensity score is a balancing 
score, i.e. based on all case mix covariates, as a function of belonging to the intervention group 
(yes/no) 137. The propensity score is obtained from the predicted values of a so-called logit model, in 
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In which β0 is a constant term, and in which xβ refers to the case mix variables x and associated 
parameters β. The right hand side of the equation is a logistic function that takes on values between 







In which β0 is a constant term, and in which xβ refers to the case mix variables x and associated 
parameters β. The right and sid  of the equation is a logistic function that takes on values between 
0 and 1 (similar to our notion of probability). Table 6 contains the case mix variables.
Case mix variable Remarks
Age
Gender
Had expenditures > €22.500 in the previous year
Had no expenditures in the previous year
Diagnosis related group number In years t-1…t-3
Number of Pharmacy Cost Groups In years t-1…t-3
Was observed (yes/no) In years t-1…t-3; also serves as a proxy of whether values have been imputed
Had supplemental coverage In year t
Table 6: Casemix variables
The parameters of the logit model are obtained from a sample including both the intervention 
and the particular control group we are working with (so, in total, we estimate five different logit 
models, corresponding to the five different control groups we have). Note that a person from the 
control group, who, in terms of case mix, closely resembles the intervention group, receives a score 
close to 1 and that, vice versa, it is also possible for a patient of the intervention group to receive a 
score of 0 if his case mix is different from what is typically observed in that group. Assuming that there 
is overlap between the two populations, i.e. that the two populations are not entirely different from 
each other in terms of case mix, we are able to match each person from the intervention group to one 
or more counterparts from the particular control group. The exact matching procedure is based on an 
algorithm we discuss in the next section.
Matching procedure 
We match individuals from the intervention group and control group based on the logit of their 
propensity scores 140, 141: 
Equation 6
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Case mix variable Remarks 
Age  
Gender  
Had expenditures > €22.500 in the previous year  
Had no expenditures in the previous year  
Diagnosis related group number In years t-1…t-3 
Number of Pharmacy Cost Groups In years t-1…t-3 
Was observed (yes/no) In years t-1…t-3; also serves as a proxy of wheth-
er values have been imputed 
Had supplemental coverage  In year t 
Table 6 Casemix variables 
The parameters of the logit mod l are obtained from a sample including both the intervention 
and the particular control group we are working with (so, in total, we estimate five different logit 
models, corresponding to the five different control groups we have). Note that a person from the 
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from each other in terms of case mix, we are able to match each person from the intervention group 
to one or more counterparts from the particular control group. The exact matching procedure is 
based on an algorithm we discuss in the next section. 
Matching procedure  
We match individuals from the intervention group and control group based on the logit of their 






This method linearizes probabilities, and incorporates the fact that a 0.01 difference in the pro-
pensity score between two individuals, has a different interpretation depending on where we stand 
in the 0-1 probability interval. For example, to an individual with a score of 0.01, an individual with a 
score of 0.02 is twice as more likely to be in the intervention group (based on case mix), whereas to 
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This method linearizes probabilities, and incorporates the fact that a 0.01 difference in the 
propensity score between two individuals, has a different interpretation depending on where we 
stand in the 0-1 probability interval. For example, to an individual with a score of 0.01, an individual 
with a score of 0.02 is twice as more likely to be in the intervention group (based on case mix), whereas 
to an individual with a propensity score of 0.98, an individual with a propensity score of 0.99 is kind of 
equally likely to be in the intervention group. Using the logit of the propensity score should therefore 
increase the quality of the matches142. Another requirement for propensity score matching to work, 
is that, conditionally on x, group membership cannot be perfectly predicted perfectly143. Otherwise, 
the propensity scores of the intervention and control group(s) do not overlap, and no matches will be 
made. This requirement implies that both groups should share some common traits.
This overlap assumption can be checked by inspecting density plots of the (logit of the) propensity 
scores for both groups. Figure 6 shows this density plot for the 2012 ‘growth trend’ control group, and 
confirms that there is an overlap in propensity scores. Results for other control groups were similar 
(available upon request). 













-4 -2 0 2
Logit of the propensity score
Intervention group Control group 2012 (input growth trend)
Having calculated the logit of the propensity score, and having established that there is an 
important degree of overlap of these scores for the intervention and control groups, we match 
individuals using a so-called kernel approach 144. Under this approach, we first define a maximum 
tolerable distance between the propensity scores of matches (meaning that we do not match 
individuals when the difference in propensity scores exceed a certain limit, say, 0.06). To each person in 
the intervention group, we then match all persons from the control group that lie within this maximum 
tolerable distance, and calculate a weighted average of their health care costs, in which persons closer 
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to the maximum tolerable distance receive a lower weight. In determining weights, we adopt the 
Epanechnikov kernel 145, which has a parabolic shape around the value of the person we are trying to 
match to. This implies that the marginal increase in weight that a better match receives, is increasing, 
the closer he is to the value of the person he is being matched to.
Obtaining the benchmark’s parameters
By the end of the last step, each person in the intervention group has received an estimate of 
the expenditures he would have incurred, had he been served by the control group’s PCPs (we did so 
by recording the expenditures of his matches). We then average over these estimates, weighting for 
the assignment length of the insured of the intervention group (note: one should not use the weighed 
assignment length of the matches, as this may decrease the balance in the covariates in case attrition 
patterns differ between intervention and control groups (which we investigate in later chapters in this 
thesis)). This is the case mix corrected average of control group expenditures. The benchmark consists 
of five such averages, that together make up the historical expenditure average (3 averages) and the 
growth rate (2 averages). 
Matching quality
In order to assess whether the matching quality was satisfactory, i.e. whether the control groups 
were similar to the intervention group in terms of case mix, we compare averages and standard 
deviations of the case mix variables between both groups146. We performed propensity score matching 
five times, and we used four different datasets to impute missing values. We therefore assessed the 
balance in covariates for all 20 resulting populations. In comparing averages, balance was assessed 
using the concept of ‘standardized bias’147, which equals the difference in averages, divided over the 
square root of the average variance in the total sample. We did not allow the standardized bias to be 
larger than 5%, which is in line with common practice144. In assessing the balance of the variances, we 
did not allow the ratio of variances to be smaller than 4/5 or larger than 5/4148, on average. In case the 
balance was unsatisfactory, we either decreased the maximum tolerable distances between matches 
or added squared terms or interaction terms to our logit model for covariates that were unbalanced144, 
until balance was appropriate. Tabel 1.7 shows the final specifications. The results suggested that the 
balance in covariates significantly improved after matching.
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Historical average – 2009
Third-order polynomial 
in Age, interacted with 
Gender
None (0.06) 9,3 1,6
Historical average – 2010 None 0.02 7,8 1,4
Historical average – 2011
Third-order polynomial 
in Age, interacted with 
Gender
0.02 6,7 1,2
Growth rate – 2011
Squared term for Di-
agnosis Related Group 
Number at t-1
None 8,7 0,8
Growth rate – 2012 None None 9,6 0,9
Table 7: Matching quality for all five control groups and actions taken to achieve this
Results
Table 8 lists the values of all elements in the benchmark. The difference in uncorrected and 
corrected averages suggests that the intervention group’s case mix worsened over the years, and that 
it is substantially heavier than the case mix of the control group. Following (3), the benchmark of the 
shared savings model equals €2260 (Box 1). The intervention group’s performance slightly exceeds the 
benchmark, suggesting that, in this hypothetical example, no savings have been realized. 
Benchmark element Uncorrected for case mix Corrected for case mix Benchmark weight
Historical average – 2009 €2.040 €2.078 0,1
Historical average – 2010 €2.040 €2.079 0,3
Historical average – 2011 €2.068 €2.118 0,6
Growth rate – 2011 €1.755 €1.907 1
Growth rate – 2012 €1.865 €2.050 1
Table 8: Matching results for each benchmark element
Benchmark:
Uncorrected for case mix €2.186
Corrected for case mix €2.260
Performance:
Intervention group, 2012 (SEM) €2.265 (34)
Savings:
Case mix corrected benchmark – Intervention group, 2012 €5 
Conclusion Excess spending
Box 1: Benchmark and result
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Additional analysis: result at median prices
Table 9 shows the results when we replace each service’s price by the median price observed in 
the full sample. That is, when we remove price differentials between providers.  
Benchmark element Uncorrected for case mix Corrected for case mix Benchmark weight
Historical average – 2009 €2.033 €2.070 0,1
Historical average – 2010 €2.032 €2.070 0,3
Historical average – 2011 €2.059 €2.103 0,6
Growth rate – 2011 €1.746 €1.898 1
Growth rate – 2012 €1.864 €2.049 1
Table 9: Matching results for each benchmark element, under median prices
Benchmark:
Uncorrected for case mix €2.187
Corrected for case mix €2.256
Performance:
Intervention group, 2012 (SEM) €2.192 (33)
Savings:
Case mix corrected benchmark – Intervention group, 2012 €64
p-value statistical test (one-sided t-test for savings) 0.025
Conclusion Significant savings
Box 2: Benchmark and result, under median prices
Interestingly, the conclusion of this analysis opposes the one earlier. This suggests that there are 
price differentials between providers. These price differentials are, in part, caused by the health insurer 
himself (reflecting differences in the outcomes of the health care purchasing process). Strikingly, 
although the changes in the separate elements of the benchmark are rather small (suggesting that 
there are no big outliers in terms of price), the performance of the provider improves when being 
evaluated at median prices. This suggests that, for 2012, and from the viewpoint of the health insurer, 
the outcomes of the health care purchasing process in the region of our pilot, were not as good as in 
earlier years.   
Discussion
Pilot aims
The overall aim of implementing the shared savings program is to lower spending growth without 
compromising on the quality of care. The approach is to reorient providers towards value-based care, 
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or to otherwise support such an orientation by adapting the payment system along this line. The 
accountable care program and supportive strategies aid primary care providers in redesigning the 
structures and processes of health care delivery. Extensive data sharing allows providers to identify the 
inefficiencies built up in the spectrum of care; the prospect of shared savings payments incentivizes 
providers to address these inefficiencies. As shared savings payments are determined with respect 
to the care continuum, pilot providers are furthermore motivated to change their configuration 
to one that supports substitution of specialist care, coordination across silos, prevention and self-
management. 
Pilot opportunities
The pilot system provides a number of opportunities for achieving the pilot aims that are not 
commonly found in other initiatives. First, Dutch citizens enroll with a PCP and their enrollment is 
typically long-lasting, which facilitates the design of interventions targeted at achieving the pilot aims, 
and rewards adopting a long-term perspective. 
Second and related, since the method of assigning patients to pilot providers is not based 
on actual health care usage but on enrollment instead, less patients will be “lost to follow-up” 149, 
because also the scores on quality indicators for patients that do not (regularly) visit the provider 
count towards the provider’s average. In contrast, patients that do not visit the provider except in 
case of emergency will not be assigned to the provider under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 
because emergency care is not part of the definition of ‘primary care services’ upon which assignment 
is based 149. Including these (generally vulnerable) patients in the program incentives providers to 
also reach out for them, involve them in tailor-made care programs, and to improve care accordingly 
149. However, an assignment system based on registration could provide incentives for risk selection: 
providers could deny access to high risk patients, or may take actions that lead to an outflow of high 
risk patients to neighboring providers. This will be a topic of further study.
A third opportunity is that the shared savings payments are at the provider level (and not on the 
level of the individual PCP), which encourages collaboration within pilot centers and recognizes that 
potential successful interventions are group efforts. A US study on accountability relationships within 
participating providers found that rewards were often at the level of the individual provider despite 
recognizing that program aims would be more readily achieved by group effort (i.e. collaboration 
between individual providers) 150. Similarly, quality is scored in absolute terms rather than in relative 
terms, to encourage collaboration between providers.  
A fourth opportunity arises from the small scale of the pilot. Due to this small scale, it is not 
computationally burdensome to calculate savings thresholds for each pilot provider separately. In 
larger initiatives, predetermined thresholds tend to be used. Hypothesis testing provides a more 
accurate way of addressing the random variation in health care expenditures and the odds of 
outperforming the benchmark by chance. 
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The pilot system faces a number of challenges in achieving its aims. One challenge comes from 
the fragmented structure of the Dutch health care system. Whereas in the US a substantial number of 
accountable care providers include a hospital 100, the functions of primary and secondary care remain 
rather separate in the Netherlands. It is unsure whether pilot providers, in their attempts to lower 
health care expenditures, succeed in involving specialist providers – in particular because specialist 
payment models have a volume component. Earlier experiments in accountable care programs 
targeted at primary care providers, resulted in an increase in expenditures of secondary care. Although 
it is yet unclear why such a trend occurred, one hypothesis is that specialist providers make up for a 
drop in the patient volumes (-25% compared to care-as-usual under the experiment), by increasing 
intervention intensity (+ €142) 151.
A second challenge is that specialist care is billed retrospectively. Specialist care is classified into 
packages called ‘diagnosis-treatment combinations (DTC)’, which have a duration of 1 year. Only upon 
billing the DTC, health insurers know that a particular individual received specialist care. For those 
DTCs with a starting date of late 2014, the billing date is expected to be mid-2016. The late billing 
time for specialist care implies that shared savings payments can be determined 1 to 1,5 years after 
the end of the performance year. A first implication is that the incentives will be less strong for this 
delayed lump-sum as people tend to discount future payments 152. It furthermore adds uncertainty 
108. As of 2015, the duration of DTCs will be drastically shortened to 120 days however, which speeds 
up this process. This also allows the health insurer to provide interim insight on specialist care use for 
pilot providers. The pilot providers standardized the process of registering patient referrals so that 
information on secondary care use will become available earlier.
  A third and final challenge is that the insurer’s health care purchasing process, and resulting 
prices, may pose a risk to the participating providers (assuming that they are limited in the extent to 
which they can send their patients to the cheapest provider). We have therefore recommended to 
narrow the geographical scope of the growth trend to include a more local sample of insured. This 
however, may limit the program’s strength in addressing and responding to built-in efficiency at the 
level of the region, inasmuch levels and growth rates of spending are correlation (in which case one 
would like to base the growth trend on a national average). In the US, such a correlation was largely 
absent, however104. 
Experience with GP fundholding (virtual vs. real budget)
Several national health care systems have gained experience with holding care providers 
accountable for the costs and quality of health care. An interesting case in this respect is the English 
National Health Service, because its programs were targeted at GPs as well. Furthermore, NHS GPs are 
considered gatekeepers too and have worked separately from hospitals. Several programs and reforms 
have been implemented over the years, among which are the Quality and Outcomes Framework 31, 
Clinical Commissioning Groups 153 and GP Fundholding 154.  The latter bears most resemblance to the 
Shared Savings Program. Under GP Fundholding (1991-1997), GPs received a budget to commission 
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health services on behalf of their population, and were entitled to the savings against this budget. 
Although there are only a few empirical studies of good quality on this topic 155, research suggests that 
the abolition of this fundholding scheme led to an increase in admission rates for chargeable elective 
admissions of between 3,5 – 5,1% 156. Research also documents a lower growth rate in prescription 
drug costs in fundholding practices 157. The evaluation of the Shared Savings Program will ultimately 
show whether pilot GPs are able to exert similar influence over the value of care delivered across the 
continuum. However, there are a number of fundamental differences between both programs that 
could change the relative performance of the Shared Savings Program. First and foremost, the pilot 
GPs are not tasked with commissioning health services on behalf of their patients, which is still done by 
the health insurer. Thus, pilot GPs may have a somewhat less direct influence on where patients will go 
for treatment. Second, the Shared Savings Program’s benchmark against which savings are calculated 
is determined ex post, rather than ex ante. Although this could yield a more precise estimate of true 
savings, this does increase uncertainty over the size of the shared savings payments which lowers 
the strength of the savings incentive. Third, the benchmark in the Shared Savings Program is more 
advanced in terms of case mix correction (under GP Fundholding, the budget was determined based 
on historical expenditures). This, in turn, makes it easier to identify and reward true savings efforts, 
which lowers uncertainty. Fourth, in the Shared Savings Program, a link is established between the 
level of shared savings payments and the quality of care, which could lower the incentive to skimp 
on quality or to stint on care to save costs. In contrast, under GP Fundholding, research documented 
a drop in patient satisfaction 158, which is explicitly monitored and rewarded here. Whether these 
differences in design (or institutional environment) drive any difference in the relative performance of 
both models is a topic of further study.
Conclusion
Shared savings programs are a relatively new phenomenon and it remains to be studied whether 
prevailing designs are optimal. This papers demonstrates that a common theme appears to be the 
minimization of risk and uncertainty, in the presence of which providers will be discouraged to invest 
in a whole-system perspective. Health system characteristics play an important role here. Dutch PCPs 
assist patients in navigating the health care system. This allows for a broader scope of the shared savings 
program, in the sense that few parts of the care continuum are a black box to the accountable provider. 
However, due to institutional fragmentation within the Dutch health care system, Dutch providers are 
typically small in scale and scope, which could pose challenges to the viability of the shared savings 
programs. Savings might be offset by providers not incentivized by the contract and, under prevailing 
(statistical) minimum savings thresholds, the efforts required to gain from participating in the program 
may be large. These will be important topics for evaluation. 
Irrespective of these challenges, incorporating a shared savings program does reward taking 
accountability for overall costs and quality results, and could thereby improve the sustainability of the 
primary care setting. Furthermore, since patients typically have a long-lasting relationship with their 
personal physician, accountability can more readily be assumed and monitored properly; if one is able 
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to condition on a relatively stable population, the confidence with which changes in costs and quality 
can be related to changes in population management (rather than to changes in the composition of 
the patient population), improves.  
Evaluating a shared savings program within a non-US health care system – like under the current 
pilot – increases our understanding of these programs, in particular of the mechanisms through which 
incentivized providers can control spending growth and improve quality.
Appendix A: Quality Indicators 
Patient reported quality of care (global scores 0-10)G
The ease with which you could make an appointment
The time between making the appointment and seeing the provider
Telephone access to the provider
The personal attention you received from your provider
The extent to which the provider tries to understand your problem
The extent to which you shared in decision-making about your treatment
The degree of satisfaction with the final treatment decision
The extent to which you were informed about your condition and treatment
The extent to which you understood this information
Overall provider score
Quality of care Diabetes Mellitus Type 2 (patients enrolled into the care program)H
Percentage of patients tested at least once for HbA1C levels in the past 12 months
The percentage of patients with HbA1C levels < 53 mmol/mol, of those tested
The percentage of patients with HbA1C levels > 69 mmol/mol, of those tested
Percentage of patients whose blood pressure was tested at least once in the past 12 months
The percentage of patients with a systolic blood pressure < 140 mm Hg, of those tested
Percentage of patients whose lipid profile was measured in the past 12 months
The percentage of patients with LDL-cholesterol levels < 2,5 mmol/l, of those tested
Percentage of patients whose renal clearance was determined at least once in the past 12 months
Percentage of patients whose albumine clearance was tested at least once in the past 12 months
Percentage of patients who have received an eye examination at least once in the past 24 months 
Percentage of patients with diabetic retinopathy, of those tested
Percentage of patients who have received a foot examination at least once in the past 12 months
Percentage of patients whose smoking behavior was registered
Percentage of patients smoking, of those for whom smoking behavior was registered
Percentage of patients whose BMI was determined at least once in the past 12 months
Percentage of patients with a BMI < 25 kg/m2, of those tested
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Quality of care COPD (patients enrolled into the care program)I
Percentage of patients whose smoking behavior was registered
Percentage of patients who smoke, out of those for whom smoking behavior was registered
Percentage of patients whose level of physical activity was registered
Percentage of patients who had their inhalation technique tested at least once in the past 12 months
Percentage of patients who received spirometry based on FEV1/FVC ratio post BD in the past 12 months
Percentage of patients who have received a flu shot
Percentage of patients who experienced an exacerbation at least twice in the past 12 months
Quality of pharmacy careJ
Percentage of users of who use metformine as an anti-diabetic drug
Percentage of users of statines whose last receipt contained simvastatine, out of those who use lipid 
lowering medication
Percentage of users of triptans, whose dosage is less than 72 tables sumatriptan or less than 48 tables of 
other triptans
Percentage of new users of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, who use ibuprofen, naproxen or 
diclofenac
Percantage of users of simvastatine, who receive dosages of 40mg
Percentage of chronic users (40-79 years) of nitrates or platelet aggregation inhibitors who have received 
statins
Users of angiotensin II receptor antagonists, who use the generic product (losartan, valsartan, etc.)
StructureK
The NHG practice accreditation program
G As developed by the participating providers (names available upon request)
H As developed by the ‘Landelijke Organisatie voor Ketenzorg’
I As developed by the ‘Instituut voor Verantwoord Medicijngebruik’
J As developed by the ‘Instituut voor Verantwoord Medicijngebruik’
K As developed by the ‘Nederlands Huisartsengenootschap’
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Over the past decade, shared savings programs have emerged as a prominent feature of health 
care reform45, 159-162. Under a shared savings program, providers share in savings relative to a predefined 
expenditure target. The actual sharing rate within these programs is commonly linked to a provider’s 
performance on a set of quality indicators94. 
Concerns have been voiced over the possibility of patient risk selection by providers as a strategy 
to secure shared savings payments163-165. Risk selection is a recurring theme in the proposed rules for 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program. Selection of patients does not necessarily imply avoiding high-
risk patients. Depending on whether or not the expenditure target is risk adjusted, it may also imply 
selecting the high risks in case the provider is cost efficient.  In both cases however, shared savings 
payments will not reflect true savings.  
Even though it is unclear whether risk selection is a real or theoretical threat to the financial 
sustainability of shared savings programs, it enters into decisions on program design. For example, 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program’s preference of performance-year based assignment of patients 
to providers, over prospective assignment (where providers know in advance for which patients they 
will be held clinically and financially accountable), was in part motivated by the fear that prospective 
assignment would facilitate risk selection. Risk selection is also brought up in relation to redesigning 
the Program’s benchmark56 and data sharing166. The fear of risk selection thus has a profound impact 
on program design. 
To the best of our knowledge however, no study exists that tries to quantify the pay-offs to risk 
selection under prevailing shared savings programs. For a number of reasons, it is not clear whether 
risk selection can yield substantial pay-offs. First, risk selection is not an easy strategy in that it requires 
a lot of data (a point to which we return below). Second, shared savings programs make extensive 
adjustments for case mix94, implying that providers who serve a beneficial population must also beat 
a lower expenditure target. This extensive case mix adjustment implies that there are fewer case mix 
dimensions left for risk selection, and that these dimensions may be less important or bad predictors 
of health care expenditures. Third, it could be the case that beating the expenditure target requires 
risk selection on a scale that will not go unnoticed. Providers would then run the risk of being excluded 
from the program.   
In this study we draft a general shared savings model that bears resemblance to the ones used in 
prevailing shared savings programs and simulate the impact of patient risk selection on shared savings 
payments, to show when risk selection is a real or a theoretical threat to the financial sustainability of 
shared savings programs. To assess the added value of case mix adjustment, we redo the simulations 
under situations of less and no adjustment for case mix. 
L Hayen, A.P, Struijs, J.N, Westert, G.P., & van den Berg, M.J. Benefiting from risk selection under shared savings 
programs: a real or theoretical threat? Preparing for submission.
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In this study, risk selection is defined as a provider’s actions to change its population ex ante, with 
the intent to increase its relative standing against the benchmark population ex post. 
Insights from agency theory help providing a rationale for risk selection under shared savings 
programs27. Agency theory starts with the notion that agency problems exist within principal-agent 
relationships, such as payer-provider relationships. Within these specific relationships, the agency 
problem is that payers delegate the task of providing care to care providers, but cannot readily assume 
that this task is performed in the way they want it. In particular, agency problems arise when the 
party delegating the task (the payer) has different goals than the one to whom the task is delegated 
(the provider), and when it is difficult to verify how the task has been done. According to agency 
theory, the contractual relationship between the payer and the provider is key to achieving control 
over the provider’s behavior under these circumstances. The theory distinguishes between outcome-
based and behavior-based control27. Outcome-based control is achieved when payers make providers’ 
compensation dependent on outcomes valued by the payers, such as their profit or increase in 
market share. This co-aligns the preferences of both parties. Behavior-based control is achieved when 
providers’ compensation is independent of outcomes, and is instead related to merely performing 
the specific “tasks and activities” that are expected to lead to those outcomes167. Under behavior-
based control, providers are therefore not at risk for outcomes. This has the additional advantage of 
transferring outcome risk from the provider to the payer. The downside is that desired behaviors have 
to be specified and providers have to be monitored27.
The potential agency problems within payer-provider relationships have been well 
documented168-170. Currently, fee-for-service payment systems are dominant, yet they incentivize 
care providers to increase volume beyond what would be indicated by case load. These incentives 
run counter to the goals of the payers, such as volume minimization or value-driven care14. A shared 
savings model is essentially an attempt to exert outcome-based control in this situation. It shifts 
provider compensation from outputs to performance with respect to an expenditure benchmark – 
payer profit. Typically, shared savings models also include elements of behavior-based control. Payers 
seem not indifferent with respect to the manner in which the provider outperforms the expenditure 
benchmark, but impose (minimum) quality requirements for receiving shared savings payments16, 94, 
171. 
Under shared savings models, providers can earn more shared savings payments by “inflating” 
outcomes. Here, inflating outcomes could refer to behaviors that lead to immediate expenditure 
savings but hurt the population in the long run172, or to behaviors that create an illusion of savings. An 
example of the former is underprovision of services. Risk selection is an example of the latter. Given 
that payers will be unable to perfectly differentiate between honest and dishonest providers, these 
behaviors must be assumed173. The empirical literature has also found risk selection in practice174.
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Behavioral controls can protect the payer against such behaviors. When their impact on the 
financial sustainability of shared savings programs is large, programs may also want to monitor for risk 
selection, as a behavioral control. In our simulation exercise, we aim to provide insight into when risk 
selection – within the dynamics of a shared savings program – creates ‘undeserved’ shared savings 
payments, and whether this would necessitate intensive monitoring for risk selection. Similar to 
Shen and Ellis’ simulation of financial gains from risk selection by HMOs, our approach is to simulate 
“empirically feasible” risk selection175. This means that we explicitly limit the case mix information 
available to the program (when adjusting the expenditure benchmark) and the provider (when 
selecting risks), in line with the real world. 
Methods and data
The Shared Savings Model
Table 1 outlines the relevant characteristics of the fictional shared savings model with which we 
performed our simulations. 
Dimension Description
Patient population A general population 
Patient assignment
Prospective assignment based on enrollment with the provider, with retrospective 
reconciliation.
Scope of the model
All health care services except dental care, covered by either mandatory or 
supplemental health insurance packages. 
Annualized expenditures are capped at €22.500 ($25.000, the 99th percentile of the 
spending distribution).
Expenditure target
A three-year, weighted, historical expenditure average, multiplied by the 
performance year growth trend in health care expenditures of a control group. Both 
elements are risk-adjusted to reflect the provider’s case mix in the performance 
year.
Control group
The control group consists of 50 non-participating providers in the area surrounding 
the participating provider.
Risk adjustment
We used both prospective and concurrent risk adjustment 106. We prospectively 
adjusted for health, using Pharmacy Cost Groups and Diagnosis Cost Groups 
(specialist care)176, 177. Age and gender (38 categories), and socioeconomic status 
were concurrently adjusted for. We also adjusted for people who had capped 
lagged expenditures and for people who were non-users last year. See appendix for 
a full description and model performance.
Savings
A provider is said to have realized savings, if he beats the risk-adjusted benchmark. 
The entire difference is paid out as ‘shared savings payments’.
Table 1: Description of the shared savings model we use in our simulation study
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We simulated the impact of risk selection on realized savings. We considered a hypothetical 
scenario of a fictional, medium-sized, care provider (14,000 patients), who selects his population prior 
to the start of the performance year. The provider does so based on historical expenditure data he 
receives in the year before. These are expenditure data that cover the second-to-most recent year. 
The expenditure data show the provider’s performance relative to the control group for several 
dimensions of case mix, and his performance in absolute terms. The data are aggregated at the 
provider-level and contain expenditure averages.
Per dimension of risk (e.g. age), we determined the category of patients in which the provider 
would most likely benefit from risk selection (e.g. between 50 and 55 years of age). In case risk selection 
takes place on a dimension included in the risk adjustment model, this would be the category in which 
performance is the worst, relative to the control group. In case risk selection takes place on a dimension 
not included in the risk adjustment model, or in a situation without risk adjustment, this would be 
the category of patients that are the most expensive. We then sorted patients by case mix category, 
and subsequently sorted categories in ascending order of (absolute / relative) performance. We then 
simulated that, before the start of the performance year, the provider excludes the top 1% - 10% of 
patients from this list. Because patients within a particular category are listed at random, we repeated 
this procedure 50 times so that we were able to report the average result and confidence interval. We 
normalized the simulation results with respect to the reference scenario of no risk selection. 
We perform the following simulations:
Is the benchmark risk adjusted using all available case mix dimensions?
YES NO
Does the provider have 
data on all available case 
mix dimensions?
YES Full risk selection Selection-on-unobservables
NO Partial risk selection not applicable
Table 2: Simulation matrix
Data
We obtained pre-intervention expenditure data (2008-2012) from a Dutch health insurer 
(Menzis), involved in a shared savings program for Patient Centered Medical Homes (PCMHs). The 
data include all insurance claims incurred by patients assigned to either the participating GPs and the 
control group. The shared savings program is extensively described elsewhere171. Table 2 provides 
relevant summary statistics.
The detailed level of the expenditure data allowed us to construct a wide range of case mix 
variables used to risk adjust the benchmark of the shared savings model (depending on the particular 
simulation). 
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We proxied for chronic illnesses using the Pharmacy Cost Groups methodology, developed by 
Lamers & van Vliet176. We distinguished between 25 Pharmacy Cost Groups, among which are Asthma, 
Diabetes Mellitus type 2 and Cardiovascular diseases. For a given calendar year, somebody is assigned 
to a Pharmacy Cost Group (PCG) if he used more than 180 defined daily doses of drugs whose active 
ingredients are targeted at treating the chronic condition. The 180 threshold is meant to distinguish 
chronic users from incidental users (incidental users may use that particular medicine for a non-
chronic disease). For medical specialist care, we observed a DRG-like code that allowed us to create 
hierarchical cost groups using the Diagnosis Cost Group (DCG) methodology177.
Apart from claims data, we observed demographic data like age and gender, and the patient’s 
postal code. The latter allowed us to add information on socio-economic status, as collected by the 
Netherlands Institute for Social Research. 
We used historical spending levels to construct two indicators of health care use: an indicator 
variable for whether expenditures in the previous year were capped or not (i.e. were above €22.500), 
and an indicator for whether somebody had zero spending in the previous year. 
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 provides the summary statistics for our hypothetical provider and the control group in 
the performance year.
Provider Control group
Number of observations 13,841 22,911
Mean expenditures 2012 (st. dev) €2288 (€4205) €1916 (€3836)
Percentage of patients with zero expenditures 11% 11%
Percentage of patients with expenditures beyond 
the cut-off point
2% 1,5%
Average risk score 2012, normalized to 1 for the 
control group (by construction)
1.09 1
Table 3: Summary statistics
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In our first series of simulations we simulated the pay-offs to full risk selection. In this scenario, 
the provider participating under the shared savings program has the same information as the risk 
adjuster. For all case mix dimensions, he knows how he performs in both absolute and relative sense.
We first used all information to determine a so-called patient ‘risk score’178. A risk score is the 
patient’s expected spending based on all information we have, as a fraction of average spending (see 
Appendix A for calculation). Based on the risk scores, we then subdivided patients into deciles of risk 
scores, and calculated the provider’s relative performance per risk decile. We simulated scenarios of 
risk selection, by letting the provider drop patients from the least favorable risk decile(s) from his list 
in the performance year (note that patients from more risk deciles will be involved when the scale of 
risk selection gets larger).  
Panel a in Figure 1 shows that the pay-offs to this form of full risk selection are small. Even 
when risk selection is performed on a large scale (10% of the population), the improvement in result 
amounts to €13 per patient only.
Partial risk selection
In Figure 1’s panel a, risk selection is performed using the full set of information that is also 
available to the risk adjuster. This includes information on the provider’s relative stance on a wide 
range of variables, including demographics, health and socioeconomic status. In some cases, it may 
be unrealistic to assume that the provider has all this information (e.g. providers may not know the 
socioeconomic status of the patients in the control group due to privacy issues, or may not know how 
their competitors are doing due to competition issues). 
Panel b shows how risk selection works out when the provider only has the information on age 
and gender, which he uses to calculate his relative performance per age/gender category (e.g. 1-4 years 
of age, etc.). Surprisingly, risk selection does not work out well in this case. The provider’s expenditure 
result is even higher, suggesting that he would incur losses from risk selection. We obtained similar 
results under partial risk selection based on chronic illnesses, where we found that the pay-offs to 
risk selection differ per chronic illness (ranging from - €5 to +  €1.50) (results available upon request).
Selection-on-unobservables
In some cases, providers may have more information on their patients than incorporated by the 
risk adjustment model. This could happen when a private insurer runs a shared savings program and 
does not have information on historical health data of its recent enrollees, such as chronic conditions 
and expenditures. Providers are typically aware of the chronic conditions their patients have and can 
use this information to select patients accordingly. We compare two such scenarios of selection-on-
unobservables: one in which there is a risk adjustment model, but without historical data (no chronic 
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conditions or historical spending, panel c), and one without a risk adjustment model (panel d). 
Panel d shows that also in this scenario, risk selection may only add substantially to the result when 
practiced on a very large scale (dropping 50% of the chronically ill). Panel c shows that a very basic 
risk adjustment model, including only age/gender categories and socioeconomic status (i.e. without 
historical data), already lowers the pay-offs to risk selection. 
Discussion
The simulation results show that risk selection does not guarantee large shared savings payments, 
and may even result in losses. A number of reasons exist for why there are no guaranteed pay-offs to 
risk selection.
First, risk selection based on expenditure averages is prone to ecological fallacy, yet these are 
the type of data that are commonly shared between plans and providers. Expenditure data are 
typically highly skewed. Expenditure outliers distort averages, which could hint providers in the 
wrong direction. In our simulation of partial risk selection based on age and gender (Figure 1, panel 
b), the provider’s decision to keep or drop a patient from his list was based on the provider’s relative 
performance in that patient’s age/gender category. In Appendix B, we show that skewness played a 
role in the expenditure averages and, therefore, in the provider’s decision whether or not to drop 
patients belonging to a particular age/gender category. We also show that this skewness is one of the 
driving forces behind the losses reported in panel b of Figure 1. Recall that we modeled this decision as 
a partly random process: in case a provider selects risks solely based on age and gender, and finds that 
his relative performance is the worst for 50-55 year old females, he randomly drops patients belonging 
to this category (he does not have more information to base his choice on). In case a small number 
of expenditure outliers drive his performance in a particular age/gender category, this implies that, 
potentially, patients will be dropped that could have contributed positively to the provider’s result. In 
Appendix B, we show that once expenditure outliers (≥ €10000 or ≥  €22500) are left out in determining 
the provider’s performance with respect to a particular age/gender category, and accordingly do not 
influence the provider’s risk selection strategy, some of the losses to risk selection that were incurred 
earlier, are recouped. These results confirm that, in part, skewness in expenditure distributions can be 
problematic for providers that consider risk selection and have to work with aggregate data. 
A second reason for why the pay-offs to risk selection are uncertain, is that providers typically 
do not have all the information used by the risk adjuster and therefore can only base their selection 
strategy on their performance on a small number of case mix dimensions. Important however, 
is a category’s performance with respect to its risk score, which is calculated using more case mix 
dimensions than are available to the provider (and therefore cannot be replicated by the provider). 
For example, consider a provider who turns out to be relatively expensive in treating 50 to 55 year 
old females. In case this is due to having a high number of chronically ill in this age/gender category, 
but when the provider is actually very efficient in treating the chronically ill, expenditures could still 
be lower than expected by the risk score. In case the provider would only look at age and gender, he 
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would drop these patients from his list while these could actually improve his financial result. The 
difference in results between panel a and b illustrates the importance of optimizing with respect to 
the risk score. Under full risk selection (panel a), the provider is able to do so, as he can reconstruct 
the risk score with the information at hand.
Third, whereas there might be persistence in individual spending179, this not necessarily implies 
that there is persistence in the provider’s relative performance at the group level. For example, 
the relative performance in treating 50 to 55 year old females may improve over time. Historical 
information (which is all there is), may therefore guide the provider in the wrong direction. Figure 
2 shows weak persistence in relative performance for 2010’s age/gender categories. A large part of 
2010’s most expensive categories do not belong to 2012’s most expensive categories. 





















-1000 -500 0 500 1000
2010 relative spending
NOTES: Change in the provider’s relative spending vs. the benchmark, by age category (labels not shown). The 
reference lines are the unweighted averages in both years.
Apart from our finding that risk selection does not guarantee shared savings payments, we also 
found that one typically needs to employ risk selection on a very large scale to earn substantial profits. 
It is questionable whether the small profits reported under our ‘selection-on-unobservables’ outweigh 
the costs of selecting risks. Being able to select risks requires that one makes additional investments 
in data integration (to also include data on a comparable control group), data management and 
their analysis. As one needs to keep pace with the risk adjustment scheme, these are continuous 
investments. Next to these infrastructural costs, providers must also discount the costs of being caught 
into today’s decision to select risks (e.g. forgone future shared savings payments).
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Even though the threat of risk selection plays an important role in many aspects of shared savings 
programs, the simulation results show that providers that engage in risk selection do not necessarily 
earn shared savings, and may even incur losses. Our findings point to the importance of risk adjustment 
under shared savings programs. For providers that engage in risk selection, a rich risk adjustment 
model – built using more information than will be typically available to the providers operating under 
shared savings programs – is highly problematic, because providers will only be able to optimize with 
respect to part of the model’s variables and this does not guarantee success. This finding implies that 
the threat of risk selection to the financial sustainability of shared savings programs, decreases with 
the richness of the risk adjustment model. Therefore, a rich risk adjustment model justifies leaving the 
threat of risk selection out of discussions on other design features of the program. This is even more 
so as shared savings programs let providers also assume upside risk of overspending the benchmark. 
In that case, providers incur financial losses when their risk selection strategy does not work out well. 
When shared savings programs are implemented within a fee-for-service environment, this risk is even 
bigger, because dropping a patient from your list implies a direct loss of revenue, while it is uncertain 
whether this loss is made up with shared savings payments180. 
Of course, despite our finding that risk selection under a rich risk adjustment model is unlikely 
to structurally harm the financial sustainability of shared savings programs, risk selection may still 
occur in practice. Because risk selection has negative implications for other domains of care, such as 
accessibility, monitoring for avoidance of ‘bad risks’ should not be abandoned.
Appendix A: Adjusting for Case Mix 
Construction of the risk score
To risk-adjust target expenditures, we first estimated an annual risk score for each individual in 
the data. The risk score expresses an individual’s expected spending against an expenditure average. 
A risk score higher than 1 means that the individual’s expected spending, based on his observed case 
mix, is higher than average.
In estimating the risk score we first decided on a calibration sample whose data are used to 
calculate the weights for the case mix dimensions (e.g. age, gender, chronic diseases). For each annual 
risk score model, we used the control group for that particular year as the calibration sample. We then 
estimated the risk score using a linear regression of health care expenditures on all observed case 
mix dimensions. The resulting model coefficients allowed us to predict each person’s expenditures for 
that particular year. We arrived at the individual risk score by dividing this prediction over the control 
group average. Because the shared savings model works on the level of the provider, we calculated a 
provider-level average by averaging the risk score over all assigned patients. 
Table A1 includes all case mix dimensions and their empirical operationalization. Table A2 shows 
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the regression coefficients for the 2012 risk-adjustment model. The output for other years is available 
upon request. 
Case mix dimension Operationalization Name in regression output (Table A2)
Socioeconomic status
Deciles of the socioeconomic status-
score, with the first decile (lowest 
socioeconomic status) as the reference 
category.
SESd(ecile)(decile number)
Age 38 age/gender categories (newborns 




Chronic medicine use 25 chronic conditions Full name
Chronic specialist care use
13 hierarchical cost categories of chronic 
specialist care use, with 0 expenditures 
as the reference category
HCC Number (number)
Health care use
An indicator variable for high expendi-
tures (≥ €22.500) in the previous year, 
and an indicator variable for no expendi-
tures in the previous year.
Full name
Tabel A1: Case mix dimensions and empirical operationalization
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Diabetes mellitus type 1 3,688***
(3,335 - 4,041)
Diabetes mellitus type 2a (w. hypertension) 1,732***
(1,397 - 2,067)
































HCC NUMBER 1 2,890***
(2,262 - 3,518)
HCC NUMBER 2 2,407***
(1,790 - 3,023)
HCC NUMBER 3 2,716***
(2,053 - 3,380)
HCC NUMBER 4 1,959***
(1,002 - 2,916)
HCC NUMBER 5 5,168***
(4,198 - 6,137)
HCC NUMBER 6 2,171***
(1,588 - 2,753)
HCC NUMBER 7 -1,380
(-3,411 - 652)
HCC NUMBER 8 4,239***
(3,043 - 5,435)
HCC NUMBER 9 4,100***
(2,328 - 5,871)
HCC NUMBER 10 4,570***
(2,317 - 6,823)
HCC NUMBER 11 7,598***
(6,254 - 8,942)
HCC NUMBER 12 346
(-1,919 - 2,611)
HCC NUMBER 13 10,203***
(8,214 - 12,192)
Expenditures ≥ €22.500 at t-1 7,290***
(6,801 - 7,778)






Tabel A2: Regression output for 2012. Confidence intervals in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * P <0.10.
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Using the risk score to risk adjust the benchmark 
The risk score is applied to risk adjust both parts of the expenditure benchmark – the historical 
expenditures and the growth trend for the performance year. Risk adjusting a provider’s historical 
expenditures means that we trend these expenditures forward to the most recent historical year (the 
year prior to the performance year, called ‘base year 3’ from here on). We did so by first multiplying 
each one of the other two historical base years by the expenditure growth trend to base year 3 
observed in the control group (e.g. from $2000 base year 1 to $2200 in base year 3 yields a growth 
trend of 1.1)178. To account for a change in case mix over the years, we subsequently multiplied this 
number by the growth trend of the case mix over the course of the period (e.g. from 1.05 in base 
year 1 to 1.10 in base year 3 gives a growth trend of 1.048 (1.10 / 1.05)178.  Risk adjusting a provider’s 
allowable growth trend (reflecting the growth in expenditures from base year 3 to the performance 
year in the control group) was done by first multiplying each year’s control group expenditures by the 
provider risk score, and then calculating the percent change.   
We use both prospective and concurrent risk adjustment106. We prospectively adjust for PCG 
and DCG assignment, because these are health indicators. Prospective adjustment implies here that 
we hold a patient’s values of PCG and DCG assignment fixed over the course of the program. This 
makes prevention more rewarding, and also leaves no room for upcoding, as these historical data 
can no longer be influenced. We concurrently adjust for age and gender (38 categories), and include 
indicators for whether somebody was a non-consumer of health care last year, and whether someone’s 
expenditures were capped last year. 
Appendix B: How skewness in expenditure distributions complicates 
risk selection 
In our simulation of partial risk selection based on age and gender (Figure 1, panel b), the 
provider’s decision to keep or drop a patient from his list was based on the provider’s relative average 
performance in that patient’s age/gender category. Panel 1 in figure B shows that the age/gender 
categories from which patients were dropped, were those with a significantly higher skewness in the 
underlying expenditure distribution. Panel 2 shows that the relative number of expenditure outliers 
in the age/gender categories from which patients were dropped, was higher. Thus, skewness in the 
expenditure data will interfere with a provider’s decision to keep or drop patients under a strategy 
of risk selection. Panel 3 shows that skewness has a negative impact on the pay-offs to risk selection. 
When we remove expenditure outliers, providers will make better decisions. However, providers who 
work with expenditure averages are unable to do this.
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age/gender categories that are not dropped .. that are  dropped
difference between mean median (skew) 95% CI
under risk selection






































age/gender categories that are not dropped .. that are  dropped
difference between mean median (skew) 95% CI




























dropping x-% of patients
with outlier bias without outlier bias (<22500)
without outlier bias (<10000)
without risk adjustment
3 - Risk selection on age and gender
NOTES: Panel 1 shows the skewness of 
the expenditure distributions underlying 
the  age/gender categories, with greater 
skewness reported in the age/gender 
categories from which patients were 
dropped.  Related, panel 2 shows that 
the patients that were dropped, were 
from categories that had a higher 
number of outliers (as compared to the 
control group). Panel 3  shows the pay-
offs to risk selection  when age/gender 
expenditure averages are no longer 
influenced by expenditure outliers.
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Since the 1990s, the Dutch health care system has gradually moved towards a system of managed 
competition181. With the passage of the Health Insurance Act in 2006 (HIA), health insurers were given 
more incentives and opportunities to compete with each other181, 182. The Health Insurance Act obliges 
every Dutch citizen to buy basic, standardized, health insurance coverage from a private health insurer. 
The idea was that health insurers would compete on elements of the insurance plan, such as premiums 
and the quality of the care providers within the plan’s network, in order to attract new enrollees . This 
would require health insurers to take up their role as “prudent buyers of health care”183, which, in turn, 
would incentivize care providers to increase value for patients and earn a contract with the health 
insurer accordingly. Within this market, increasing value is defined as improving patient outcomes for 
‘each dollar spent’184. 
However, these value-based incentives might not have been accurately transmitted to care 
providers. Importantly, when choosing a health plan, Dutch customers deem freedom of provider 
choice more important than price, and show limited appreciation for health insurers that focus on 
contracting high-quality providers185. If insurers are discouraged or otherwise unable to channel 
customers to high-value  providers, `prudence’ in buying health care services could instead relate to 
including appropriate value-based incentives in contracts with care providers. These incentives can 
be financial stimuli that encourage care providers to increase value for their patients. Assessments of 
provider contracts typically show however, that payment mechanisms  are  ill-aligned with the aim to 
increase patient value14, 186.  
Both problems are particularly evident for general practice care. Dutch Health insurers seem 
unable to contract selectively with GPs, since Dutch citizens are usually listed with a general practitioner 
(GP) and typically wish to maintain a sustained relationship with a single GP187. Apart from that, only 
a few value-based incentives follow from the GP payment system – which is a blend of capitation fees 
and fee-for-service payments. This is problematic, because Dutch GPs, like in other countries, fulfill a 
central and coordinating role in the health care system188, implying that when value-based incentives 
are lacking at the GP level, this may have important consequences for value delivered in other parts of 
the health care spectrum. Especially since Dutch GPs are gatekeepers to specialist services, coordinate 
the provision of chronic care services, and are able to substitute some hospital services with primary 
care. 
A truly value-based incentive is one that incentivizes GPs to internalize the value implications of 
their referral policy and decisions on substitution of services – which would otherwise be fully carried 
by the health insurer.  
Menzis, a large Dutch health insurer, started experimenting with a ̀ shared savings arrangement’16, 
M Hayen, A.P, van den Berg, M.J., Struijs, J.N., & Westert, G.P.. Dutch shared savings program targeted at primary 
care, led to significant reduction in total medical spending.
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48, 189-191, as a complement to the current payment system. Under the shared savings arrangement, 
GPs are held accountable for the medical spending and quality of health care services their patients 
receive across the full continuum of care (including services by out-of-network providers) and  share 
in expenditure savings when they outperform the pre-negotiated expenditure benchmark. The extent 
to which they share in savings depends on their score on a number of quality metrics. As they are 
being held financially accountable for costs and quality across the entire care spectrum, GPs would be 
incentivized to internalize the value implications of their decisions. 
Menzis first piloted the shared savings arrangement with `Arts en Zorg’ (AEZ), a large national 
chain of primary care centers (henceforth referred to as ̀ providers’)192. The program was implemented 
in July 2014. In this study, we present the first-year results. Our research question is two-fold: (1) 
did the shared savings arrangement affect medical spending and quality, and (2) are these changes 
instrumental in achieving value?
Background
GP care in the Netherlands
The Netherlands have a strong primary care system193. Nearly all Dutch citizens are registered 
with a GP and their enrollment is typically long-lasting187: a large majority of those who are registered 
with a GP, has been enrolled for over 2 years (90%) , with two-thirds being enrolled for over 10 years. 
Typically, the GP is a patient’s first point of contact for new health problems, which is reinforced by a 
gatekeeping system: specialist care will only be reimbursed by the health insurer, when patients have 
a referral from their GP188. Referral rates are low however: only 4% of all patient contacts results in a 
referral194. This too is indicative of the strength of the Dutch primary care system. 
Although GPs have long been working single-handedly, most GPs now work in group practices 
or large primary care centers, together with 3 to 7 GPs and a variety of primary care professionals 
(practice nurses, specialized nurses, psychologists, physiotherapists)195.
At the time of study, the GP payment system consisted of quarterly capitation fees for each 
person enrolled with the practice, and fee-for-service payments for patient visits and specific medical 
procedures (such as the placement of intrauterine devices). GPs also received bundled payments for 
providing a predefined bundle of chronic care services. Since January 2015, in the middle of our study 
period, the payment system was slightly altered and structured into three segments: (1) `base pay’ 
– a mix of capitation fees and consult fees, (2) `bundled payments’ for chronic care and (3) `pay-for-
performance and innovation’196, within which health insurers can design their own incentive structures 
to reimburse or reward GPs for services and performance in a number of areas (e.g. substitution, 
prescription drug policy, etc.). A shared savings arrangement is an example of an incentive structure 
that can be financed through segment 3. Other examples of arrangements that are financed through 
segment 3 include forms of pay-for-performance, and insurer specific agreements on innovation and 
substitution of care. 
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The shared savings arrangement
The shared savings arrangement was introduced in 2014, and we present the first-year results. 
Participating providers agreed to take accountability for medical spending and quality of care within 
their population of listed patients, and are now held accountable for the full set of services covered 
by Menzis’s insurance policies, also when these services are being delivered by other providers. Under 
the program, expenditure savings are evaluated against an expenditure benchmark, consisting of a 
three-year weighted average of providers’ own historical expenditures, trended forward by the growth 
rate in health care expenditures of patients from non-participating providers in the same city. As 
health care expenditures typically portray high variability across insured, a savings threshold is added, 
using the basic principles of statistical testing. In case a provider passes this savings threshold, its 
entire result qualifies as a saving (`first-dollar base’166 ). The resulting payout to providers is a function 
of both absolute and relative performance on a wide range of quality indicators (see Appendix A), with 
better performance corresponding to higher pay-outs, the sharing rate and a shared savings payment 
maximum (both are not disclosed). The contract also includes a maximum amount of investment costs 
that GP can book to the program. In case net savings (savings minus investment costs) are positive, 
AEZ is fully reimbursed for its investment costs and is also entitled to a share of net savings. In case 
net savings are negative, AEZ is entitled to only 50% of its investment costs and a share of any savings 
made. So, in case of a negative net result, AEZ will not recoup its investment costs.  
Data and methods
Study population
We analyzed Menzis claims and enrollment data from 2011 to mid 2015, for patients enrolled 
with either a GP from the intervention group or with a GP from a control group (in total: 57 GPs, 
59,512 patients; intervention group: 8 GPs, 19,488 patients)). The GPs in our intervention group were 
all located in the same city of Enschede (160,000 inhabitants). The control group consisted of a random 
sample of 49 GPs from non-participating GPs, in the regions surrounding our intervention group. GPs 
from either group that were not continuously operative during the period of study were excluded 
from the analysis (4 GPs, 2761 patients). We also excluded people whom we did not continuously 
observe during our period of study (this was mainly because they were not insured with Menzis, or 
not registered with one of the sample GPs; 30,925) or because they switched GPs between the period 
studied (100 patients, 1 GP). Our final sample consisted of 25,726 patients and 52 GPs (intervention 
group:  7 GPs, 9,637 patients).
Study variables
We analyzed individual quarterly spending and enrollment. For each insured person in each 
quarter, we summed all reimbursed insurance claims that were covered by the shared savings 
arrangement (including deductible payments). In order to limit the effect of outliers, we capped 
quarterly spending at the 95th percentile. We matched each person’s insurance claims to the GP who 
had billed a capitation fee for that person at the beginning of the quarter. We categorized spending 
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based on either characteristics of the claim (prescription drug spending, hospital care, GP care, care 
covered by supplemental health insurance) or characteristics of the submitting provider (laboratory 
tests). In order to separate a shared savings effect into a price and a volume effect (research question 
1), we reconstructed spending under a scenario of no price-differentials across providers. We did so by 
replacing each claim’s price with the median price for that particular service191. 
In order to account for differences in characteristics of the insured between both groups, we 
created an aggregate measure of case mix which we denote as the ‘risk score’. Using linear regression 
techniques, our approach was to estimate a model that explains 2011 spending based on age/
gender categories, coverage, the presence of 25 chronic conditions (using data on drug spending), 
and neighborhood characteristics (average income, percentage of non-Western immigrants and 
urbanity measured at the postal code level) (R2 = 0.13). For each insured in our sample, we made a 
model prediction and divided this prediction over average expenditures. This yielded an individual 
risk score. We then grouped individuals into risk score deciles. We used this aggregate measure of 
health status, because we also want to control for health status trends over time. When modeling 
patient characteristics separately, adding this time trend would have drastically increased the number 
of covariates in our main specification, while we found in preliminary analyses that we did not need 
such an approach to satisfy the parallel trends assumption (see methods). We also deemed it more 
appropriate to control for expenditure trends of risk types (e.g. high vs. low spenders), rather than for 
patient characteristics in isolation.
Quality of care
To study the quality of care under the shared savings program, we collected data on a wide range 
of quality indicators, from the GP registration system. We were limited to performing a before-after 
study, as control group data were either not reliable, or not available to us. By extending a patient 
survey that was already operative, we measured patient satisfaction at baseline (N = 309, 20% response 
rate) and after the end of the first performance year (N = 595, 39% response rate). The survey was 
send electronically to all patients who were enrolled with a participating GP, and who had visited the 
GP in the three months prior to the start of the performance year or in the three months after the end 
of the first performance year (September, October, November 2015). We also evaluated the quality of 
chronic care delivery (diabetes and COPD)197 and GPs’ prescription policy198. We calculated both sets 
of indicators by extracting data from the GP Information System (‘HIS’). 
Methods
For both total spending and categories of spending we used linear regression models with a 
difference-in-difference design199-201 to isolate the effect of the shared savings program on quarterly 
spending (QS). We included GP fixed effects to account for pre-intervention differences among GPs. 
In order to correct for differences in case mix between both groups, we included our risk decile fixed 
effects. Because health care expenditures might develop differently over time for different risk deciles, 
we also included linear time trends specific to each risk decile. Finally, we included quarter fixed 
effects to flexibly account for time trends common to both groups.  We used heteroscedasticity-robust 
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standard errors202 and clustered them at the level of the individual GP to account for correlation in 
expenditures between patients of the same GP, and serial correlation for the GP cluster (a GP incurring 
high costs in one quarter, may also incur high costs in the next quarter)200, 203. Our estimation equation 
is:
Equation 1




QSipq=α + Ppθ + Qqδ + SSMptβ + Riρ + q ∙ Riγ + εipt 
In which QS refers to “quarterly spending”,  for individual i assigned to provider p in quarter q. ‘α’ 
is the constant, P is a vector of indicator variables for whether p equals P, and associated GP fixed 
effects θ. Similarly, δ is the vector of quarter fixed effects. ‘SSM’ is an interaction term consisting of 
an indicator variable of whether a provider p is part of the intervention group, multiplied by an indi-
cator variable of whether quarter q belongs to the post-intervention period. ‘ρ’ is a vector of fixed 
effects belonging to risk deciles R, and γ are the associated linear time trends. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 refers to the 
error term of the equation. 
Using a linear model for health care expenditures was deemed appropriate, because we wanted 
to report the average effect of a shared savings arrangement on expenditures. Due to our large sam-
ple size, coefficients will be normally distributed around the mean, which is what one needs for con-
ventional statistical inference204. Apart from that, our difference-in-difference model specification is 
flexible, implying that it allows for a wide range of statistical relationships between independent and 
dependent variables (e.g. compared to a situation in which the risk score would enter as a continu-
ous variable)200. 
The identifying assumption underlying a difference-in-difference design, is that the intervention 
and control group exhibit parallel spending trends in the pre-intervention period (which would con-
tinue in the absence of a shared savings program)200. We tested this `parallel trends assumption’ 
using a falsification test205. Under such a test, one tests for deviations of a common trend in the pre-
intervention period by adding leads and lags of the shared savings program. A significant lead effect 
implies a deviation of the common trend. For this placebo test, our estimation equation is: 
Equation 2 
QSipq=α + Ppθ + Qqδ + AEZpβ-9 + AEZpβ-8… AEZpβstart +...AEZpβ+3 + Riρ + q ∙ Riγ + εipt 
In which AEZ is an indicator variable of whether provider p was part of our intervention group, 
and in which the β subscripts denote the time to/after the start of our intervention (-10 is the refer-
ence period, which corresponds to the first quarter of 2012).  
Our main specification reports the average effect of the shared savings program on spending, 
over all post-intervention periods. In order to assess whether this average accurately captures spend-
ing dynamics over time, we ran a difference-in-difference specification in which we interacted partic-
In which QS refers to “quarterly spending”,  for individual i assigned to provider p in quarter q. 
‘α’ is the constant, P is a vector of indicator variables for whether p equals P, and associated GP fixed 
effects θ. Similarly, δ is the vector of quarter fixed effects. ‘SSM’ is an interaction term consisting of an 
indicator variable of whether a provider p is part of the intervention group, multiplied by an indicator 
variable of whether quarter q belongs to the post-intervention period. ‘ρ’ is a vector of fixed effects 
belonging to risk deciles R, and γ are the associated linear time trends. Finally, ε refers to the error 
term of the equation.
Using a linear model for health care expenditures was deemed appropriate, because we wanted 
to report t  aver g  eff ct of a share  savings ar angement on expenditures. Due to our large 
sample size, coefficients will be normally distributed around the mean, which is what one needs for 
conventional statistical inference204. Apart from that, our difference-in-difference model specification 
is flexible, implying that it allows for a wide range of statistical relationships between independent and 
dependent variables (e.g. compared to a situation in which the risk score would enter as a continuous 
variable)200.
The identifying assumption underlying a difference-in-difference design, is that the intervention 
and control group exhibit parallel spending trends in the pre-intervention period (which would 
continue in the absence of a shared savings program)200. We tested this `parallel trends assumption’ 
using a falsification test205. Under such a test, one tests for deviations of a common trend in the pre-
intervention period by adding leads and lags of the shared savings program. A significant lead effect 
implies a deviation of the common trend. For this placebo test, our estimation equation is:
Equation 2




QSipq=α + Ppθ + Qqδ + SSMptβ + Riρ + q ∙ Riγ + εipt 
In which QS refers to “quarterly spending”,  for individual i assigned to provider p in quarter q. ‘α’ 
is the constant, P is a vector of indicator variables for whether p equals P, and associated GP fixed 
effects θ. Similarly, δ is the vector of quarter fixed effects. ‘SSM’ is an interaction term consisting of 
an indicator variable of whether a provi er p i  part of the intervention group, multiplied by an indi-
cator variable of whether quarter q belongs to the po t-interventi n p riod. ‘ρ’ is a vec or of fixed 
effects b longing to risk d ciles R, and γ are the associa d linear time trends. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 refers to the 
error term of the equation. 
Using a linear model for health care expenditures was deemed appropriate, because we wanted 
to report the average effect of a shared savings arrangement on expenditures. Due to our large sam-
ple size, coeffici nts will be normally distribut d around the m an, which is what one ne ds for con-
ventional statistical inference204. Apart from that, our difference-in-differe ce mo el specification is 
flexible, implying that it llows for a wide range of statistical relationships between independent and 
dependent variables (e.g. comp ed to a situation in which the risk score w uld enter as a continu-
ous variabl )200. 
The identifying assumption underlying a difference-in-difference design, is that the intervention 
and control group exhibit parallel spending trends in the pre-intervention period (which would con-
tinue in the absence of a shared savings program)200. We tested this `parallel trends assumption’ 
using a falsification test205. Und  such a test, one tests for deviations of a comm  trend in the pre-
intervention period by adding leads and lags of the shared savings program. A sig ificant lead effect 
implies  deviation of the common trend. For this placebo test, our estimation equation is: 
Equation 2 
QSipq=α + Ppθ + Qqδ + AEZpβ-9 + AEZpβ-8… AEZpβstart +...AEZpβ+3 + Riρ + q ∙ Riγ + εipt 
In which AEZ is an indicator variable of whether provider p was part of our intervention group, 
and in which the β subscripts denote the time to/after the start of our intervention (-10 is the refer-
ence period, which corresponds to the first quarter of 2012).  
Our main specification reports the average effect of the shared savings program on spending, 
over all post-intervention periods. In order to assess whether this average accurately captures spend-
ing dynamics over time, we ran a difference-in-difference specification in which we interacted partic-
In which AEZ is an indicator variable of whether provider p was part of our intervention group, 
and in which the β subscripts denote the time to/after the start of our intervention (-10 is the reference 
period, which corresponds to the first qu rter of 2012). 
Our main specification reports the average effect of the shared savings program on spending, 
over all post-i tervention periods. In order to assess whe her this average accurately captures 
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spending dynamics over time, we ran a difference-in-difference specification in which we interacted 
participation in the shared savings program with the time since the start of the program (with time 
capped at ‘0’ in the pre-intervention period). As a sensitivity analysis, we ran a difference-in-difference 
model for each GP separately, to check whether a shared savings effect could be found for all GPs 
or only for a number of them. This analysis informs us about the generalizability of our findings. In 
order to rule out the possibility that our shared savings coefficient captures a negotiation effect, we 
also defined a second control group that consisted of a random selection of insured within the same 
city.  
We analyzed quality using a before-after study. Our quality indicators (see Appendix A) cover 
patient satisfaction, chronic care delivery, and prescription drug policy. For each period, we calculated 
a weighted average per quality indicator, using the pre-intervention size of each participating GP as 
weights. This ensures that a comparison of quality before and after the first year of our program, 
is not confounded by changes in GP size. After all, each GP may have a different starting point. The 
problem of changes in size during our study period, is primarily an issue in the case of measuring 




Our study population consists of 25,726 insured, who have been continuously enrolled with a 
GP from our study sample, throughout our study period. Table 1 reports population characteristics 
separately for AEZ and the control group. 
AEZ Control group
Number of insured 9,637 16,089
Age, yrs (+ SD) 44.92 (22.68) 44,08 (22.21)
Female sex (%) 51% 50%
Chronic illness in 2011 (%)
Asthma 3.3% 2.8%
Diabetes Mellitus 2 2.9% 2.6%
Cardiovascular diseases 2.5% 2.3%
Risk score in 2011
Mean 1.07 0.96
Interquartile range (Q3-  Q1) 0.69 0.62
Table 1: Summary statistics
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Figure 1 shows the time pattern of unadjusted spending for both AEZ and the control group. On 
average, unadjusted spending was €56 higher for AEZ (P < 0.001) in the pre-intervention period, and 
€45 higher (P < 0.001) in the post-intervention period. This difference of -€10 is statistically significant 
(P < 0.05), which is descriptive evidence of a shared savings effect. Figure 1 also shows that the time 
pattern of pre-intervention spending is rather similar in both groups. Spikes and drops in medical 
spending are at similar positions. We formally test whether pre-intervention trends are similar for 
adjusted spending in the next section.  



















2012 --- pre-intervention period --- 2014 start pilot 2015
AEZ Control group
Change in medical spending
Throughout our study period, adjusted quarterly expenditures were €20 (P < 0.01) higher in 
the intervention group (not shown). Despite this difference in absolute health care expenditures, we 
found that spending trends were similar in the pre-intervention period: as shown in Figure 2, the 
confidence intervals of the lead effects in the pre-intervention period always include the zero. This 
result supports a causal interpretation of our findings, as it shows that the expenditure savings were 
only realized after the start of the program. 
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Table 2 reports the results of our main specification. Our difference-in-difference coefficient is 
negative and significant, suggesting that the shared savings program has led to savings in health care 
expenditures. On average, and over the entire post-intervention period, savings equal €16 per person 





Main specification with 
control group consist-
ing of city of Enschede
.. under median 
prices
Shared savings effect -15.56*** -9.931** -9.197** -8.426*
(SE) (4.532) (4.672) (3.745) (4.264)
Observations 360164 360164 350840 350840
R2 0.170 0.190 0.171 0.192
Table 2: Effect shared savings arrangement on quarterly spending, in Euro (€)*
 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. Expenditures capped at 95th percentile. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01
Figure 3 plots the shared savings effect for each quarter separately. The figure shows that 
the effect is mainly concentrated in the first two quarters of the performance year. Although the 
coefficients in later quarters are of the right sign, their confidence intervals show that they are no 
longer statistically significant at conventional levels. 























Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Quarter
Point estimate 95% CI
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Figure 4 shows that the expenditure savings were not concentrated within a single GP, but that 
each participating GP has displayed cost-saving behavior. 



























Point estimate 95% CI
Prices, volumes or both?
Among others, savings can be achieved by lowering volumes or by shifting care to lower-
priced care providers. In order to disentangle price and volume effects, we imputed median prices 
for all services delivered to the population such that price differentials between providers vanish by 
construction. Our results are in table 2, column 2. We found that the shared savings coefficient is still 
negative and significant. In terms of its size, the result suggest that savings have been predominantly 
achieved by lowering volumes.
Effect according to type of care
Table 3 shows the results of additional difference-in-difference regressions, in which the 
dependent variable `quarterly total spending’, was replaced by category-specific spending only. We 
found a significant decrease in expenditures for hospital care, laboratory tests and GP care.
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Spending under supplemental coverage 0.440 (0.467)
Prescription drug spending 0.623 (0.830)
Table 3: Effect shared savings arrangement on quarterly spending, according to type of care, in Euro (€) 
 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. Expenditures capped at the 95th percentile. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p <  0.01
Is there a negotiation effect?
An alternative explanation of our finding that expenditures dropped in the post-intervention 
period, is that Menzis has tightened hospital budgets in the region immediately surrounding our 
intervention GPs, and that such effects materialize in the last quarters of the calendar year (which 
are the first quarters of the program’s performance year, exactly those in which we found significant 
savings). In order to test this hypothesis, we replaced the control group with a random sample of 
Menzis insured in the city of Enschede. This control group would pick up any negotiation effect, 
because these insured live in exactly the same area. Our effect is similar to the one reported using our 
regular control group, under median prices. When we again imputed median prices for this second 
control group, the shared savings coefficient turned out to be rather similar. The combination of 
findings suggest that it cannot be ruled out that part of the result is due to effects at the level of the 
region, but that the shared savings effect is still present when controlling for this. The results from this 
analysis confirm that savings have been predominantly achieved by lowering volumes rather than by 
actively shifting care to lower priced care providers (within a geographical market.) 
Change in quality of care (see Appendix A)
We quantified changes in quality of care using a before-after study, in which we compare 
quality before and after the start of the shared savings arrangement. We found small and statistically 
insignificant  changes in patient satisfaction (p-value > 0.05), suggesting that patient satisfaction 
remained constant throughout our period of study. For chronic care and prescription drug policy, 
our results are ambiguous. We found both improvements and declines in quality. We found a large 
absolute decline in the percentage of patients with type-2 diabetes mellitus, who get treatment via a 
chronic care program (Appendix B).
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The results suggest that, in its first performance year, the shared savings arrangement was 
successful in changing GP behavior – which answers our first research question: the first performance 
year of the shared savings arrangement resulted in a 3.5% drop in per capita medical spending, which 
was not offset by actual shared savings payments to providers or development costs (not disclosed). 
Therefore, the arrangement led to net savings in its first year while, at the same time, overall quality 
seemed to have remained rather constant.  Importantly, we found that each GP has displayed cost-
saving behavior, and that for all but one GP, these costs savings were significantly different from zero. 
This supports a causal interpretation of our findings. 
While overall quality remained rather constant, we did find significant drops or increases for some 
individual indicators. In discussing these findings with the participating GPs, we found no adequate 
explanation for these sudden swings in quality, suggesting that the shared savings arrangement has 
primarily targeted spending behavior and not quality. What is striking, however, is the large absolute 
decline in the number of patients enrolled in a chronic care program for diabetes (Appendix B). GPs 
enroll patients in to these programs, and receive a bundled payment for each enrolled patient, in 
exchange for which they have to provide chronic care. The GPs indicated that they critically reviewed 
their enrollment policy during the pilot period, in terms of patient no shows and the extent to which 
each diabetic patient would require the full service level as covered by the bundled payment. Patients 
with high no show rates, or patients who would be equally well off with a lower number of services 
(e.g. less foot exams), were excluded from the program and received regular care instead. This leads 
to direct cost savings, while it should have little or no effect on the quality of care. In its current form, 
the shared savings arrangement incentivizes to exclude no-show patients from chronic care programs, 
because these patients lower a provider’s average score on the process indicators and directly lower 
the shared savings payment rate (which is a function of process quality).  
As discussed earlier, one of the main motivations for implementing a shared savings arrangement, 
was to incentivize GPs to take up their role as coordinators within the health care system, by not only 
rewarding them for savings in primary care expenditures, but also for savings in spending by other 
providers. We found that the bulk of the shared savings effect can be attributed to a drop in hospital 
expenditures, suggesting that GPs have truly taken up this role. The large volume effect we found, 
combined with our finding that overall quality remained rather constant, signals that GPs have realized 
a reduction in wasteful or low-value care (of which the exclusion of no-show patients from chronic 
care programs is a clear example), rather than merely shifting patients to lower priced care providers. 
These results suggest that a (one-sided) shared savings arrangement is a promising way of transmitting 
value-based incentives to GPs, which answers our second and last research question.  However, there 
are two issues that warrant further attention. 
First, it is not yet clear whether the incentives that follow from a shared savings arrangement 
have a lasting impact on participating providers. The dynamics of the shared savings effect showed 
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that the arrangement’s contribution to lowering health care spending was concentrated in the first 
two quarters of the year. For later quarters, the arrangement’s influence on health care expenditures 
was no longer statistically significant. A reason for this temporary effect could be that by the end 
of the first performance year, many GP-based interventions to reduce spending were still not fully 
implemented – suggesting that there is room for improvement. Also, the GPs themselves indicated 
that the most important intervention during the first performance year, was the sharing of expenditure 
data by Menzis. Although GPs are gatekeepers to specialist care, they are typically uninformed about 
medical spending elsewhere in the spectrum. Therefore, providing data on prices and volumes of 
spending outside the GP practices, and benchmarking these against other practices, was considered 
insightful by all GPs. This, however, was a one-off event because the possibilities for providing real-
time data on expenditures were limited. It therefore seems plausible to assume that the effect of this 
information on GP behavior fades away with time, when the information becomes outdated. This fits 
with the within-year dynamics of the shared savings effect we observed, which showed a decline in 
incentive strength towards the end of the performance year. Whether sharing expenditure data prior 
to the start of the next performance year, or sharing data multiple times throughout the year, creates 
a similar or persisting effect on health care expenditure respectively, is a question open to follow-up 
research. 
Second and last, we found that the impact of the shared savings arrangement on quality was 
ambiguous. On average, the quality level remained rather constant over the performance year. Under 
the arrangement, a primary incentive for participating providers is to lower spending, and, by letting 
the sharing rate depend on elements of performance, one can provide some constraints as to the 
interventions GPs will employ to earn shared savings payments. Nevertheless, the incentive to cut 
back on spending is stronger by design, because high quality, in and by itself, does not directly lead 
to shared savings payments. Depending on the situation at hand, and the nature of the value-based 
incentives that one wants to introduce via a shared savings arrangement, one may opt for a different 
way of intertwining costs and quality incentives. In our pilot group, quality levels were generally 
satisfactory while cost levels were not, so much weight was put on directing efforts to lowering 
spending, while, at a minimum, maintaining the quality status quo. This was done by giving large 
weights to ‘absolute performance’, relative to ‘improvement’. However, the arrangement included a 
provision that a decline in quality of more than 5% would imply that no savings were shared at all. 
Stronger quality incentives can be introduced by putting more weight on improvement, or by sharing 
savings only conditionally on achieving a combined set of quality targets. 
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, in case attrition affects the common trend assumption, 
estimating difference-in-difference models using Ordinary Least Squares requires that the sample is 
balanced, meaning that we need to exclude persons who we do not observe for the full window of 
study206. Provided that we can only control for some health-related reasons underlying attrition, the 
results of this study may therefore not be fully generalizable to different populations. However, we 
did find that this selection requirement was important in obtaining reliable estimates: we found that 
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for our attrition sample, differences in age and the probability of having a chronic disease were more 
pronounced between the intervention and control group than in our estimation sample (for those for 
whom data were available). This suggests that patterns of attrition are different between both groups, 
which could lead to different growth patterns and a violation of the common trend assumption 
accordingly, if not adequately controlled for. 
A second limitation of this study, is that we were limited to performing a before-after study to 
detect changes in quality induced by the shared savings arrangement. Therefore, we are unable to 
separate a time trend – if any – from an intervention effect. A third and related limitation is that, in 
measuring patient satisfaction, we were obliged to use the survey that was already in place. Although 
we were given the opportunity to add some of our own questions, it implied that we could not use an 
empirically validated patient survey.  
A fourth limitation is that we capped expenditures at the 95th percentile of the spending distribution 
for each quarter, implying that, in principle, our results do not generalize to the full population of 
patients. In our sample, medical spending was skewed to the right (skewness > 7). Spending outliers 
can have a profound influence on the spending average, which is the main economic quantity we are 
studying, while at the same time it is difficult to predict who will be a cost outlier102 (meaning that we 
cannot adequately control for factors that drive extraordinary surges in individual spending). In our 
case, outliers consumed up to 150 times more than the median and the top 5 percent spenders were 
responsible for 40% of medical spending. Hence, even a slight imbalance in the number of outliers 
in the intervention and control group, can mask a shared savings effect. Surprisingly, the parallel 
trend test did not reject the null of parallel trends when using the uncapped expenditures. However, 
a closer look at the data revealed that, throughout our study period, the proportion of outliers was 
higher in the intervention group. Plots of the proportions of outliers in both groups showed that these 
differences were becoming smaller over time – a trend that was already visible at the start of our 
observation window (2 years before the start of the program). Using uncapped expenditures – which 
would be a legitimate choice given the results of the parallel trend test – would therefore overestimate 
the shared savings effect (we found a highly significant drop in quarterly spending, of €77). Inasmuch 
the spending of outliers was limited in anticipation of joining the shared savings program, our results, 
using capped expenditures, are a conservative estimate of the true shared savings effect. 
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This first year evaluation of the shared savings arrangement contains several insights for health 
care policy. First, a shared savings arrangement can help transmitting value-based incentives to 
providers, in the sense that it incentivizes providers to bend the cost curve without compromising 
on quality of care. Second, performance under a shared savings arrangement seems to be driven 
by the extent to which it is possible to share spending data with providers, suggesting an important 
role for privacy law here. Third, even in a highly fragmented health care system, one may be able 
to find provider types who are able to assume accountability for total health care spending. Thus, 
market competition does not necessarily have to be compromised, in the sense that one does not 
need vertical integration of providers across the spectrum in order to assume accountability50. Fourth, 
we also found a drop in providers’ own expenditures, suggesting that it is not necessarily true that the 
fee-for-service incentive is stronger than the shared savings incentive207. We attributed this drop in GP 
expenditures in part to the process indicators in our pay-for-performance element in the arrangement, 
which discourage GPs from billing a bundled payment for patients that do not require or do not want 
the full bundle of services. Finally, this evaluation also confirms that a one-sided risk arrangement, in 
which providers do not share in excess spending, already elicits substantive effort to reduce spending 
– even when it is introduced as a ‘mere’ complement to the existing payment model48. Introducing 
additional value-based incentives in health care purchasing markets therefore does not seem to rely 
on disruptive payment reform. 
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Appendix A: Quality Indicators and Scores
COPD
(Score / maximum score)
Indicator Baseline PY1 Significant (p<0.10)?
Percentage of patients who had their inhalation technique tested at least 
once in the past 12 months 90.53% 64.98% yes
Percentage of patients who received spirometry based on FEV1/FVC ratio 
post BD in the past 12 months 81.98% 72.90% yes
Percentage of patients whose level of physical activity was registered 93.55% 86.51% yes
Percentage of patients whose smoking behavior was registered 96.18% 89.16% yes
Percentage of patients smoking, of those for whom smoking behavior was 
registered 50.12% 50.76% no
Percentage of patients who have received a flu shot 85.75% 85.47% no
Percentage of patients who experienced an exacerbation at least twice in 
the past 12 months 81.98% 85.09% no
Diabetes
(Score / maximum score)
Indicator Baseline PY1 Significant (p<0.10)?
Percentage of patients tested at least once for Hba1c levels in the past 12 
months 97.04% 98.89% yes
Percentage of patients with Hba1c levels < 53 mmol/mol, of those tested 61.28% 59.38% no
Percentage of patients with Hba1c levels>69 mmol/mol, of those tested 94.32% 94.42% no
Percentage of patients whose lipid profile was measured in the past 12 
months 88.34% 91.18% no
Percentage of patients with LDL-cholesterol levels < 2,5 mmol/l, of those 
tested 67.90% 66.61% no
Percentage of patients whose renal clearance was determined at least 
once in the past 12 months 92.11% 94.34% no
Percentage of patients whose albumin clearance was tested at least once 
in the past 12 months 84.38% 89.10% yes
Percentage of patients whose blood pressure was tested at least once in 
the past 12 months 96.98% 98.74% yes
Percentage of patients with a systolic blood pressure < 140 mm Hg, of 
those tested 62.61% 63.76% no
Percentage of patients whose BMI was determined at least once in the 
past 12 months 94.57% 97.97% yes
Percentage of patients with a BMI < 25, of those tested 16.06% 15.89% no
Percentage of patients whose smoking behavior was registered 92.56% 98.08% yes
Percentage of patients smoking, of those for whom smoking behavior was 
registered 80.07% 80.41% no
524990-L-bw-Hayen
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 102
Chapter 4
102
Percentage of patients who have received aneye examination at least once 
in the past 24 months 85.04% 93.61% yes
Percentage of patients with diabetic retinopathy, of those tested 87.13% 89.29% no
Percentage of patients who have received a foot exam 83.89% 91.19% yes
Patient satisfaction
(10-point scale)
Indicator Baseline PY1 Significant (p<0.10)?
Overall satisfaction 8.2 8.2 no
The degree of satisfaction with the final treatment decision 8.2 8.4 no
The ease with which you could make an appointment 8.4 8.4 no
The time between making an appointment and seeing the provider 8.5 8.3 no
The ease with which you could reach your provider by phone 8.1 8.1 no
The personal attention you received during your visit 8.6 8.4 no
The extent to which the provider tries to understand your problem 8.6 8.6 no
The extent to which you shared in decision-making about your treatment 8.6 8.5 no
The extent to which you were informed about your condition and treat-
ment 8.4 8.5 no
The extent to which you understood this information 8.5 8.5 no
Prescription drug policy
Score / Maximum score
Indicator Baseline PY1 Significant (p<0.10)?
Percentage of users of who use metformine as an anti-diabetic drug 88.90% 91.20% no
Percentage of users of statines whose last receipt contained simvastatine, 
out of those who use lipid lowering medication 50.70% 50.80% no
Percentage of users of triptans, whose dosage is less than 72 tables su-
matriptan or less than 48 tables of other triptans 89.30% 87.40% no
Percentage of new users of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, who 
use ibuprofen, naproxen or diclofenac 78.30% 82.70% yes
Percantage of users of simvastatine, who receive dosages of 40mg 66.90% 69% no
Percentage of chronic users (40-79 years) of nitrates or platelet aggrega-
tion inhibitors who have received statins 70.80% 69.60% no
Users of angiotensin II receptor antagonists, who use the generic product 
(losartan, valsartan, etc.) 85.20% 88.40% Yes
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Appendix B: Patients with Diabetes Mellitus type 2, and their 
enrollment into chronic care programs
Enrollment type Baseline PY1 Significant (p<0.10)?
Percentage of DM2 patients receiving treatment mainly from a 
specialist 14% 13% no
… receiving treatment mainly from a GP 82% 85% no
… receiving treatment mainly from a GP, but not out of a chronic 
care program 5% 13% yes
… enrolled in a chronic care program 77% 71% yes 
524990-L-bw-Hayen
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 104
CHAPTER 5
Does the framing of patient 
cost-sharing incentives matter? 
The effects of deductibles vs. no-claim refundsN
524990-L-bw-Hayen
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 105
CHAPTER 5
Does the framing of patient 
cost-sharing incentives matter? 
The effects of deductibles vs. no-claim refundsN
524990-L-bw-Hayen




High and increasing health care expenditures are a major policy concern in many countries. 
One of the main policy tools to reduce medical spending is to introduce or expand patient cost-
sharing schemes that let patients pay for a portion of health care expenditures not covered by health 
insurance. Across OECD countries, patients now pay on average around 20 percent of total health care 
expenditures out-of-pocket208. Evidence from both field experiments65, 209 and natural experiments210, 
211 shows that individuals reduce medical spending in response to economic incentives that follow 
from cost-sharing schemes such as deductibles and co-payments.
Yet, individuals might react not only to the economic incentives themselves, but also to the way 
these economic incentives are framed. For example, instead of framing cost-sharing incentives as a 
price that patients have to pay for health care utilization, they can also be framed as a refund that 
patients receive if they use little or no health care. From other contexts we know that individuals’ 
choices can be affected by the framing of economic incentives212, 213. More generally, seemingly 
small changes in policy schemes can have large effects, and understanding whether such changes 
make a difference is a key input in the design of economic policy214. In our context, the framing of 
cost-sharing incentives can have implications for cost containment, access to care, and financial risk 
borne by patients, and understanding how the framing of cost-sharing incentives affects health care 
expenditures can help with improving the design of health insurance plans.
In this study, we compare patients’ responses to a deductible to the responses to a no-claim 
refund, two alternative patient cost-sharing schemes. The economic incentives under a deductible and 
a no-claim refund are very similar, but they are presented in a different way. Under a deductible policy, 
individuals pay out-of-pocket for all medical care up to the deductible limit. Under a no-claim refund 
policy, individuals receive a payment at the end of the year if their health care spending during the year 
was below the no-claim refund limit. The payment is equal to the difference between the no-claim 
refund limit and annual health care spending. Loss aversion implies that individuals respond stronger 
to losses than to gains76. If individuals perceive deductible payments as losses and lower no-claim 
refunds as foregone gains then we might expect that individuals will react stronger to deductibles than 
to no-claim refunds. Therefore, the different framing of cost-sharing incentives might have an impact 
on health care expenditures.
Usually, it is hard to study the effect of such differences in plan design, since patient populations 
differ between insurance plans. In our paper, we make use of the fact that in the Netherlands, 
both schemes have been in place at different points of time while the patient population and the 
services covered by health insurance remained comparable. In the years 2006 and 2007 Dutch law 
has mandated that health insurance contracts included a no-claim refund, and from the year 2008 
onward, it required that health insurance contracts include an annual deductible.
N Hayen, A. P., Klein, T.J., & Salm, M. Does the framing of patient cost-sharing incentives matter? The effects of 
deductibles vs. no-claim refunds.
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Our analysis is based on unique administrative data from the Netherlands for the years 2006-
2015. Our data include claim-level information on health care utilization from a Dutch health insurer, 
which we aggregate to around 9 million person-month observations. Having information on health 
care utilization at a monthly level is important for our empirical strategy, which exploits variation in 
cost-sharing incentives within a year. One can think of cost-sharing as imposing a price of care. Under 
both a deductible policy and a no-claim refund the price for health care utilization can vary over the 
course of the year depending on whether or not an individual has exceeded her deductible or no-claim 
refund limit. For health care expenditures below these limits the price is one, while for expenditures 
above these limits the price is zero from the patient’s perspective. Following Brot-Goldberg et al. 211 we 
define prices as the price for the first unit of care in a given month, and we examine how the reaction 
to prices differs between the years when a no-claim refund policy was in place and the years when 
a deductible policy was in place. Our main hypothesis is that individuals respond stronger to prices 
under a deductible policy than under a no-claim refund policy.
We account for the possible endogeneity of prices with an instrumental variables approach. As 
instrumental variable for the price we use a simulated average price for people in the same risk score 
decile and age group, and with the same gender. This approach exploits differences in the evolution 
of prices across groups of individuals: individuals with higher risk scores tend to exceed cost-sharing 
limits more frequently and earlier in the year than individuals with lower risk scores. Our instrumental 
variable approach is similar to the approach by Ellis et al.215, who use average prices for different 
health insurance plans as instruments, leaving out the price of the respective individual. Instead of 
using average prices, we simulate prices using draws from the empirical distribution of health care 
costs within groups, pooling over all years and months. Thereby, we purge the simulated average 
prices of possibly confounding factors that may lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction. By 
design, variation in our instrument within the year is not affected by seasonal trends in health care 
expenditures and variation across years is solely driven by changes to the institutional rules, but not by 
the reaction of individuals to those changes. Comparable simulated instrumental variable approaches 
have been employed in other settings216-218, but are new in the context of studying the effects of 
patient cost-sharing.
We find that a higher price decreases health care expenditures under both a no-claim refund 
and a deductible policy, but the decrease is much larger under a deductible policy. Monthly health 
care expenditures are reduced by 17.5 percent under a no-claim refund and by 36.2 percent under a 
deductible. Hence, the framing of incentives can be quantitatively as important as the incentive itself. 
While these estimates might seem large, our estimates for the deductible scheme are similar to the 
results obtained by Brot-Goldberg et al.211. We do not find significant differences in the size of the effect 
by age and by income in the neighborhood, but we do find that women react stronger to prices than 
men and that effects are stronger for individuals with lower risk scores than for individuals with higher 
risk scores. Cost-sharing has no economically significant effect for a range of high value treatments 
such as medication for diabetes and hypertension. This is not altered by the framing of cost-sharing 
incentives. Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity analyses which use alternative definitions 
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of health care utilization and alternative specifications of explanatory variables. Our results cannot 
be explained by end of year effects, and in a placebo test we find no significant effect when we apply 
our empirical approach to 15-17 year olds who in the Netherlands are excluded from both no-claim 
refunds and deductibles.
We interpret our findings as evidence for a strong effect of the framing of cost-sharing incentives 
on health care expenditures. An alternative explanation would be the different timing of payments 
under a no-claim refund and a deductible policy. Invoices for deductible payments are sent a few 
months after treatment, while no-claim refunds are due only after the end of the calendar year. 
However, we show that the difference in responses to a deductible policy and a no-claim refund policy 
is too large to be explained by the difference in timing of payments. Based on a simple model similar 
to Einav et al.219 we show that the annual discount rate that would be necessary to explain our results 
is above 300%, which we consider to be implausibly large. We also show that if we discount payment 
streams with a large, but still plausible annual discount rate of 10% our results remain essentially 
unchanged.
Our study makes several contributions. First, our study contributes to the literature on the effect 
of patient cost-sharing on health care expenditures. Studies on the effect of patient cost-sharing on 
annual health care expenditures in the Netherlands include Ecorys, Lambregts and van Vliet, and 
Remmerswaal et al. 71, 80, 220 EO. A focus of the recent literature on patient cost-sharing and health care 
expenditures is a better understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of patients’ responses to 
cost-sharing schemes, e.g. to what degree patients respond to the dynamic incentives provided by 
cost-sharing schemes67, 221, 222, whether co-payments cause patients to shop for cheaper providers211, 
or how responses vary by type of medical service223. In our study, we expand the knowledge about 
patients’ responses to cost-sharing schemes in a new direction by showing that the framing of patient 
cost-sharing as deductible or as no-claim refund can have a large impact on health care utilization. 
Relatedly, Remmerswaal et al.80 show that the difference in annual health care expenditures in the 
Netherlands between 19 and 17 year olds is bigger in years when a deductible was in place than in 
years when a no-claim refund was in place.
Second, our study contributes to the literature on prospect theory and loss-aversion76. Johnson et 
al.79 predict that individuals should react stronger to deductibles than to no-claim refunds in insurance 
markets. However, van Winssen et al.224 point out that this prediction depends on a specific choice 
of reference point. If individuals choose their financial situation after paying insurance premiums 
as reference point then they will see a deductible payment as a loss and no-claim refund as a gain, 
and as a consequence they will react stronger to a deductible than to a no-claim refund. If however, 
individuals choose their financial situation before paying insurance premiums as reference point, 
then they will feel to be in the loss domain under both schemes, and there should be no stronger 
response to deductibles than to no-claim refunds. Theory provides no clear guidance about how 
individuals choose reference points in the context of loss aversion. Reference points can be chosen 
O A survey on the Dutch literature can be found in Remmerswaal et al. (2015).
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as either the decision maker’s status quo, an expectation, or an aspiration level225, and evidence on 
how reference points are chosen in field settings is scarce. The fact that we find a stronger response 
under a deductible than under a no-claim refund provides support for the hypothesis that individuals 
choose their financial situation after paying insurance premiums as reference point. Thus, our study 
contributes to our understanding of how individuals choose reference points in the context of patient 
cost-sharing.
Third, our study focuses on no-claim refunds, a form of cost-sharing in insurance markets that has 
received relatively little attention in the previous literature. No-claim refunds can be applied to many 
different types of insurance contracts with cost-sharing, and they are common for example in private 
health insurance plans in Germany. Previous studies provided several reasons for why no-claim refunds 
might have advantages compared to more traditional cost-sharing schemes such as deductibles and 
co-payments. Johnson et al.79 argue that loss averse agents might prefer an insurance plan with a no-
claim refund over an insurance plan with a deductible. Individuals might see no-claim refunds as a 
“friendlier” form of cost-sharing. Furthermore, Fels226 shows in a theoretical model that incentivizing 
efficient health care utilization with a bonus rather than with deductibles and co-payments can be 
optimal if consumers make mistakes and can be financially constrained.
In the following, Section 2 describes the institutional background. A conceptual framework based 
on loss aversion is proposed in Section 3. Section 4 provides details on the data. Section 5 presents 
descriptive evidence. Section 6 describes the empirical approach. Section 7 presents the main results 
and Section 8 presents robustness checks. Section 9 discusses policy implications and concludes.
Institutional background
The Dutch health care system lends itself well for separating framing effects from other 
determinants of demand. Insurance plans with a no-claim refund in the years 2006 and 2007 and 
insurance plans with a deductible in the years thereafter were markedly similar in terms of coverage 
and services for which there was cost-sharing. These plans also provided similar economic incentives 
because the deductible limit was similar in size to the no-claim refund limit. Next, we provide some 
background information on the health care system in the Nether-lands, the two cost-sharing schemes, 
and the way in which providers are paidP.F
Health insurance in the Netherlands
The Netherlands have a system of universal, mandatory health insurance coverage. Since a reform 
of the health insurance system in the year 2006, insurance is funded in about equal pro-portions 
by income-dependent employer contributions that are paid into a fund and premiums paid by the 
insured. At the same time, there is a risk equalization scheme between insurance providers.
Every resident of the Netherlands is obliged to purchase a basic, nationally standardized 
insurance plan on the market, from one of several competing private health insurers. The premiums 
P  See for instance Schäfer et al. (2010) for additional details.
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are community-rated, meaning that the insurance premium is similar across patients, irrespective of 
characteristics like age, gender, and health status. Premiums may only differ for different levels of cost-
sharing, and for enrollees who enroll via a collective bargaining agreement (in which case they can 
receive a discount of up to a 10% of their monthly insurance premium). Furthermore, health insurers 
are not allowed to deny basic health insurance coverage.
The basic health insurance plan includes a wide range of services, such as general practitioner 
(GP) services, hospital care, prescription drugs, mental health care, and medical devices such as 
hearing aids and prostheses. On top of this basic insurance package, individuals can buy additional 
coverage on the market for supplemental health insurance, for example for dental care.
Private insurers compete with one another in terms of policy conditions. Apart from setting the 
level of the monthly premium, health insurers may also restrict coverage, for example by contracting 
selectively with providers. However, case law demands that health insurers still pay a ‘substantial’ 
amount of the bill in case a patient visits an out-of-network provider. The contracts between health 
insurer and care providers typically contain agreements on prices, volumes, and quality227. At the start 
of each year, insurees are allowed to switch to another health insurer. Between 2006 and 2012, the 
annual switching rates ranged between 4 and 6 percent228.
Patient cost-sharing
Since the year 2006 the Dutch government has implemented two alternative patient cost-sharing 
schemes. They have been in place at different points in time. Both schemes were mandatory and 
uniform across health insurance plans. In the years 2006 and 2007, health insurance plans had to 
include a no-claim refund, and since the year 2008 health insurance plans have to include an annual 
deductible. Under the no-claim refund scheme enrollees receive a refund at the end of the year if their 
annual health care spending during the year was below the no-claim refund limit. The amount of the 
refund is equal to the difference between the no-claim refund limit and annual health care spending. 
Under the deductible scheme individuals pay out-of-pocket for all care up to the deductible limit. 
Health care utilization beyond the deductible limit is free from the patient’s perspective.
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Figure 1: No-claim refunds and deductibles
NOTES: This figure shows financial implications of care consumption under a no-claim refund and a deductible. 
The cost-sharing limit is the same for both.
Annual payment streams for both schemes are illustrated in Figure 1. For illustration purposes, 
the no-claim refund limit in the figure is set equal to the deductible limit. The horizontal axis depicts 
annual health care spending. The vertical axis shows annual payments relative to a reference point 
which in the figure is set to the financial situation after paying health insurance premiums. Under a 
no-claim refund scheme the financial situation is always positive or zero compared to the reference 
point for any level of annual health care spending. Under a deductible scheme the financial situation is 
always negative or zero. The two curves for no-claim refunds and for deductibles have the same shape, 
but they are shifted vertically. The identical shape of the two curves reflects that the “price” that 
patients have to pay for an additional euro of health care utilization is identical under both schemes 
for any level of annual health care spending. The vertical shift between the two curves does not imply 
that health care is cheaper under a no-claim refund scheme than under a deductible scheme. Instead, 
the vertical shift will be offset by different levels of health insurance premiums which will be higher 
under the no-claim refund scheme than under the deductible scheme.
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The no-claim refund limit in the years 2006 and 2007 was 255 euros. The deductible limit started 
at 150 euros in the year 2008, and it was subsequently increased in several steps to 375 euros in the 
year 2015P.G Minors up to the age of 18 years are excluded from patient cost-sharing under both the 
no-claim refund and the deductible scheme (a feature we make use of in a placebo test). Furthermore, 
certain types of medical services such as GP care and maternity care are also excluded from patient 
cost-sharing (GPs are a patient’s first point of contact when in need for health care, and they have a 
gatekeeping function in the Dutch health care system, cf. Schäfer et al.63).
Under both regimes, individuals could opt for a voluntary, additional deductible (in quantities 
of 100 euros, with a maximum of 500 euros)R.H In return, they received a discount on their monthly 
premium. Under the no-claim refund, the no-claim limit needed to be exhausted first, before health 
are spending would count towards the voluntary deductibleS.I 
Importantly, there were no other policy changes at the same time. Coverage and services were 
not affected by the reform. Even though cost-sharing regimes were uniform across different patient 
populations, people with a chronic illness could apply for a subsidy that partially compensates them 
for their higher expected deductible payments. Eligibility was determined based on whether or not 
people had received treatment for chronic illnesses in the previous two years. Since it was based on 
expenditures in previous years, the subsidy did not depend on current year’s spending. Despite the 
fact that many people would qualify for this subsidy, a substantial share of the people eligible for 
receiving the funds were not aware of the rule229.
Payment of providers and timing of deductible payments
The way in which providers are paid is important for understanding the spending dynamics under 
cost-sharing regimes, because it influences the timing of payments by the patients. In the Netherlands, 
providers are predominantly paid for bundles of services63. For specialist care, services are bundled 
into so-called “diagnosis-treatment combinations (DTC’s)”230. The specialist assigns the patient to 
a DTC upon first contact, but is allowed to adjust this choice later should there be changes in the 
treatment process. As of 2010, a similar bundling takes place for the treatment of specific chronic 
diseases (e.g. diabetes, COPD, and the management of those at risk of cardiovascular diseases, cf. 
Van Til et al.231). One consequence of bundled payment is that patients are not billed for each service 
separately, but for the entire DTC at once. 
Deductible payments are not collected by providers at the point of service, but by the health 
insurer. This means that a health service needs to be billed first to the health insurer before the 
deductible payment is due. This is usually done with a delay (the average delay across all claims in 
our data is 60 days, see also Figure C.5 in the appendix). Thereafter, when the health insurer receives 
Q  The deductible limits were 155 euros in 2009, 165 euros in 2010, 170 euros in 2011, 220 euros in 2012, 350 
euros in 2013, 360 euros in 2014.
R  The number of individuals doing so was almost negligible. We exclude them from our analysis. See Data for 
details.
S GP care is generally excluded from cost-sharing, but did fall under the voluntary deductible when there was a 
no-claim refund.
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the bill, he will determine the amount the patient has to pay based on the height of the remaining 
deductible. In our analysis below, the key explanatory variable is whether, because of other treatments, 
cost-sharing limits have been exhausted at the time a new treatment decision is made. Then, we say 
that the price of care is zero for the individual. 
Importantly, we count the expenditures on other treatments towards the cost-sharing limit if 
these other treatments have been started at the time a new treatment decision is made, irrespective 
of whether or not the other treatments have already been billed to the health insurer. This implies that 
patients might not always know whether or not they have exceeded their cost-sharing limit at a given 
point in time, because they do not know the exact costs for treatments that have been started, but 
have not yet been billed to the health insurer. However, for more frequent treatments patients might 
know the approximate costs based on past experience. The costs for any serious treatment, which for 
example involves repeated consultations with a medical specialist or an overnight stay at an hospital, 
are likely to exceed the relatively low cost-sharing limits in the Netherlands.
Conceptual framework 
Non-linear price schedules
Our study examines how patients react to cost-sharing under a deductible and no-claim refund 
policy, respectively. To study this, we use the concept of the price of health care, which is one if an 
individual has to pay himself and zero if a treatment is fully covered by the insurer.
Under both policies individuals make decisions throughout the year. The price of care is a function 
of past health care consumption in the same year, and can therefore vary over the course of a year. 
At the beginning of the year the price of care is one. After patients have exceeded their annual cost-
sharing limit the price they pay for additional care is zero. Forward-looking decision-makers should 
take this into account when making choices about health care utilization. In a seminal theory article, 
Keeler and Rolph232 present a set of assumptions including risk neutrality and separability of the 
utility function in health and money under which the expected end-of-year price—this is equal to one 
minus the probability of hitting the cost-sharing limit by the end the year—is the only relevant price. 
Ellis215 refines this by also incorporating risk aversion and derives the relevant shadow price. Based 
on this, one could proceed and spell out a structural model and estimate it using our data. This will 
involve making a set of assumptions on the stochastic process describing the evolution and temporal 
dependence of health care needs. We do so in a companion paper, in which we study the reaction of 
patients to the deductible and then perform counterfactual experiments233.
Here, we instead follow Brot-Goldberg et al.211 and Ellis et al.223 and focus on the question of how 
health care consumption depends on the current price of health care at the point in time at which 
the decision is made, and then study how this reaction depends on the framing of cost-sharing. We 
do so for two related reasons. First, recent empirical studies find evidence for substantial myopia in 
patients’ decisions about health care use in the presence of non-linear price schedules. In particular, 
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Brot-Goldberg et al.211 show that patients react to current prices even after controlling for expected 
end-of-year prices . Second, health care consumption is lumpy and deductibles are relatively small in 
the Netherlands. Both the current price and the expected end-of-year (“future”) price are functions 
of past health care consumption, and because of the lumpiness and the small cost-sharing limits both 
are highly correlated. In our estimation sample, the correlation is 0,799. In addition, we intentionally 
do not control for the evolution of the future price over the course of the year, as it is not the focus 
of this paper whether the reaction we observe is a reaction to the future price or the current priceT.J 
We will however control for differences across individuals by controlling for the future price at the 
beginning of the year. 
Framing as gains and losses
Loss aversion, one of the elements of prospect theory, postulates that decision makers value 
losses more than corresponding gains. This concept can also be applied to patient cost-sharing for 
health insurance where cost-sharing incentives can be perceived either as a loss or a gain. Whether 
patients perceive payments as a loss or a gain depends on their reference point. Previous theoretical 
studies propose alternative reference points in the context of cost-sharing schemes in insurance 
markets. Johnson et al.79 consider the case when patients perceive their financial situation after paying 
insurance premiums as reference point. Compared to this reference point they will view a deductible 
payment as a loss. On the other hand, if they receive a refund at the end of the year under a no-
claim refund policy, then they will view this payment as a gain relative to their reference point. Thus, 
patients should react stronger to cost-sharing under a deductible policy than under a no-claim refund 
policy. The exact same annual payment can be evaluated differently when cost-sharing incentives are 
provided by a deductible instead of a no-claim refund.
The reasoning above is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a utility curve under loss aversion 
when the cost-sharing limit has not been reached. The reference point is the financial situation after 
paying health insurance premiums. The utility curve is steeper to the left than to the right of the 
cutoff point, and in both directions the utility curve becomes flatter with increasing distance to the 
reference point. The figure shows that the experienced effect of a deductible payment is higher than 
the effect of an equivalent reduction in the refund under a no-claim re-fund policy. When patients 
make decisions about medical care use they will compare the value of the treatment with the value 
they assign to their own payment, either a deductible payment or a foregone refund under a no-claim 
refund policy. Thus, patients will use less medical care under a deductible policy than under a no-claim 
refund policy . 
T  In fact, the coefficient on the current price will capture the effect of both, the evolution of the current price and 
the evolution of the future price. Qualitatively, we will see a similar reaction in either case, as prices are highly 
positively correlated. Because of the correlation, our estimates will put the more weight on the current price the 
more individuals discount. To see this, consider the two polar cases. Suppose individuals are fully myopic. Then, 
they will react only to the current price, which is included in the regression. Instead assume that they are fully 
forward-looking and don’t discount. Then, they will react only to the future price. As this price is highly positively 
correlated with the current price that is included in the regression, we will qualitatively capture the effect of the 
future price even if we include the current price into the regressions.
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Figure 2: Experienced effects
NOTES: This figure shows the experienced effects of a foregone refund and of a deductible payment. The 
amount for both is the same.
To be precise, the hypothesis stated above is that individuals are loss averse and that patients 
use their financial situation after paying insurance premiums as reference point. However, individuals 
might choose reference points other than their financial situation after paying insurance premiums. 
van Winssen et al.224 point out that the conclusion above does not hold if patients use the financial 
situation before paying health insurance premiums as reference point. In this case patients would 
always be in the loss domain under both a deductible policy and a no-claim refund policy and for any 
level of annual health care expenditures, and we would not expect a stronger response to deductibles 
than to no-claim refunds.
Previous studies provide no guideline which reference point patients should choose in the context 
of cost-sharing schemes in insurance markets. Finding that patients react stronger to deductibles 
suggests that the reference point is given by wealth after insurance premiums have been paid.
Data
Our data come from a large Dutch health insurer. They were obtained under a concurrent pilot 
project in which a new payment model for GPs was designed and implemented (see Hayen et al.192 , 
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for details). This pilot ran from July 2014 to the end of 2015, but the data also include pre-intervention 
years. The data cover the years 2006 to 2015, allowing us to compare spending under the entire no-
claim regime (2006 and 2007), to spending under the deductible regime (from 2008 onward).
From a set of approximately 200 GPs that participated either in the intervention or were part of 
the control group, we first selected all insurance enrollees who were registered with those GPs. For 
our main analysis, we used observations for individuals who were at least 19 years old (such that they 
were subject to cost-sharing for the entire year—information on the month of birth is not available 
to us), were insured for the entire year (which essentially means that they did not die before the end 
of the year, as one is allowed to change insurance only at the start of the year), and did not have a 
voluntary deductible over the course of our observation window. This gives us an unbalanced panel 
with about 85000 insured individuals in any given yearU.K. 
To assess the representativeness of our sample, we compare the average age and the proportion 
of women, both among individuals who are at least 19 years old, to the respective values for the 
population. Differences are small. Individuals in our sample are about 1 year older on average and 
the percentage of women is by one percentage point higher. Moreover, excluding individuals with a 
voluntary deductible from our sample does not seem to cause serious concerns, as we exclude only 
about 2 percent of observations for that reasonV.
Our data include information on each person’s insurance policy, length of enrollment, and 
medical care utilization at the claims level. These claims-level data are very detailed. Among others, 
they include the billing code of the particular service, a full description of the service, the full DTC for 
medical specialist care, the date on which the care was delivered, the billing date (by the provider to 
the insurance company, not the billing date to the patient), the amount paid by the insurance and 
the amount paid out-of-pocket by the patient. For prescription drugs, we know the exact quantity 
delivered (e.g. 5 ml of Tobramycin) and their classification according to the Anatomical Therapeutic 
Chemical Classification System with defined daily doses234
 We inferred information on whether or not an individual has one of 25 chronic conditions (e.g. 
type 2 diabetes) based on claims for prescription drugs. In case a person has billed more than 180 daily 
doses of medicines linked to the treatment of a particular chronic condition, she was believed to have 
this conditionW.M. 
U People who met this requirement were both insured with the health insurer, and registered with one of the 
GPs in our sample. The panel is unbalanced because individuals may have changed insurer or may have chosen 
a voluntary deductible in some years (and were therefore excluded in those years). In our analysis below, we 
control for time effects and thereby also for differences in sample composition over the years. Individuals in 
our sample were always observed for entire years and our main parameters of interest are estimated from 
within-year variation.
V The fraction of individuals with a voluntary deductible varies over the years. In the beginning, it was about 1 
percent and then grew to 4 percent over the course of 10 years.
W  We obtained additional data from the Royal Dutch Pharmacists Association to translate each prescription 
drug claim into the number of defined daily doses obtained. For each individual, we then summed the number 
of defined daily doses obtained per medicine group as defined by their 6-digit Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
Classification (e.g. metformine) and used data from the Dutch Health Care Institute to link a medicine’s classi-
fication to the treatment of chronic conditions (e.g. metformine is used for the treatment of type 2 diabetes).
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The data also contain demographic information (age, gender), and a person’s postal code at the 
6-digit levelX.N We use the latter to add information on socioeconomic status: we add income (as 
measured in December 2008) and the percentage of non-western immigrants (as measured over 
2010) at the 6-digit post code level using data from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics235. We also 
add 2006 socioeconomic status scores at the 4-digit postal code level, as calculated by the Netherlands 
Institute for Social Research236 Y.  These status scores are calculated based on income, education and 
employment status.
Outcome variables in our study are measures of health care expenditures. Our measures of 
health care expenditures include all care that is included in the basic health insurance package and is 
in principle subject to patient cost-sharing. The latter restriction excludes GP care and maternity care. 
Our two outcome variables in the main analysis measure monthly health care expenditures at the 
intensive margin and at the extensive margin, respectively. Our measure of health care expenditures at 
the intensive margin is given by yit = log(spendingit + 1) where spendingit are the ealth care expenditures 
of individual i in month tZ.P Our measure of health care expenditures at the extensive margin is a binary 
indicator that equals 1 in case a person consumed a positive amount of medical care in a given month, 
and it equals 0 in case she did not consume medical care in this month.
Our main independent variable in both models is the price pit for person i in month t, which we 
define as the marginal cost-sharing rate for the first unit of care consumed within a month. This price 
equals 0 in case a person has exhausted her deductible or exceeded the no-claim limit at the beginning 
of a month, and 1 in case she has not. Whether or not medical spending is above the cost-sharing 
limit is determined based on the treatments that have been started up to that point of the year, 
independent of whether this care has already been billed to the health insurer.
Additional control variables include age and gender, risk score deciles, and the expected end 
of year price at the beginning of January. The risk score is given by a person’s predicted annual 
expenditures divided by the sample’s average annual expenditures. We obtained this prediction by 
performing a linear regression of annual health care expenditures on several risk characteristics, which 
are age and gender (fully interacted with a third-order polynomial in age), last year’s spending decile, 
indicators for chronic illnesses in the previous year, and quartile splits for income, the percentage of 
non-western immigrants, and the socioeconomic status score in the neighborhood. In our choice of 
X  A 6-digit post code consists of a number with 4 digits and two letters. In 2007, there were 456,913 dif-ferent 
post code areas (http://postcodeinfo.nl/files/factsheet-postcodeinfonl.pdf, accessed November 2017) and 17 
million inhabitants  (http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?PA=37296ned&D1=a&D2=0,10,20,30,40,50,
60,(l-1),l&HDR=G1&STB=T, accessed November 2017). This means that there are on average 37 inhabitants per 
post code area.
Y  There are 4054 4-digit post codes (https://home.kpn.nl/pagklein/postcodes.html, accessed November 2017). 
This means that there are on average 4193 inhabitants per post code.
Z  See Appendix A.1 for details on how this was constructed.
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risk characteristics we aim to mimic the Dutch risk adjustment scheme between health insurersAA.Q. 
Based on individual risk scores we compute a set of risk score decile indicators at the person-year level. 
We also estimate the expected end-of-year (“future”) price from the perspective of the beginning of 
the year is calculated as the average end-of-year price at the level of a cell formed of the risk score 
decile and age/gender category (18-40, 40-65, and over 65 years of age).
Estimation sample Full sample Balanced sample
Individual and neighborhood characteristics
Proportion female 0.52 0.52 0.52
Mean age 49.80 48.75 53.27
Monthly income (if not missing) €2182.36 €2188.58 €2167.31
Proportion of people with missing income 0.04 0.04 0.03
Care consumption per month
Mean expenditure €168.22 €161.94 €156.78
Proportion of people with a claim 0.42 0.41 0.43
Number of observations 8,772,000 10,965,504 4,283,640
Table 2: Summary statistics for each sample.   
  
NOTES: This table shows summary statistics for individuals who are at least 19 years old, insured for the entire 
year, and choose the minimum deductible. One observation is a person-month. The first column is for all 
individuals in our estimation sample who automatically meet these requirements. The second column is for the 
full sample of individuals meeting these criteria. There are more observations because in our estimation sample 
we also require that information for the respective previous year is available. This information is used to calculate 
the risk score. The third column is for the balanced sample of individuals who have been at least 19 years old in 
2007 and were in our data until 2015. All presented values are means across individuals and time. Income is gross 
income at the 6-digit post code level in nominal euros. Care consumption is the consumption of care that falls in 
principle under the no-claim refund policy or the deductible. Has claim is one if care consumption is non-zero in 
a given month. 
     Table 1 presents summary statistics for three different samples. The first column is for our 
estimation sample. The second column is for the full sample of individuals in our data who are at least 
19 years old. The third column is for the sample of individuals who are in our data in all years. About 
half of the individuals in our estimation sample are female, and they were in their late 40s on average. 
Average gross income at the postcode level is about 2200 euros per month. In a given month, average 
health care expenditures that are subject to cost-sharing are 168 euros, and the likelihood that there 
AA  See Appendix A.2 for details. Our approach closely corresponds to the way risk scores are calculated for the 
national risk-equalization scheme, where insurance companies compensate one another for differences in the 
risk pools. This is necessary because risk-rating is not allowed. The actual risk scores use additional information 
that was not available to us. For instance, they use income at the individual level, while we use income at the 
6-digit post code level. We expect the difference to be small, as a post code covers 37 households on average 
(footnote m).
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are positive expenditures in a given month is 42 percentBB.R.
Comparing means across columns shows that individuals in the balanced sample, who remained 
with both the insurer and the sampled GPs throughout our study period, are somewhat older on 
average. They have a higher probability to have a claim in a given month, but lower average health 
care expenditures. Still, differences across samples are not dramatic, especially given the fact that the 
balanced sample is about half the size of the estimation sample.
Figure 3 shows how the average price of care evolves over the course of the year for the years in 
our study period. The horizontal axis shows months of the year. The vertical axis shows the fraction 
of individuals whose care consumption was still below the cost-sharing limits at the beginning of the 
month. These are the individuals for whom the price of care is one. By construction, the average price 
of care is monotonically decreasing over the course of the year. Level differences between curves are 
driven by a combination of differences in medical spending across years and differences in no-claim 
refund limits and deductible limits across years.

















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
month
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NOTES: This figure shows the fraction of individuals who have not hit the deductible or the no-claim refund limit, 
by month and for all years between 2006 and 2015. Calculated for the full unbalanced panel. The cost-sharing 
limits were 255, 255, 150, 155, 165, 170, 220, 350, 360, and 375 euros.
BB  Figure C.2 plots the consumption of care within the year. It shows that there is no strong seasonal component. 
Table C.2 presents average care consumption and the fraction who hit the cost-sharing limit by year, respec-
tively.
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The central question in this paper is whether individuals react differently to similar incentives 
when they are framed in terms of a deductible instead of a no-claim refund. Figure 4 presents our 
main model-free evidence documenting that they react stronger to a deductible than to a no-claim 
refund. For this, we follow individuals who exceed the no-claim refund or deductible limit in a given 
year, and we compare their health care spending in the weeks before and after hitting the cost-sharing 
limit. We do so for a balanced panel of individuals whom we observe at least 12 weeks before hitting 
the cost-sharing limit and 12 weeks thereafter in the same calendar year. This means that we exclude 
all observations for individuals who do not hit the cost-sharing limit during the year or who hit the 
cost-sharing limit very late or very early in the year.
The horizontal axis shows weeks relative to the week of hitting the deductible limit (or the no-
claim refund limit). The week of hitting the cost-sharing limit is set to zero. The vertical axis shows 
average weekly health care expenditures. Each dot shows the average health care expenditures for a 
different week alternatively in the year 2007 when a no-claim refund was in place and in the year 2008 
when a deductible policy was in place. To the right of the vertical line, after hitting the cost-sharing 
limit, the price of care is zero. We find that to the right of the vertical line average expenditures are 
very similar under the no-claim refund in 2007 and the deductible in 2008. By construction, there 
is a peak in health care expenditures in the week that the deductible limit (or the no-claim refund 
limit) is hit, but in the weeks thereafter health care expenditures are essentially constant. To the 
left, before hitting the cost-sharing limit, the current price is one, and individuals are subject to cost-
sharing incentives. Under both schemes, average expenditures are lower to the left than to the right 
of the red line. However, expenditures are substantially lower in 2008, under the deductible than in 
2007 under the no-claim refund. Accordingly, the increase in health care expenditures at the time of 
exceeding the cost-sharing limit is much larger under the deductible scheme than under the no-claim 
refund scheme.
Figure 4: Care consumption around week in which cost-sharing ends
NOTES: This figure shows average health care 
expenditures against the week relative to the 
week of exceeding the no-claim refund limit or 
the deductible in 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
Cost-sharing incentives were framed as a no-
claim refund in 2007 and as a deductible in 
2008.
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Thereby, this figure shows strong suggestive evidence for our main hypothesis that health 
care expenditures respond stronger to deductibles than to no-claim refunds. We call this evidence 
suggestive because the increase in health care expenditures upon hitting the deductible cannot be 
interpreted as a causal effect. It could also be explained for example by serial correlation in health 
care expenditures if high health care expenditures in the week of hitting the cost-sharing limit tend 
to be followed by other weeks with high health care expenditures. However, the figure shows that 
health care expenditures tend to level out soon after hitting the cost-sharing limit. Furthermore, serial 
correlation in health care expenditures can not explain why the responses to hitting the cost-sharing 
limit is stronger under the deductible than under the no-claim rebate. In the following sections we 
turn to a more formal analysisCC.S. 
Empirical approach
Our goal is to estimate the effect of the price of care on health care utilization, alternatively under 
a no-claim refund policy and a deductible policy. We specify the estimation equation:
Equation 1 Does the framing of patient cost-sharing incentives matter? The effects of deductibles vs. no-claim refunds




𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊′ 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where i denotes individuals, t is time measured in months, pit is the price of care at the begin-
ning of month t, dtno-claimrefund is a binary indicator for months in which the no-claim refund was in 
place, dtdeductible is a binary indicator for months in which the deductible was in place, and xit is a vec-
tor of controls that includes a constant term. eit is an error term, and γ is a vector of parameters. βno-
claimrefund and βdeductible are the main parameters of interest. They measure how health care expendi-
tures respond to prices under a no-claim refund and a deductible, respectively. 
In our baseline specifications, the dependent variable yit is either the log of health care costs of 
individual i in month t plus 1 (as health care costs can be zero), so that coefficients are approximately 
percentage changes in total spending. Or the dependent variable is a binary indicator for any ex-
penditures in a given month, in which case coefficients measure effects at the extensive margin. 
We control for determinants of health care costs. We include a full set of month and year dum-
mies into xit and thereby control for seasonal variation in health care needs related to, for instance, 
the flu and changes across years that are, for instance, driven by health care inflation. We also con-
trol for age using indicator variables for 5 year age bins and for gender. In addition, xit includes indi-
cators for the deciles of the individual risk score and the expected end-of-year price from the per-
spective of the beginning of the year. The risk score controls for differences in expected health care 
expenditures across individuals, and the expected end-of-the-year price captures in addition that 
cost-sharing limits and health care prices change over the course of our study period such that in 
different years individuals with the same risk score face a different probability of exceeding the cost-
sharing limit and experiencing a zero price. 
We estimate the parameters using an instrumental variables approach which we describe below. 
Throughout, reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the level of 
groups defined by the risk score decile, three age categories, gender, and year. In our definition of 
clusters we follow the level of variation in our instrumental variable, across groups within the yearDD.  
Next, we discuss potential threats to identification. Then, we explain how we address these con-
cerns using our instrumental variables approach. 
Threats to identification 
                                                          
DD We have merged the two higher age categories for the lowest 4 risk score deciles. Therefore, there are 
468 clusters (10 deciles times 3 age categories times 2 genders minus 8 merged groups) in our baseline sample. 
where i denotes individ als, t is time measured in months, pit is the price of care at the begin-
ning of month t, dt
no-claimrefund is a binary indicator for months in which the no-claim refund was in place, 
dt
deductible is a binary indicator for months in which the deductible was in place, and xit is a vector of 
controls that includes a constant term. eit is an error term, and γ is a vector of parameters. β
no-claimrefund 
and βdeductible are the main parameters of inter st. They m asure ow h lth care exp nditures r spo  
to prices under a no-claim refund and a deductible, respectively.
In our baseline specifications, the dependent variable yit is either the log of health care costs of 
individual i in month t plus 1 (as health care costs can be zero), so that coefficients are approximately 
percentage changes in total spending. Or the dependent variable is a binary indicator for any 
expenditures in a given month, in which case coefficients measure effects at the extensive margin.
We control for determinants of health care costs. We include a full set of month and year dummies 
into xit and the eby control for seas nal variation in health care ne ds relat d to, f r instance, the flu 
and changes across years that are, for instance, driven by health care inflation. We also control for 
age using indicator variables for 5 year age bins and for gender. In addition, xit includes indicators for 
the deciles of the individual risk score and the expected end-of-year price from the perspective of 
CC Figure C.4 in the appendix is for care that does not fall under the deductible and thereby provides a placebo 
test. In that figure, the pattern before and after hitting do not depend on whether cost-sharing incentives were 
framed as lower no-claim refunds or deductibles. Moreover, the levels of expenditures are comparable before 
and after the week of hitting the cost-sharing limit.
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the beginning of the year. The risk score controls for differences in expected health care expenditures 
across individuals, and the expected end-of-the-year price captures in addition that cost-sharing 
limits and health care prices change over the course of our study period such that in different years 
individuals with the same risk score face a different probability of exceeding the cost-sharing limit and 
experiencing a zero price.
We estimate the parameters using an instrumental variables approach which we describe below. 
Throughout, reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the level of 
groups defined by the risk score decile, three age categories, gender, and year. In our definition of 
clusters we follow the level of variation in our instrumental variable, across groups within the yearDD.T. 
Next, we discuss potential threats to identification. Then, we explain how we address these 
concerns using our instrumental variables approach.
Threats to identification
pit is individual-month specific. Variation in pit is a function of past care consumption by the same 
individual within the same calendar year. It is zero when individuals have exceeded the cost-sharing 
limit and one otherwise. This means that a first concern could be that our estimates may suffer from 
omitted variables bias when we do not sufficiently control for individual differences in expected 
spending. To see this, suppose that the omitted variable was the risk score (for which we actually 
control in our analysis, among others). For a given pit , individuals with a high risk score will on average 
consume more care compared to those with a low risk score. Because prices are a function of past 
health care consumption, pit will therefore on average be lower for individuals with a higher risk score, 
which means that a regression of health care consumption on prices will lead to an upward-biased 
estimate of βno-claimrefund and βdeductible when we do not control for the risk score. This concern is partly 
already addressed by including numerous control variables for health care needs in xit, including the 
risk score. The remaining concerns are addressed by performing an instrumental variables approach 
that is detailed below.
A second concern is also related to the fact that pit is a function of past health care consumption. 
The price in t depends on past values of eis, when s < t. If there is autocorrelation in the error term, 
then pit will also be correlated with eit , because pit is a function of eis and eit will be correlated with 
past eis, which will result in prices being endogenous
EE.U We expect this to be less of a concern in the 
Netherlands than in other countries, because services are not charged individually, but bundled into 
DTC’s, as described in ‘Institutional background’. This means that care that is received at a later point 
is recorded in our data as if it was received earlier. Still, following Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017), we also 
control for health care expenditures in the previous three months and address remaining concerns by 
performing instrumental variables estimation.
DD We have merged the two higher age categories for the lowest 4 risk score deciles. Therefore, there are 468 
clusters (10 deciles times 3 age categories times 2 genders minus 8 merged groups) in our baseline sample.
EE Note that this means that we cannot use a fixed effects estimator to control for level differences, because a 
fixed effects estimator would only yield consistent estimates if strict exogeneity would hold. This does not hold 
here because the regressor pit is correlated with some eis, s < t, for the same individual.
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A third potential concern is that seasonal trends in health care consumption differ between 
groups of the population. In equation (1) we control for period effects, but not for interactions of 
period effects with individual characteristics. It could for instance be that younger individuals are more 
likely to have skiing accidents which tend to occur in the winter months at the beginning of the year. 
A consequence of this would be that prices are negatively correlated with the error term, as the error 
term also captures the deviation of the group-level seasonal trend for younger individuals from the 
general seasonal trend which is captured by period fixed effects. Also this concern is addressed with 
our instrumental variables approach.
Instrumental variables approach
The mechanical nature in which prices depend on past health care consumption can be used 
to construct an instrument. Price changes over the course of the year are related to health care 
expenditures. Thus, groups of the population with different levels of expected health care expenditures 
tend to face different prices. In our empirical approach we use the simulated average price at the 
group level as an instrumental variable for the individual price pit , and we exploit changes within the 
year in the fraction of individuals who are subject to cost-sharing as a source of exogenous variation. 
This can be seen as a generalization of a differences-in-differences estimator. For illustration, 
suppose that there are only two groups and two points in time and that for both groups the average 
price changes between the two points in time, but by a different amount. For both groups we can 
also compute the change in average spending between the two points in time. Then the instrumental 
variable estimator relates the difference in the change in spending be-tween the two groups to the 
difference in the change in prices.
In a similar context, Ellis et al.223 use the average price at the group level as an instrument for 
the price, leaving out the observations for individual i, respectively, and controlling for differences 
in the level of spending across groups. Our approach differs in two main aspects. First, Ellis et al.223 
specify a group to consist of all individuals who chose a particular insurance plan. We instead define a 
group by the combination of the risk score decile, an age group, and genderFF.VSecond, instead of the 
fraction of individuals who have not hit the cost-sharing limit at time t, we use the simulated fraction 
of individuals who have not hit the cost-sharing limit at time t.
We simulate this fraction by drawing from the empirical distribution of monthly health care 
consumption across all months and years, but for the same group. By summing up randomly drawn 
monthly expenditures we can determine whether or not an individual’s expenditures would have 
exceeded the cost-sharing limit at a given point of time, and we can then for each month compute 
the simulated fraction of individuals in a given group who have not hit the cost-sharing limit. In that 
way, the instrument is also purged of differences in seasonal patterns across groups in the population. 
Simulated average prices for the same group and month differ across years because of changing cost-
sharing limits.
FF  Age groups are defined as age 0-18, 19-39, 40-64, and 65+. For the first four risk score deciles, we combine 
the two last age groups into one to ensure that there are enough observations per group.
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In a different context, Currie and Gruber216, 217 and Cutler and Gruber218 use a similar approach to 
construct an instrument that is purged of potentially confounding factors specific to states in the US: 
instead of using the number of individuals who are eligible for health insurance as the instrument, 
they use the simulated number, drawing from the distribution of characteristics at the national level 
and then applying state-specific eligibility rules to these hypothetical applicants. In that way, the 
instrument is purged of unobserved differences across states.
Figure 5 shows the average value of the instrument by month and by risk score quartiles. This 
figure illustrates the variation in average prices between groups that we use to identify price effectsGG.W 
For all enrollees, prices are one in January. For enrollees with high risk scores, average prices quickly 
decline over the following months and then approach zero. For enrollees with low risk scores, this 
decline is much slower and average prices are still close to one at the end of the year. In our empirical 
strategy we control for level differences in average prices between groups by including covariates xit . 
The variation in prices that we use in our empirical approach comes from differences between groups 
in the change of average prices over the course of the year. These differences in the change of prices 
between groups are reflected in the different shapes of the curves depicted in Figure 5.


























NOTES: This figure shows the simulated fraction of individuals who have not hit the deductible. Average by 
quartile of the risk score, across years. Figure C.3 in the appendix shows the actual fractions by risk score.
GG  Figure C.3 in the appendix shows the actual fractions by risk score for 2007 and 2008. One can see that 
overall patterns are very similar, but that the actual fractions exhibit some seasonal variation.
524990-L-bw-Hayen
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 125
Does the framing of patient cost-sharing incentives matter? The effects of deductibles vs. no-claim refunds
125
5
Formally, for the instrument zit to be valid, we need it to be relevant and an exclusion restriction 
needs to hold. As for relevance, by design it is clearly related to pit , and below, we document that the 
first stage F-statistic is very high. The exclusion restriction is that
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Formally, for the instrument zi  to be valid, we need it to be r levant and an exclusion restriction 
needs to hold. As for relevance, by design it is clearly related to pit , and below, we document that 
the first stage F-statistic is very high. The exclusion restriction is that 
𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼[𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] = 𝔼𝔼𝔼𝔼[𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] 
which means that conditional on time dummies, age, gender, risk score, future price in January, 
and expenditures in the previous 3 months, the simulated fraction of individuals without cost-sharing 
is mean independent of eit. 
Earlier, we discussed three possible threats to identification if we estimate parameters in equa-
tion (1) by means of a linear regression: omitted variable bias, autocorrelation in error terms, and 
seasonal trends that differ between groups in the population. Our instrumental variable approach 
addresses these threats. In contrast to individual prices pit , our instrumental variable zit is unlikely to 
be correlated with current or past individual error terms, since individual health expenditures are 
unlikely to influence average prices at the group level. In this way, our empirical approach addresses 
the first two threats to identification we discussed in the above. Furthermore, by drawing expendi-
                                                          
GG Figure C.3 in the appendix shows the actual fractions by risk score for 2007 and 2008. One can see that 
overall patterns are very similar, but that the actual fractions exhibit some seasonal variation. 
which means that conditional on time dummies, age, gender, risk score, future price in January, 
and expenditures in the previous 3 months, the simulated fraction of individuals without cost-sharing 
is mean independent of eit.
Earlier, we discussed three possibl  threats to identification if we stimate param ters in 
equation (1) by means of a linear regression: omitted variable bias, autocorrelation in error terms, 
and seasonal trends that differ between groups in the population. Our instrumental variable approach 
addresses these threats. In contrast to individual prices pit , our instrumental variable zit is unlikely to be 
correlated with current or past individual error terms, since individual health expenditures are unlikely 
to influence average prices at the group level. In this way, our empirical approach addresses the first 
two threats to identification we discuss d in the above. Furtherm re, by drawing expenditures for our 
simulation randomly across months our instrumental variables are purged of seasonal trends. This 
addresses the third identification threat.
However, a possible violation of the exclusion restriction comes from the fact that when 
estimating the empirical distribution function of monthly health care consumption, then we also use 
observations for individual i. Formally, the instrument is therefore a function of the error terms of 
individual i. However, the impact thereof will vanish in the limit, when the number of observations 
goes to infinity. We are not concerned about this because of the large number of observations. On 
average, there are more than 160,000 observations for each group and the smallest group has 29,232 
observationsHH.X.
In robustness tests we examine whether or not our estimation results are sensitive to different 
specifications of covariates in xit, such as allowing for interactions between year and month indicators 
and between year indicators and risk score deciles, allowing for a more flexible form of lagged health 
care expenditures, and to omitting the expected end-of-year price. Furthermore, we examine whether 
or not our estimation results are sensitive to the functional form of the outcome variable. As alternative 
to using the log of health care costs of individual i in month t plus 1, we use the log of health care 
costs plus 10, and the log of health care costs plus 0,1. Finally, in a placebo test we apply our empirical 
approach to 15-17 year olds, who are exempted from patient cost-sharing in the Netherlands, and we 
find no significant effects.
HH  In principle, one could construct the instrument at the individual level by estimating the empirical distribution 
function using data from all other individuals, but this would substantially increase the computational burden 
(by a factor N, where N is the number of individuals). We have experimented with this for a small number of 
individuals and have found that it did not affect the estimates of the empirical distribution function. Therefore, 
we have not implemented this for the full sample.
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(current price) x (no-claim regime) -0.175*** (0.0461) -0.0531*** (0.00894)
(current price) x (deductible regime) -0.362*** (0.0249) -0.0728*** (0.00474)
Future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,772,000 8,772,000
Number of clusters 468 468
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0000 0.0253
Table 3: Main results  
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates. We use data at the monthly level. Expenditures are measured 
as the log of one plus the actual amount. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-
gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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We now turn to our results. Our central hypothesis is that individuals react more strongly to 
financial incentives when they are framed in terms of a deductible instead of a no-claim refund. This 
means that we expect the estimate of the coefficient on the current price interacted with an indicator 
for the deductible regime to be more negative than the coefficient on the current price interacted with 
an indicator for the no-claim regime.
Our main results are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable in column (1) is the log of 
expenditures that are subject to cost-sharing plus oneII. Therefore, reported coefficients are 
(approximately) percentage changesJJ.Z We find the price effect to be a 17.5 percent decrease in 
expenditures under a no-claim refund and a 36.2 percent decrease under a deductible. The last row 
of the table shows the p-value for a test of the null hypothesis that the two are equal. The difference 
is highly statistically significant at any conventional level. While these estimates might seem large, our 
estimate for the effect of deductibles is similar and even somewhat smaller compared to the one of 
Brot-Goldberg et al.211, who find a price effect of deductibles on monthly health care expenditures of 
42.2 percent for a sample of highly paid employees of a large American firm.
In column (2), the dependent variable is an indicator for having a claim. Hence, reported 
coefficients show price effects at the extensive margin. The price effect is a 5.31 percentage point 
decrease in the probability to have a claim in a given month under the no-claim regime and a 7.28 
percentage point decrease under the deductible. The difference is statistically different from zero at 
the 5 percent level.
To summarize, we find negative price effects on both, the level of expenditures and the probability 
to have a claim, and a clear difference between the price effects.
Effect heterogeneity
Next, we characterize effect heterogeneityKK.AAFor this, we split the sample. We start with 
investigating whether price effects and the impact of framing differs by income. This could be the 
case if for example individuals with a lower income react stronger to cost-sharing incentives or if 
the reference point differs between income groups. We divide individuals in 4 groups, according to 
the average income at the 6-digit neighborhood level with lower groups referring to lower income 
quartiles. As described in Section 4, a 6-digit postal code has on average 37 residents. Table 3 shows 
results for the price effect at the intensive margin. Results for each of the income groups are similar 
II  In Table 10 below we show that adding 10 or 0.1, respectively, leads to different point estimates but the same 
qualitative findings.
JJ  Recall that we use the log of expenditures of 1 as the dependent variable. The exact percentage change of the 
dependent variable associated with a coefficient of 0:175 on the current price in the no-claim regime is e 0:205 
1 = 0:161. In the following, we will abstract from the small difference.
KK  Here and in the following we present results for the effect on expenditures. Results for having a claim in a 
given month are presented in Appendix C.
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to the baseline results, and there are no systematic differences across groups. In particular, individuals 
in poorer neighborhoods do not react stronger to cost-sharing incentives than individuals in richer 
neighborhoods. This result is in line with evidence from the RAND health insurance experiment which 
also does not find significant differences in the effect of deductibles on total health care expenditures 
by income groups209. Furthermore, within each group the price effect is significantly stronger 
under a deductible scheme than under a no-claim refund scheme. Also, the difference between 
the price effects under a deductible and a no-claim refund is similar across income groups.  
Income quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4


















Future price in January Yes Yes Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2,052,132 2,206,728 2,083,332 2,084,652
Number of clusters 467 467 468 468
p-value equality current price co-
efficient 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0001
Table 4: Effects on expenditures by income quarter  
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates for different subsamples defined by income quartile at the 6-digit 
neighborhood level. We use data at the monthly level. Expenditures are measured as the log of one plus
the actual amount. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-gender-age group-year level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Female Male Age 19-64 Age 65+














Future price in January Yes Yes Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,548,864 4,223,136 6,797,784 1,974,216
Number of clusters 234 234 360 155
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0000 0.0000 0.0052 0.0002
Table 5: Effects on expenditures by age and gender categories  
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates by age and gender, respectively. We use data at the monthly level. 
Expenditures are measured as the log of one plus the actual amount. Standard errors are clustered at the risk 
score decile-gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
 Table 4 shows results by age and gender. In general, individuals in all groups react stronger to 
deductibles than to no-claim refunds. Moreover, we find that price responses are similar for persons 
above age 65 and for persons below age 65. This is an interesting result since many previous studies 
on the effects of patient-cost sharing examine either the working age population or people above age 
65, e.g. Medicare beneficiaries. In the Netherlands, individuals buy the same type of health insurance 
below and above age 65 and insurance coverage does not change discontinuously at age 65, as it does 
for instance in the U.S.237. However, we find differences in price effects on expenditures by gender. 
Women react stronger to cost-sharing incentives than men, both under a deductible and a no-claim 
refund.
 A third way in which we split the sample is by risk score. The idea behind this is that we 
expect individuals with a higher risk score to react less strongly to price changes. About 80 percent of 
the individuals with an above-median risk score will exhaust the deductible or no-claim limit by the 
end of the year, while this is the case for only about 20-30 percent of the individuals with a below-
median risk score. Therefore, one might expect below-median risk score individuals to react more 
strongly to hitting the cost-sharing limit, as it is a priori less likely that they do. Table 5 tentatively 
confirms this. We find that the price effect for individuals with below-median risk scores is generally 
stronger than for individuals with above-median risk scores. However, respective confidence intervals 
intersect. Thus, the difference in price effects between risk score groups is not significantly different 
from zero.
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Low risk score High risk score










Future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,335,168 4,436,832
Number of clusters 198 270
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0052 0.0000
Table 6: Effects on expenditures by risk type
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates by risk score. We use data at the monthly level. Expenditures are 
measured as the log of one plus the actual amount. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-gender-
age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Effect for selected types of care
Table 6 shows results for selected types of care. Specifically, we look at expenditures for 
medicines that are considered high valueLL.ABFollowing Brot-Goldberg et al.211, we consider medication 
for diabetes type 1, diabetes type 2, high cholesterol level (statins), depression (anti-depressants), 
and high blood pressure (anti-hypertensives). These medications are commonly used, they provide 
major medical benefits, and they are typically not very expensive. This list includes both medications 
for which the absence of the medical benefits is salient and felt almost immediately (as for diabetes 
drugs and anti-depressants) and medications for which the absence of medical benefits is less salient 
(statins and anti-hypertensives). Statins and anti-hypertensives reduce the risk of heart diseases, but 
these benefits are not felt immediately.
The results in Table 6 show that the effects of deductibles and no-claim refunds are small, as 
compared to the effects presented in Table (2). They are very precisely estimated and therefore, 
some of them are formally statistically different from zero. But economically, these are negligible. 
Importantly, this holds true independent of the framing of cost-sharing incentives.
LL  It is not feasible to identify individual procedures such as imaging services based on the information on 
bundled payments in our data.
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type 2 Statins Anti-depressants Anti-hypertensives
























Future price in 
January Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 
months plus 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies decile risk 
score Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 
observations 8,772,000 8,772,000 8,772,000 8,772,000 8,772,000




0.0000 0.0000 0.0823 0.3890 0.0002
Table 7: Effects on expenditures by selected types of care 
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates. We use data at the monthly level. Expenditures are measured as the 
log of one plus the actual amount. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-gender-age group-year 
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The effect of framing on total health care costs
In our main analysis, we relate care consumption to the current price at the beginning of the 
month and the way cost-sharing incentives are framed. It is possible to translate the results into effects 
on yearly health care expenditures and yearly out-of-pocket spending.
For this, we conduct a simulation study. In a first step, we calculate the residuals and estimate 
their empirical distribution function. Then, we take our estimation equation and a current price of 1 
at the beginning of January as a starting point and simulate, for each individual in our data set, health 
care expenditures in January by calculating the predicted mean of the log of health care expenditures 
plus one, according to (1), and adding a draw from the empirical distribution function of the residual. 
This is then transformed into actual health care expenditures by applying the exponential function and 
subtracting 1MM.ACNext, we calculate simulated prices for all individuals at the beginning of February, 
again predict the mean of the log of health care spending plus one given those prices, and so on. We 
do so for the case in which cost-sharing incentives are framed as a deductible, as it was the case in 
2015, and for the case in which cost-sharing incentives are framed as a no-claim refund. For the latter, 
we use βno-claimrefund instead of βdeductible.
MM  Recall that the dependent variable is the log of health care spending plus one.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
risk score decile
change in out of pocket expenditures (left scale)
change in expenditures (right scale)
number next to dot is percentage change
NOTES: This figure shows, for each risk score decile, the simulated effect of framing cost sharing incentives as a 
deductible instead of a no-claim refund (dots). Numbers next to the dots are the percentage changes. Absolute 
values are given on the right axis. The solid line is the effect on out-of-pocket payments. The simulation is done 
for 2015.
Figure (6) shows the result. On average, health care expenditures are about 10 percent lower 
when cost-sharing incentives are framed as a deductible. This reduction is driven by the months in 
which individuals are still facing a current price of 1. Interestingly, a stronger reaction to the current 
price of one leads to lower spending and therefore will also face a price of 1 for more months. In 
absolute terms, yearly health care expenditures decrease more for higher risk score deciles. In relative 
terms, health care expenditures decrease more for lower risk score deciles.
Effects on out of pocket spending are non-monotonic in the risk score decile. They are lowest for 
individuals with a high risk score. The reason for this is that they will hit the cost-sharing limit anyway. 
Low risk-score individuals have low out-of-pocket spending and therefore, the effect is low in absolute 
terms, about 7 euros per year. The effect on out-of-pocket spending is highest for individuals with a 
risk score of 5 and 6, and driven by them reacting to cost-sharing incentives.
Overall, it is striking that changing the framing of cost-sharing incentives leads to large effects 
on health care spending—a reduction of about 150 euros per year on average—, while having very 
modest effects—a reduction of about 10 euros on average—on out-of-pocket expenditures.
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Validity of instrument and sensitivity analysis
In this section, we first assess whether the instruments we use are relevant. Then, we present 
results from a placebo test in order to assess the credibility of our empirical approach. After this, 
we ask the question whether the dependence of price effects on framing could also be explained 
by differences in the timing of payments. Finally, we present results from a number of robustness 
checks for alternative specifications of explanatory variables and outcome variables. Here, we also ask 
whether end-of-the-year effects could explain our results.
Current price no-claim Current price deductible
simulated fraction group not hit
interacted with noclaim regime 0.904*** (0.0130) -0.00647 (0.0126)
interacted with deductible regime 0.00289* (0.00167) 0.900*** (0.0112)
future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
number of observations 8,772,000 8,772,000
number of clusters 468 468
F-statistic excluded instruments 2543.16 7011.88
Table 8: First stage 
 
NOTES: First stage estimates.  We use data at the monthly level.  Standard errors are clustered at the risk score 
decile-gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Instrument relevance
One of the conditions for an instrument to be valid is that the instrument must be related to the 
endogenous variable conditional on controls. Table 7 shows that the simulated average price at the 
group level is highly predictive of the individual price pit . The dependent variable in the first column is 
the individual price interacted with an indicator for the no claim regime, and the dependent variable 
in the second column is the individual price interacted with an indicator for the deductible regime. The 
respective coefficient on the simulated average price interacted with the regime indicator is about 0.9. 
The relevant F-statistics which are shown in the last row of the table are extremely high. They are 2543 
and 7012, respectively.
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(current price) x (no-claim regime) 0.116 (0.123) -0.0123 (0.0471)
(current price) x (deductible regime) 0.0292 (0.0643) 0.000266 (0.0180)
Future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 359,736 359,736
Number of clusters 180 180
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.4632 0.7961
Table 9: Placebo test: no effect  
  
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates for individuals who are between 15 and 17 years old. We compute risk 
scores and instruments separately for this group. We use data at the monthly level. Expenditures are measured 
as the log of one plus the actual amount. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score-year level. * p < 0:10, ** 
p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Placebo test
One way to assess the credibility of our empirical approach is to perform a placebo test. In the 
Netherlands children below the age of 18 are not subject to patient cost-sharing. For this reason, our 
main analysis was conducted for a sample of individuals at ages 19 and aboveNN. If we apply our 
empirical approach to a sample of individuals between ages 15 and 17, we should not find any effect. 
And indeed, Table 8 shows that price effects are not significantly different from zero for this group, and 
they are also much smaller in absolute value then estimation coefficients in our main analysis. Thus, 
our empirical approach performs well in a setting where we know that the true parameters are zero.
Can the difference in timing explain our results?
Our main finding is that individuals react stronger to deductibles than to no-claim refunds. So 
far, we interpreted our results as evidence for a strong effect of the framing of cost-sharing incentives 
on health care spending. Yet, deductibles and no-claim refunds differ not only in the framing of cost-
sharing incentives, but also in the timing of payments. In general, deductibles have to be paid several 
weeks or months after the treatment, whereas the no-claim refund is only paid out at the end of the 
first quarter of the following year. This raises the question whether this difference in the timing of 
payments could explain our results.
NN   We did not include 18 year old individuals because we only observe the birth year and not the month of 
birth.
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In this section, we present empirical evidence that strongly speaks against this alternative 
explanation. In order to examine whether different responses can be explained by differences in the 
timing of payments, we re-do our analysis and take the delay in payments into account. For this, we 
assume a high, but still plausible annual discount rate of 10 percent, and we allow for compounding 
within the year. We further assume a delay of 3.5 months under the deductible regime, corresponding 
to the deductible payment being due at the end of the third month after the treatment. For the no-
claim refund, we assume that the delay is 3.5 months in December, 4.5 months in November, and so 
on, because the no-claim refund is paid out at the end of the first quarter in the following year. Making 
these assumptions allows us to re-compute current prices and thus taking the difference in timing into 
account. In particular, we set the current price to (1=(1 + 0.1))m/12 for payments m months in the future.
Results are presented in Table 9. They are very similar to our main results presented in Table 2. 
Thus, discounting payments at a 10 percent rate is not enough to explain our findings. In addition, we 
use a stylized model to compute which discount rate would be high enough to explain the difference 
in effects between deductibles and no-claim refunds that we find. Appendix B contains details of our 
calculations. We find that the annual discount rate would need to be higher than 300% to explain our 
results.
One possible explanation for this very high discount rate could be liquidity constraints. In our 
context, we believe that for institutional reasons liquidity constraints are unlikely to explain our results. 
The maximal amount an individual had to pay was 375 euros per year, in 2015, which is an amount 
that most Dutch persons can raise. In case this proves difficult then individuals can arrange payment 
in installments with the health insurer if they wish to do so. Moreover, as explained earlier, usually, 
the treatment and the billing date (to the insurance) do not coincide, which means that usually the 
payment is not immediate at the time of treatment. Figure C.5 in the appendix shows that the median 
delay between the treatment and billing date is about a month, and there will be an additional delay 
before the insurance will send an invoice to the individual.
Evidence that liquidity constrains are unlikely to explain the different effect of deductibles and 
no-claim refunds also comes from our analysis for different income groups at the 6-digit post code 
level. We would expect that liquidity constraints are more common for individuals with lower incomes. 
However, in Table 3 we do not find that the price effects differ between income groups.
Taken together, our results strongly suggest that the difference in the timing of payments is not 
one of the main explanations for our finding that patients react stronger to deductibles than to no-
claim refunds.
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(current price) x (no-claim regime) -0.194*** (0.0510) -0.0586*** (0.00988)
(current price) x (deductible regime) -0.371*** (0.0255) -0.0746*** (0.00485)
Future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,772,000 8,772,000
Number of clusters 468 468
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0002 0.0977
Table 10: Specification with discounted prices  
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates. We take the difference in timing into account by using the discounted 
current price instead of the actual current price. We use data at the monthly level. Expenditures are measured 
as the log of one plus the actual amount. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-gender-age group-
year level. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Robustness
In this subsection, we present a number of robustness checks. We first examine whether or not 
our estimation results are sensitive to different specifications of the covariates in xit . These results are 
shown in Table 10. Recall that in our baseline specifications xit includes variables for the future price in 
January, 5 year age brackets, indicators for the decile of the risk score, year and month dummies, and 
the log of expenditure in the previous 3 months plus 1. 
In the first column of Table 10 we use a specification with a full set of risk score-year interactions 
and a full set of year-month interactions. The results are similar to the baseline results presented in 
Table 2, suggesting that a specification that is not fully-interacted in this way is general enough. For 
the second column we include 6 lags of the log of the respective monthly expenditure plus 1 instead 
of the log of the expenditure in the previous three months plus 1. Results are qualitatively similar as 
well. In the last column, we use the baseline specification but do not control for the expected price 
at the end of the year. This again leads to qualitatively similar results, but now the magnitude of the 
estimated effects is higher. 
Summarizing, we find that our main finding that the price effect is more negative under a 
deductible than under a no-claim refund is robust to using different specifications of explanatory 
variables. 
Next, we examine whether or not our estimation results are sensitive to the functional form of 
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the outcome variable. Recall that up to now, we have used the log of expenditures plus 1. If we instead 
use the log of expenditures plus 0.1 or plus 10, then coefficients will be rescaledOO.AETable 11 shows 
that indeed, adding 0.1 and 10 instead of 1 leads to different estimates—as could be expected. But 
importantly, the main finding remains unchanged: the price effect is more negative under a deductible 
than under a no-claim refund. 
Our final robustness check concerns the shifting of health care expenditures across years238. 
For some types of health care, individuals have some discretion about the timing of treatment. For 
example, they can choose whether they will receive a cataract surgery now or some months later. 
Individuals who have exceeded their cost-sharing limit in the current year have an incentive to shift 
treatments from the next year to the current year, because at the start of the new year patient cost-
sharing limits will be reset. For those patients, the price of care in the current year is zero, but the price 
of care at the beginning of the next year is one.
To see whether the shifting of care between years has an impact on our estimation results we 
estimate a model that in addition to the other covariates also includes an interaction term between 
the price pit an indicator for the month of December. The results presented in the first column of Table 
12 show that this does not substantially change the coefficients for the price effects under the two 
cost-sharing schemes. Interestingly, however, individuals do seem to be more sensitive to the price of 
care in December than in other months, as one would expect. In the second column we do not use 
data for December and find results that are very similar to the ones presented in the first column and 
to our baseline estimates.
OO For a simple example suppose that there is a claim with probability 0.4 under no cost-sharing and that the 
claim size is 50 conditional on there being a claim. Assume that the price effect of cost-sharing is a reduction in 
the probability that there is a claim by 10 percentage points and a reduction in the claim size by 50 percent once 
there is a claim. Then, the difference between the expected log of expenditure plus 1 under no cost-sharing and 
the expected log of expenditure plus 1 under cost-sharing is 0:33. If we use respectively 0.1 and 10 instead of 1, 
then we arrive at 0:42 and 0:23. This shows that the constant one adds will matter. The estimated effect will be 
tentatively be smaller in magnitude if we add a bigger number, at least in this example.
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Flexible form Distributed lag No future price
(current price) x (no-claim regime) -0.199*** (0.0601) -0.206*** (0.0262) -0.553*** (0.0695)
(current price) x (deductible regime) -0.345*** (0.0226) -0.312*** (0.0210) -0.716***(0.0474)
future price in January Yes Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes No Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score No Yes Yes
year dummies No Yes Yes
month dummies No Yes Yes
6 distributed lags log expenditure No Yes No
risk score-year dummies Yes No No
year-month dummies Yes No No
number of observations 8,772,000 8,772,000 8,772,000
number of clusters 468 468 468
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0294 0.0000 0.0038
Table 11: Alternative specifications explanatory variables  
  
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates. This table shows results using alternative specifications of the 
explanatory variables. In the first column we use a more flexible specification with risk score-year dummies and 
year-month dummies. The next column uses a distributed lag structure instead of the log of the expenditure 
in the previous 3 months. In the last column we do not condition on the future price in January. We use data 
at the monthly level. Expenditures are measured as the log of one plus the actual amount. Standard errors are 
clustered at the risk score decile-gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
 
Log(expenditures + 0.1) Log(expenditures+10)
(current price) x (no-claim regime) -0.297*** (0.0646) -0.0583** (0.0293)
(current price) x (deductible regime) -0.529*** (0.0347) -0.201*** (0.0160)
Future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,772,000 8,772,000
Number of clusters 468 468
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0002 0.0000
Table 12: Alternative specifications dependent variable 
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates.  We use data at the monthly level.  Standard errors are clustered at 
the risk  score decile-gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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December interaction December dropped
(current price) x (no-claim regime) -0.161***(0.0463) -0.163***(0.0479)
(current price) x (deductible regime) -0.347***(0.0250) -0.334***(0.0249)
(current price) x (December) -0.117***(0.0146)
Future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,772,000 8,041,000
Number of clusters 468 468
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0000 0.0002
Table 13: End-of-the-year effects 
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates. We use data at the monthly level. Expenditures are measured as the 
log of one plus the actual amount. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-gender-age group-year 
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Conclusions
In this study we compare the effects of patient cost-sharing on health care expenditures under 
a deductible policy and a no-claim refund policy. We show that patients react more strongly to 
deductibles than to no-claim refunds. This finding holds across income groups, for older and younger 
people, men and women, and for individuals with both high and low risk scores. Our results are robust 
to alternative specifications of both the outcome variable and the explanatory variables. In a placebo 
test we do not find any effects if we apply our approach to 15-17 year olds who in the Netherlands are 
not subject to patient cost-sharing. Furthermore, descriptive evidence shows that the main result that 
individuals react stronger to deductibles than to no-claim refunds can also be seen in the raw data. 
Our preferred explanation for our results is that individuals are loss averse and respond differently to 
both scheme since they perceive a deductible payment as a loss and a no-claim refund as a gain. We 
can exclude alternative explanations such as the different timing of payments under deductibles and 
no-claim refunds or the shifting of health care expenditures across years. 
Our study adds to the growing evidence that patients’ responses to cost-sharing incentives are 
subject to strong behavioral biases239. We contribute to the literature by showing that the framing of 
cost-sharing incentives has a strong effect on health care expenditures. In fact, the framing of incentives 
is quantitatively as important as the incentive itself. We also show that individuals are loss averse in 
the context of patient cost-sharing schemes and that their reference point is the financial situation 
after paying insurance premiums. This finding holds across different groups in the population, and it 
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could potentially also apply to insurance markets other than health insurance.
An important remaining question is whether deductibles or no-claim refunds should be preferred 
from a welfare point of view. This question is difficult to answer. The original academic justification for 
patient cost-sharing incentives is to reduce moral hazard240. According to standard economic theory, 
individuals weigh the benefits and costs of treatment in their decisions. With full health insurance 
coverage the financial costs of health care utilization is zero which can lead to moral hazard. Thus, 
reductions in medical spending as a result of patient cost-sharing should be seen as a welfare gain209. 
Based on this reasoning, deductibles are preferable to no-claim refunds, because they lead to stronger 
reductions in medical spending.
However, patients might be ignorant about the true benefits of medical treatment239. 
Consequently, costs sharing incentives might cause patients not only to forego low-value care, but 
also care that is highly beneficial. We characterize the effect of both, no-claim refunds and deductibles 
on 5 selected types of high value care and find economically negligible effects. However, this may 
be specific to the Dutch institutional environment with low deductible limits and it remains to be 
seen whether this holds more generally. In contrast, Brot-Goldberg et al.211 find suggestive evidence of 
effects of deductibles on similar types of high value care.
Some features of no-claim refunds might be attractive also from a policy point of view. In addition 
to reducing moral hazard, one of the main motivations of policy makers for introducing patient cost-
sharing schemes is to make sure that sick individuals pay more into the system than healthy ones 
while insurance is still provided241. In a simulation study, we show that on average, out-of-pocket 
expenditures are higher by about 8 euros under a no-claim refund, while health care expenditures are 
higher by about 150 euros per year. Framing cost-sharing incentives as deductibles lowers health care 
expenditures substantially, while affecting out-of-pocket spending only marginally.
Furthermore, no-claim refunds might prove to be less unpopular than deductibles. Deductibles 
are controversial in the political debate both in the Netherlands and in other countries. Several 
political parties favor the abolition of deductibles in the Netherlands, and part of the opposition to 
the Affordable Care Act in the United States can be explained with aversion to high deductibles and 
co-payments. If individuals are loss averse and use their financial situation after paying insurance 
premiums as reference point —as our results suggest— then they might prefer no-claim refunds over 
deductibles79. However, one disadvantage of no-claim refunds compared to deductibles is that no-
claim refunds have to be financed by higher insurance premiums.
For the design of economic policy it is generally important to pay careful attention to possible 
behavioral biases. A good understanding of the behavioral underpinnings of how individuals respond 
to cost-sharing schemes in insurance markets can be an important input for the design of such 
schemes. Our paper contributes to that.
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Appendix A: Additional details on the data
Services that are subject to cost-sharing
Constructing our main independent variables and the price requires that we know which services 
are subject to cost-sharing, as health insurers can exempt some services from cost-sharing. Such a list 
was not available to us. We therefore proxied for this using data on actual deductible payments made 
and information on the overarching care types that are exempt from the deductible, as specified by 
law. The types of care that are exempted include obstetric and maternal care, care generally provided 
by General Practitioners (GPs) and participation under a chronic care program. More specifically, our 
approach for determining coverage consisted of the following steps (in chronological order):
1. Every specialist service was defined as counting towards the deductible;
2. Services provided by registered obstetricians were defined as not counting towards the 
deductible;
3. Specialist services were not defined as counting towards the deductible when they were 
received only by women (90%, to account for administrative errors) and,
(a) for which in fewer than 1% of the claims a deductible payment was requested, for  
 services that we observed over a 1000 times in the data or
(b) for which in fewer than 10% of the claims a deductible payment was requested for  
 services that observed less than a 100 times in the data;
4. For any remaining services, we determined coverage along the lines of 3a and 3b. That is, we 
let coverage fully depend on the percentage of claims in which actual deductible payments 
were made;
5. Coverage under the no-claim regime was deduced from 2008 deductible data.
Using the percentage cut-off points in 3a and 3b, we take account of administrative errors. We 
used a more conservative cut-off points for services that were billed less frequently.
Now we have proxied for coverage using the 5-step approach outlined above, we can calculate 
the marginal cost-sharing rate at the beginning of a particular month, by summing expenditures over 
all health services subject to cost-sharing, that a patient has received up to that month.
Risk scores
To calculate the risk score, we regress total health care costs for a given year on a gender dummy, 
fully interacted with a third order polynomial in age, indicators for the decile of costs in the previous 
year, indicators for chronic conditions, indicators for characteristics at the 6-digit neighborhood level. 
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For the latter we conduct a median split for income, the fraction non-western immigrants, and the CBS 
socioeconomic status score, respectively. We also include dummies for missing characteristics at the 
neighborhood level. Finally, we obtain fitted value and divide them by the average.
Appendix B: Implied discount rate
In our empirical analysis, we have obtained estimates of price effects, separately for the no-claim 
and deductible regime. Our interpretation of the difference between the estimated effects is that 
the difference arises due to framing. In principle, an alternative explanation is that individuals react 
stronger to deductibles because then they have to pay earlier, as the no-claim refund is only paid out 
at the beginning of the following year. Here, we conduct a simple back-of-the envelope calculation 
with the goal to determine what the individual discount factor must be in order to generate this effect. 
We find that it would have to be unreasonable low, supporting the interpretation of the effects as 
being due to framing. For this, we use a framework with a quadratic utility function as in Einav et al.219 
Denote health care needs in month t by λt , health care consumption by mt , income by yt , and the 
implications of cost-sharing by δtpt . δ is the monthly discount factor so that δt is the discount factor 
associated the delayed payment t months later, when the “current price” is pt . The flow utility in 
period t depends on health care consumption:
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Risk scores 
To calculate the risk score, we regress total health care costs for a given year on a gender dum-
my, fully interacted with a third order polynomial in age, indicators for the decile of costs in the pre-
vious year, indicators for chronic conditions, indicators for characteristics at the 6-digit neighborhood 
level. For the latter we conduct a median split for income, the fraction non-western immigrants, and 
the CBS socioeconomic status score, respectively. We also include dummies for missing characteris-
tics at the neighborhood level. Finally, we obtain fitted value and divide them by the average. 
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as being due to framing. For this, we use a framework with a quadratic utility function as in Einav et 
al.219 Denot  health care needs in month t by λt , health care consumption by mt , income by yt , and 
the implications of cost-sharing by δtpt . δ is the monthly discount factor so that δt is the discount 
factor associated the delayed payment t months later, when the “current price” is pt . The flow utility 
in period t depends on health care consumption: 
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) −
1
2𝜔𝜔𝜔𝜔 (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆)
2 + 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿τ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 
Differentiating with respect to mt allows us to solve for the optimal consumption in t, 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡∗(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) = 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝜔𝜔(1 − 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿τ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) 
When individuals have to fully and immediately pay out-of-pocket, we have δτpt= 1. Then, opti-
mal health care consumption is equal to health care needs. In contrast, after hitting the cost-sharing 
Differentiating with r spect to mt allows us to solve for the optimal consumption in t,
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When individuals have to fully and immediately pay out-of-pocket, we have δτpt= 1. Then, opti-
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When individuals have to fu ly and i i t l  - f- t, we have δτpt= 1. Then, optimal 
health care consumption is equal to health care needs. In contrast, after hitting the cost-sharing limit, 
δτpt=0 so that health care consumption is equal to health care needs plus ω. For that reason, ω can be 
interpreted as ex post moral hazard.
The effects reported in this paper are percentage changes in health care consumption, where the 
base is consumption when the current price is equal to zero. In terms of this model, this is
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Different regimes have different discount factors because they have different delays for the 
payments. For a rough approximation say that the average treatment date is after the first half of the 
year, payment under the deductible regime occurs on average three months later, and payment un-
der the payback rebate occurs at the end of the first quarter of the following year. This means that 
the difference in timing is 6 months on average. 
Assuming that health care needs and moral hazard effects stay the same, the ratio of coefficients 





so that the yearly discount factor would have to be 
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿12 = 0.234 
which corresponds to the arguable unrealistically high discount rate of 
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payments. For a rough approximation say that the average treatment date is after the first half of the 
year, payment under the deductible regime occurs on average three months later, and payment under 
the payback rebate occurs at the end of the first quarter of the following year. This means that the 
difference in timing is 6 months on average.
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Assuming that health care needs and moral hazard effects stay the same, the ratio of coefficients 
obtained in the main analysis is
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Number of individuals 35,697
Table C1: Summary statistics over time  
 
NOTES: This table shows summary statistics for all individuals who were in the sample in January 2006. Care 
consumption is the consumption of care that falls under the no-claim refund policy or the deductible. 
Hit deductible is one for a person in a given year if that person exceeded the deductible or the payback limit in 
a given year.
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quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4


















Future price in January Yes Yes Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 2,052,132 2,206,728 2,083,332 2,084,652
Number of clusters 467 467 468 468
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.1170 0.1007 0.0081 0.0014
Table C2: Effects on the probability to have a claim by income quarter  
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates for different subsamples defined by income quartile at the 6-digit 
neighborhood level. We use data at the monthly level. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-
gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Female Male Age 19-64 Age 65+


















Future price in January Yes Yes Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,548,864 4,223,136 6,797,784 1,974,216
Number of clusters 234 234 360 155
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.1215 0.0004 0.0266 0.4788
Table C3: Effects on the probability to have a claim by age and gender categories  
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates by age and gender, respectively. We use data at the monthly level. 
Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01.
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Low risk score High risk score
(current price) x (no-claim regime) -0.134*** (0.0263) -0.0872*** (0.0145)
(current price) x (deductible regime) -0.169*** (0.0257) -0.102*** (0.0124)
Future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,335,168 4,436,832
Number of clusters 198 270
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0589 0.1296
Table C4: Effects on the probability to have a claim by risk type 
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates by risk score. We use data at the monthly level. Standard errors are 




type 2 Statins Anti-depressants Anti-hypertensives
























Future price in January Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months 
plus 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,772,000 8,772,000 8,772,000 8,772,000 8,772,000
Number of clusters 468 468 468 468 468
p-value equality current price 
coefficient 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table C5: Effects on the probability to have a claim by selected types of care 
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates. We use data at the monthly level. Standard errors are clustered at 
the risk score decile-gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Flexible form Distributed lag No future price
(current price) x (no-claim regime) -0.199***(0.0601) -0.206***(0.0262) -0.553***(0.0695)
(current price) x (deductible regime) -0.345***(0.0226) -0.312***(0.0210) -0.716***(0.0474)
future price in January Yes Yes No
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes No Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score No Yes Yes
year dummies No Yes Yes
month dummies No Yes Yes
6 distributed lags log expenditure No Yes No
risk score-year dummies Yes No No
year-month dummies Yes No No
number of observations 8,772,000 8,772,000 8,772,000
number of clusters 468 468 468
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0294 0.0000 0.0038
Table C6: Results for the probability to have a claim - alternative specifications explanatory variables  
  
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates. This table shows results using alternative specifications of the 
explanatory variables. In the first column we use a more flexible specification with risk score-year dummies and 
year-month dummies. The next column uses a distributed lag structure instead of the log of the expenditure in 
the previous 3 months. In the last column we do not condition on the future price in January. We use data at the 
monthly level. Standard errors are clustered at the risk score decile-gender-age group-year level. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
December interaction December dropped
(current price) x (no-claim regime) -0.0506***(0.00897) -0.0484***(0.00921)
(current price) x (deductible regime) -0.0703***(0.00470) -0.0651***(0.00452)
(current price) x (December) -0.0201***(0.00247)
Future price in January Yes Yes
log exp. previous 3 months plus 1 Yes Yes
5 year age brackets Yes Yes
dummies decile risk score Yes Yes
year dummies Yes Yes
month dummies Yes Yes
Number of observations 8,772,000 8,041,000
Number of clusters 468 468
p-value equality current price coefficient 0.0256 0.0703
Table C7: End-of-the-year effects for the probability to have a claim 
 
NOTES: Instrumental variables estimates. We use data at the monthly level. Standard errors are clustered at 
the risk score decile-gender-age group-year level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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NOTES: This figure shows risk score deciles. See Appendix A.2 for details on how the risk score was calculated.












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
month
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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NOTES: This figure shows care consumption, by month and for all years between 2006 and 2015. Calculated for 
the full unbalanced panel. 
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NOTES: This figure shows the fraction of individuals who have not hit the deductible, by month and by quartile 
of the risk score, pooled over the years. Figure 3 shows the fractions by year.
Figure C.4: Care consumption for care not covered by deductible around week in which cost sharing ends
 
Figure C.4: Care consumption for care not covered by deductible around week in which cost sharing ends 
 
NOTES: This figure shows average health care expenditures for care that is not covered by the deductible against the  
   week of exceeding the payback limit or the deductible in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Cost-sharing incentives were  









NOTES: This figure shows average health care expenditures for care that is not covered by the deductible 
against the week of exceeding the payback limit or the deductible in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Cost-sharing 
incentives were framed as a o-cl im refund in 20 7 and as a deductible in 2008.
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NOTES: This figure shows how the delay between treatment and billing date changed over time. Calculated 
using all claims in our data.
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The following research aims were formulated in the introductory chapter of this thesis:
Part A (shared savings)
1. To design a shared savings program for Dutch PCMHs that incentivizes value-based 
care, by identifying and rewarding savings efforts in overall health care expenditures, 
with accuracy and statistical confidence;
2. To model and estimate changes in health care expenditures and quality in the first year 
of operating under the shared savings program, and to interpret these results in terms 
of patient value.
Part B (patient cost sharing)
3. To model and estimate patient responses to deductibles and no-claim rebates;
4. To investigate whether differences in patient responses to deductibles and no-claim 
rebates can be attributed to the implied differences in the framing of both incentives;
5. To investigate whether framing effects in patient cost-sharing incentives, if any, are 
more pronounced for particular subgroups in society.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will reflect on our main findings, in light of these research aims.
Main findings and reflection
Reflections on the design of the shared savings model
Potential ways of making the model more value-based
In light of the rising health care expenditures, and the fact that a significant portion of medical 
spending is wasteful, we have hypothesized that adding value-based incentives, via the implementation 
of a shared savings model, lowers wasteful spending, by holding care providers financially accountable 
for both spending and quality. In chapters 1 and 4 of this thesis, we have elaborated on the current way 
in which GPs are reimbursed for their services, and have argued that only few value-based incentives 
follow from this payment method. Since Dutch GPs fulfill a central and coordinating role in the Dutch 
health care system, we hypothesized that introducing a shared savings model at this level, increases 
value in broad parts of the spectrum. Therefore, a first research aim has been to design a shared 
savings program for Dutch GPs (working in a PCMH), that incentivizes value-based care. Chapter 2 
describes the design of the shared savings model. In short, the model consists of five generic building 
blocks:
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1. GPs are held accountable for the costs and quality of care, for patients registered with 
them;
2. GPs are held accountable for total costs, also for the costs that are generated outside 
their own practice, with the exception of dental care; these costs are expressed as an 
average per insurance year.
3. A GP’s average costs per insurance year are evaluated against an expenditure 
benchmark, consisting of a three-year weighted historical average, multiplied by the 
growth rate of a regional control group consisting of non-incentivized GPs;
4. A GP is said to have realized savings in case his average costs per insurance year are 
statistically significantly lower than those of the benchmark;
5. Savings are shared in accordance with a payment maximum and a sharing rate. The net 
sharing rate depends on the achievement of quality targets.
To make the incentive stronger, we find that we had to lower the uncertainty surrounding the 
incentive payments. We did so by:
1. Setting the scope of the model such that it only includes patients and services for which 
participating providers can be held accountable; 
2. Excluding those who were born or who died during the performance year from the 
program.
3. Capping expenditures in order to limit the effect of outliers;
4. Adjusting for differences in casemix between provider and benchmark populations;
5. Defining savings on the basis of a statistically significant difference between provider 
and benchmark performance.
We addressed four problems relevant for the accuracy and statistical confidence of the model (as 
stated in the last part of the first research aim), related to (1) annualized expenditures (2) missing data 
on casemix variables, (3) casemix differences between a participating provider and the populations 
that make up his benchmark and (4) the interaction of 3 and 4. 
When reflecting on the design choices made in chapter 2, we saw a number of future opportunities 
for program/model improvement, that will further strengthen the value-based incentives that follow 
from them.
524990-L-bw-Hayen




A distinguishing feature of shared savings models, is that spending and quality incentives are 
integrated: the amount of shared savings payments earned, ultimately depends on achieving pre-
specified performance targets. In the Menzis shared savings model, quality indicators were derived 
from a patient survey, and professional standards regarding chronic care delivery, prescription drug 
policy, and quality and safety aspects of running a primary care center. Apart from the fact that 
professional standards change over the course of time (e.g. recommended blood sugar levels for 
those aged 70 and up), and that data on a larger number of quality indicators is becoming available242, 
trends in what elements of quality should be incentivized, also change. Judged by current standards, 
the quality model may be too narrow in scope, and also targets only a few patient populations. Also, 
our patient survey is currently targeted at a general population, while a current approach is to design 
surveys around specific diseases243 or combinations of diseases244. Such an approach allows one to 
focus on those domains of life that are potentially affected by the disease, and will therefore be better 
able to measure the value implications of receiving care. Apart from that, the quality indicators were 
mainly centered on a GP’s own work (although drugs may also be prescribed by specialists). For some 
specialist treatments for which a patient has a larger option set (i.e. plannable care), one might want 
to add process and outcome indicators to the model, such that GPs take the quality of the hospital 
they are referring to, into consideration.  
The design of the benchmark
A criticism of the benchmark in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), is that it is 
largely build around a provider’s own historical expenditures – whose weighted spending average 
forms the base of the benchmark56. Back then, the provider was fully billing under fee-for-service, 
and, presumably, faced little incentives to save costs. Assuming that fee-for-service payment models 
increase volumes beyond value, one might wonder whether this makes up an appropriate starting 
point. Or, like Berenson207 noticed “previous practice inefficiency is baked into the calculations”. Under 
the MSSP, a potential benefit of using historical expenditures as the base of the benchmark, is that 
one is most likely to attract previously inefficient providers53, which are, presumably, the providers 
that need additional incentives to lower costs. Recently, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, proposed to change the MSSP’s benchmark, to let it also depend in part on average spending 
in the region surrounding the provider56. That is, the base of the benchmark would be changed in to a 
weighted average of a provider’s historical spending and the regional fee-for-service spending level. The 
weight received by region’s spending level would increase over time. Rose et al. 53 motivate why such 
a change needs to be implemented gradually, especially in case the underlying risk-adjustment model 
is incomplete – for it may otherwise penalize providers who serve a high-cost high-risk population. In 
their analysis however, they did find a large variation in risk-adjusted performance across providers, 
suggesting that Berenson’s concern was valid. 
Like the MSSP benchmark, the benchmark used in the Menzis shared savings model was also 
based on AEZ’s historical expenditures. From chapter 2’s analysis, in which we performed a test run 
of the shared savings model, we can derive that AEZ resides within a high-spending area (chapter 2’s 
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table 9 shows that AEZ’s 2012 spending is over 5% higher than that of a matched population from 
the control group. This was replicated for 2012-2015 in chapter 4). To introduce additional incentives 
for savings costs, we therefore propose to add a regional spending factor to the benchmark. This can 
be accomplished by predicting the expenditures of the regional control group when assigned a case 
mix similar to that of AEZ, and calculating a weighted average of actual and predicted expenditures. 
The larger the difference between predicted and actual expenditures, the lower the weights, and the 
slower the increase in weights, must be53.
Replacing the GP base payment system by capitation
In the above, we noted that shared savings models are incremental payment models that are 
often implemented as a complement to the current payment system. GPs derive a substantial part of 
their income from fee-for-service revenues245. Berenson207 wrote that, under a shared savings model, 
the future and uncertain shared savings payments compare unfavorably to direct, fee-for-service 
payments. This made him wonder why Accountable Care Organizations are incentivized to realize 
savings in the first place. In an essay in the American Journal of Managed Care246 (not part of this 
dissertation), we wrote that the Accountable Care Organization is still incentivized to lower spending 
of providers that practice outside the boundaries of its organization. This may also speak in favor of 
physician-led ACOs as opposed to hospital-led or integrated ACOs, because for the former, a drop 
in hospital revenues by lowering fee-for-service payments, does not harm them247. Still, we believe 
that Berenson is right by saying that the incentives following from a provider’s base payment and 
incremental payment, may not be fully congruent. 
Currently, the Centers for Medicaid and Medicaid Services proposed to start a new track of 
Accountable Care Organizations, in which the underlying fee-for-service payment model is replaced 
by models that put the provider at risk for overspending248. During the project, AEZ also proposed to 
alter their base pay as well, and use this model in a second wave of the payment reform – a process 
in which we assistedPP.AFThe idea is to replace the payment models underlying all three GP payment 
segments, with a single capitation fee that covers all expected expenses. This capitation payment is 
a ‘per beneficiary per quarter’ (PBPQ) payment, and is paid to each person that is assigned to the 
GP using the rules developed in chapter 2. We then combine these PBPQ payments, which cover 
GP expenses, with a shared savings arrangement that covers total medical spending – similar to the 
arrangement that we designed in this dissertation. 
The idea behind linking PBPQ payments to an overall shared savings arrangement is that the 
shared savings arrangement will counter incentives to stint on primary care, inasmuch this will 
eventually cause demand for acute or specialist care. Vice versa, the combination of PBPQ payments 
and a shared savings arrangement, incentivizes AEZ to only exceed spending above its capitation 
payments in case the benefits of providing additional services are matched with savings elsewhere in 
the spectrum of care (i.e. for conditions for which substitution or prevention is highly cost-efficient). 
Therefore, the combination of both forms of capitation may reinforce each other in realizing value-
PP  Together with employees from both Menzis and AEZ 
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based care. However, this is a topic left to future research. Currently, we know of no similar payment 
initiative, although this payment model combines elements of the MSSP, AQC, Pioneer model and the 
Next Generation payment model.
A note on risk selection
Since our research aim has been to develop a shared savings model that incentivizes value-
based care, an additional check we must do is determining whether providers can earn shared savings 
via different routes. That is, realizing savings – as defined by the model – without having exerted 
any savings effort. In Chapter 3, we investigated an often-voiced concern regarding shared savings 
models (and financial incentives in general), which is that providers can benefit from risk selection 
when participating under the program. To determine whether this is a mere theoretical threat, we 
simulated risk selection under a shared savings program. We found that for providers that want to 
select risks, a rich risk adjustment model – built using more information than will be typically available 
to the providers operating under shared savings programs – is highly problematic, because providers 
will only be able to optimize with respect to part of the model’s variables. This does not guarantee 
success, and may even imply a drop in shared savings payments, as we found. This finding implies 
that the threat of risk selection to the financial sustainability of shared savings programs, decreases 
with the richness of the risk adjustment model. We also found that, in practice, a relatively simple risk 
adjustment is able to substantially lower the expected pay-offs to risk selection – taking into account 
that selecting risks is, by itself, a procedure that involves costs.
Since chapter 2 describes a rich risk equalization model – using casemix information that will not 
be available to GPs (note that GPs hardly have any benchmark information) – we do not expect that 
we lower the threat of risk selection (and thereby strengthening the value-based incentives that follow 
from the program), by adding more casemix variables to the model.
Remaining challenges
The Dutch health care system in which the Menzis shared savings model is operative, is 
characterized as a managed competition181. From the perspective of both the providers and the payer, 
this brings about several challenges for increasing value via shared savings arrangements, related to 
(1) payment models of non-incentivized providers and (2) switching behavior of insured 
1) A first challenge follows from the possibility that payment models used to reimburse providers 
not participating in the shared savings arrangement, are or will become incongruent with shared 
savings models. This poses at least some risk to participating GPs. For example, a hospital 
financed under activity-based costing might be less willing to cooperate with an incentivized GP, 
than a hospital who just signed a multiannual block contract. For the latter type of contract, and 
for global payments in general, it also holds that true savings efforts by participating GPs will 
not result in net savings, because the payment to the hospital has to be done anyway. In the 
savings calculations, Menzis decided to use gross expenditures, rather than net expenditures. 
Gross expenditures include the original DRG hospital payments, without ex post corrections on 
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prices in case the hospital has hit the ceiling (as under a block contract). Under this approach, 
GPs are rewarded for their savings efforts regardless of the type of contract Menzis concluded 
with the hospital. Note that concluding multiannual block contracts leaves Menzis paying twice 
in case participating GPs realize savings. It will be Menzis’s responsibility to lower the hospital’s 
price ceiling in the next year.
2) A second challenge follows from the fact that people may switch to a different health insurer at 
the start of the year. For the participating providers, this implies that these people will be dropped 
from the program. This too poses a risk to providers, as it makes it harder to recoup investments. 
In the MSSP, in which patients are retrospectively assigned to an ACO, there is an additional risk 
that some patients might ultimately be assigned to benchmark providers, potentially lowering 
the amount of shared savings payments55.
Placing the shared savings model on the payment model continuum
Risk
Chapter 2 discussed the concept of payment models, and provides some examples of dimensions 
that can be used to categorize them. A major theme in the classification of payment models is 
‘risk’ as payment models are often classified accordingly. Miller, for example, outlined a continuum 
of payment models, in which the extremes – fee-for-service and traditional capitation – pose the 
‘least’ and the ‘most’ risk for care providers, respectively14. In this discussion however, we re-interpret 
Miller’s continuum as making a distinction of payment models in terms of the number and types of 
variables for which the provider assumes risk (the dimensionality of risk), rather than in terms of the 
absolute magnitude of the riskQQ.AGBy doing so, we re-interpret Miller’s continuum, by saying that the 
dimensionality of risk is lowest for fee-for-service arrangements and highest for traditional capitation. 
 




Figure 1: Payment model continuum, adapted from Miller14 
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QQ  Which, we think, would be mistaken, because the size of the risk, i.e. the variation in outcomes, does not only 
depend on the number of dimensions for which somebody is at risk.
524990-L-bw-Hayen
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 158
Chapter 6
158
In chapter 3, we outlined the design of the Menzis shared savings program. Under this program, 
care providers are held financially accountable for medical spending in their population, irrespective 
of whether the underlying health care services were delivered by them or by other providers. As such, 
and following Miller’s risk typology, the providers participating under the shared savings program 
assume risk for all variables in figure 1. At a first glance, when hypothesizing about the effect shared 
savings programs will have on the behavior of participating physicians, it therefore seems valuable to 
draw a comparison with behavior under traditional capitation now the dimensionality of risk under 
both models seems comparable. However, rather than assuming straight away that shared savings 
models influence behavior in a similar way and to a similar extent, a number of differences exist 
between the models, that may also cause differences in the way providers respond to these models. 
In the remainder of this section, we explore these differences between capitation and shared savings 
payments, and derive implications for physician behavior under shared savings models.
Base payment versus incremental payment
A first difference is that shared savings payments are not a provider’s main source of revenue13. 
In the design of the shared savings program, a maximum on the amount of shared savings payments 
was imposed. Furthermore, the program served as a mere complement to the GP payment system 
which has been described as a mix of three segments: (1) capitation payments and fee-for-service, 
(2) bundled payments for the management of chronic diseases, and (3) performance fees196. Out 
of these three segments, the capitation and fee-for-service payments together make up the largest 
part of provider revenue249 (capitation payments are a GP’s main source of income, fee-for-service 
revenues come in second245). Under the shared savings program, segment 1 continues to be the most 
important source of GP income. Therefore, ‘shared savings payments’ are considered to be a form of 
“incremental pay”, rather than a form of “base pay” of which traditional capitation is an example13.
One-sided vs. two-sided risk
A second difference is that, when participating under a shared savings contract, providers 
only share in savings against an expenditure benchmark, and do not have to repay in case of excess 
spending. Under traditional capitation, spending in excess of the capitation fee is fully borne by the 
providers themselves. However, even though providers only share in expenditure savings, participating 
under a shared savings model is not without risk. Providers typically make substantial investments 
in anticipation of sharing in the expenditure savings these investments are believed to generate 
elsewhere in the spectrum of care52. On top of that, there are also costs associated with running the 
program, borne by the providers themselves166. The risk that these types of costs are not recouped, 
is still present under a one-sided payment model. Under a two-sided model there will be a larger 
variation in outcomes, however, which poses additional risk to the provider. 
Timing of payments
A third difference is that the timing of capitation payments differs from shared savings payments. 
Capitation payments are typically prospective payments whereas shared savings payments are paid in 
retrospect. This is because expenditure benchmarks, against which savings are evaluated, may contain 
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real time parameters such as expenditure growth and can therefore only be calculated once these are 
known. In the Menzis shared savings model, the expenditure benchmark consists of a weighted, three-
year historical expenditure average, multiplied by the local growth trend in expenditures during the 
performance year. As such, savings can only be determined after the claims run-out period. 
Implications for behavior
To sum up: capitation payments are a provider’s base pay, paid prospectively, implying that a 
provider runs a two-sided risk. Consequently, the incentives following from capitation and shared 
savings payments are framed differently. In chapter 5 of this dissertation, we found that differences 
in the framing of patient cost-sharing incentives elicit different behavioral responses – as would be 
expected by Prospect Theory79, 250. This might also apply to provider payment models. To illustrate 
this, consider a provider who receives a prospective global payment in exchange for fully managing 
the health of a population of insured. Assume that his own spending will remain unchanged, but that 
he is able to influence spending by other providers (e.g. by utilization review, gatekeeping, etc.251). 
Under this prospective payment, the provider’s reference point79 will be the situation after receiving 
the global payment. Spending by other providers will be debited against the budget, and the provider 
will perceive this as a loss accordingly. Under the Menzis shared savings program, the same provider 
will continue to bill under fee-for-service, and his reference point will be his wealth in the beginning 
of the year. By the end of the performance year, the payer (Menzis) will evaluate spending by other 
providers against the shared saving model’s benchmark, and, in case no savings have been generated, 
will not make any shared savings payments. The provider is likely to perceive this as a foregone gain. 
Even though the provider’s income could be equal under both payment models in case of no change, 
Prospect Theory would predict that providers would display more risk-taking behavior under a global 
budget, and more risk-averse behavior under a shared savings program. Although it is difficult to 
draw general conclusions as to the differences in interventions that providers will implement under 
both payment models, our first thought on this topic is that interventions targeted at reducing the 
prevalence and incidence of high-spending outliers, are less likely to be implemented under shared 
savings programs than under capitation programs. Although having a disproportionate number of 
outliers in one’s patient population can have detrimental consequences for a provider’s revenue under 
either a global payment or a shared savings arrangement, the pay-offs to setting up intensive care 
management programs for those at risk of ending up in the upper tail of the spending distribution, 
are highly uncertain102, which might make them more attractive for risk-takers than for those who are 
risk-averse. 
Although we cannot analyze how AEZ’s performance would have been, had they operated under 
a global payment, we performed additional analyses that, in light of this discussion, showed that the 
savings found in chapter 4 were unlikely the result of actions targeted at high-cost patients – which 
is at least congruent with our hypothesized framing effectRR.AHIn preparation of our analysis, we first 
checked whether there was a relationship between a person’s risk decile – as defined at the beginning 
RR  In an overview of the planned interventions, the GPs did not mention an intervention specifically targeted at 
high costs. Menzis did supply several statistics of high spending patients, as requested by the GPs.
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of the study window – and her probability of being a cost outlier in either the pre-intervention or the 
pilot year. Figure 2 shows that there is such a relationship: cost outliers (those with costs in excess of 
the 95th percentile in the spending distribution) are disproportionally located in the higher risk deciles, 
for both the pre-intervention and pilot year. In our first analysis, we subsequently split out the shared 
savings effect according to risk decile, using our difference-in-difference specification of chapter 4 
(equation 1). Figure 3 displays the results. The figure shows that, on average, the higher risk types 
did not contribute to the shared savings effect. Savings were found for a more regular population of 
care consumers (risk deciles 2-6; note that risk decile 1 contains the expected non-users of care). This 
suggests that, in realizing savings, AEZ did not focus on those groups of patients in which the proportion 
of cost outliers was the largest. As it could well be the case that AEZ focused its interventions on cost 
outliers in risk deciles 2-6 – which would be incongruent with our hypothesized framing effect, we 
checked whether the savings that followed from patients in risk deciles 2-6 were the result of lowering 
the proportion of high cost outliers vis-à-vis the proportion in the control group. We found that the 
relative proportion of high cost outliers within these risk group remained the same (p=0.12 against 
the null of no relative change). This too suggests that AEZ, in its efforts to realize savings, did not target 
interventions at its cost outliersSS.AISimilarly, McWilliams et al. found that savings under the Medicare 
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SS  Alternatively, they might have done so, but were simply not successful in doing so. The analyses cannot rule out 
this alternative explanation.
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Reflections on the results of the first performance year of the Menzis Shared Savings 
Program
Our second research aim has been to model and estimate changes in health care expenditures 
and quality in the first year of operating under the shared savings program, and to interpret these 
results in terms of patient value. 
We found a statistically significant and robust drop in health care expenditures. We found that GPs 
have lowered volumes rather than prices, and have realized savings within the domains of specialist 
care, GP care, and diagnostic care. We found that these ‘shared savings’ effects are not concentrated 
within a single GP practice, but that each GP participating in the experiment has realized savings. This 
supports a causal, negative, link between participating under a shared savings program, and resulting 
health care expenditures.
While overall quality remained rather constant, we did find significant drops or increases for some 
individual indicators. In discussing these findings with the participating GPs, we found no adequate 
explanation for these sudden swings in quality, suggesting that the shared savings arrangement has 
primarily targeted spending behavior and not quality.
Our shared savings effect does not necessarily generalize to other GPs. The primary care centers 
participating in this first wave of the shared savings program, were not chosen at random, but only 
after careful consideration (chapter 2). Apart from that, the primary care centers were all part of AEZ – 
a large national chain of primary care centers that offers managerial support to its individual members 
(such as data analytics) – who indicated interest in participating. In that sense, AEZ self-selected into 
treatment. In order to limit self-selection bias, one approach is to pick a control group of primary 
care centers similar to those of AEZ. We did so by selecting primary care centers at random, from a 
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group of centers in which 2 or more GPs were working together, and who indicated to be “primary 
care centers”. This was the closest approximation to AEZ we could get. In combination, chapter 4’s 
figure 1 and 2 suggest that we ultimately managed to find a control group that followed a similar 
expenditure trend in the pre-intervention period (differences in the absolute level of expenditures 
are controlled for in our fixed effects design). Nevertheless, since our difference-in-difference setup 
essentially estimates the average treatment effect on the treated (we use data from a control group 
to construct the counterfactual outcome only for those enrolled in the shared savings program), we 
cannot establish whether our results generalize to different settings.
As previous research found that savings positively depend on historical levels of spending, or 
on the spending level of the region48, 50, and, as noted earlier on, AEZ had relatively high historical 
spending levels, and Enschede (the pilot city) is among the high spending regions in the Netherlands253, 
we might expect savings to be lower for GPs in other parts of the Netherlands. However, we also 
found that savings have been realized for the lower-risk deciles. And, given that these deciles make 
up a larger part of the population in other regions (AEZ’s population was less healthier than average), 
there are reasons to believe that there is still room for bending the cost curve, via shared savings 
arrangements, in other parts of the Netherlands. 
As for investigating the program’s effect on quality, we can think of a number of opportunities 
for improvement. First and foremost, control group data on quality were not available to us, making it 
impossible to establish a firm causal link between program participation and quality, if any. A second 
opportunity would be to add data on quality indicators that were not incentivized by the model, to 
see whether we observe patterns indicative of “teaching to the test”, as observed under the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework in the UK – Doran et al.254 argued that improvements in incentivized quality 
indicators were obtained at the expense of (relatively) diminishing quality in non-incentivized domains 
of quality. A third opportunity would be to identify low value and high value services from the claims 
data, and split the shared savings effect accordingly. An assumption one must make is that, within 
the first year of the program, the program does not (yet) have a negative impact on the incidence of 
diseases – otherwise, the obtained estimates will be biased downwards.
Comparing our findings with the literature
In chapter 4, we reported that medical spending dropped by 3.5% following the implementation 
of the Menzis shared savings program. If we would split the shared savings effect in a price and a 
volume component, and would fully attribute the price effect to the health insurer’s bargaining power, 
savings were estimated to be 1.9% of medical spending. 
Pope et al. 255 analyzed changes in medical spending in five years of the  US Physician Group 
Practice (PGP) Demonstration project, which ran from 2005 until 2010. The PGP Demonstration 
project was a shared savings program targeted at 10 large physician groups, who, like AEZ, continued 
to bill under fee-for-service36. The participating sites were multispecialty groups, with “well-known 
names”, and were “held in high regard”256. The expenditure benchmark in the shared savings model 
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was calculated as baseline spending, multiplied by the growth in expenditures in the PGP’s service 
area. Like in the Menzis shared savings model, both elements of the benchmark are adjusted for 
case mix. In order to analyze the shared savings model’s effect on medical spending, Pope et al. 
selected a control group of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries from the counties surrounding the 
PGPs and employ a difference-in-difference specification using 4 years of pre-intervention data. They 
used propensity score matching techniques to both drop observations with propensity scores higher 
than 0.90 and lower than 0.10TT.AJ(see our discussion of the overlap assumption in chapter 3), and 
to weigh observations in the regression equation. They reported an average annual saving of 2% in 
medical spending – which is close to the effect we reported. When the authors performed the analysis 
separately for each participating PGP, they only found significant savings for 1 PGP, whereas we found 
that, apart from 1 participating GP, all GPs had realized savings. They also reported that savings were 
predominantly achieved in the upper part of the risk score distributionUU,AKwhereas we only reported 
savings for those classified in to risk deciles 2 - 6. It is difficult however to compare this last result, 
because we used prospective risk adjustment, whereas Pope et al. used concurrent risk adjustment. 
Savings were primarily achieved from the hospital setting, which is similar to our findings.
The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) was evaluated by, among others, McWilliams et al. 
48 and McWilliams41. For each participating provider, the expenditure benchmark under the program 
was defined as a case mix adjusted weighted average, multiplied by the national growth rate in fee-
for-service expenditures. To quantify the spending effects, McWilliams et al. used a random sample of 
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries and assign these beneficiaries to either participating providers 
(Accountable Care Organizations, ACOs), or non-participating providers, based on the program’s 
assignment rules. Subsequently, a difference-in-difference design is used to identify the shared savings 
effect. They found that, on average, spending levels declined by 1.4% in the first performance year of 
the first cohort (which started in 2012). The authors found that savings were higher for independent 
primary care groups than for groups that were vertically integrated with hospitals, which is an 
interesting observation in light of our study. Like under the PGP Demonstration project, savings have 
been achieved in hospital spending, but also in post-acute spending. In an update of the evaluation, 
McWilliams41 found that the spending reductions for the 2012 cohort grew to -2.6% in 2014, and again 
confirms that financial integration (between different providers) is not necessary for achieving savings. 
Also for later cohorts, he found that savings increase with time. In the same year, 32 ACOs started 
under the Pioneer program. On top of the MSSP, the Pioneer program introduced two-sided risk, but 
also a higher sharing rate in case of savings. McWilliams et al.50 found a 1.2% reduction in spending in 
the first performance year, and did not find a difference in performance between Pioneer ACOs that 
were vertically integrated with a hospital and those that were not.
A final shared savings program we consider here is the Alternative Quality Contract of 
Massachusetts, which is a commercial program16. Providers that participate in the Alternative Quality 
TT Essentially, they drop outliers in a case mix sense, rather than in a spending sense, like we did.
UU Note that this does not automatically imply that this is evidence against our framing hypothesis, because, un-
der the PGP demonstration, case mix adjustment happened on a concurrent basis, rather than on a prospective 
basis. Under the PGP demonstration, the risk score explains spending, and does not necessarily predict spending.
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Contract, operate under  global budget, which is trended forward each year by an agreed-upon rate of 
growth. Hence, participating providers also run upside risk of overspending the benchmark, similar to 
ACOs participating in the Pioneer program. Song et al.42 evaluated four years of the Alternative Quality 
Contract, for four different cohorts defined by the year in which they start (2009-2012). They used 
commercially insured persons across the other Northeastern states as their control group, which, in 
terms of demographics and health risk, were similar to those treated by the participating organizations. 
Similar to the other studies, Song et al. use a difference-in-difference approach to identify the shared 
savings effect. They found an initial drop in spending corresponding to 2.4%, which grew to over 10% 
in the last performance year considered. Contrary to the other programs, savings were predominantly 
achieved in the outpatient setting while the effect we found is largely concentrated among those who 
have visited a hospital. The authors also reported a drop in expenditures associated with imaging and 
tests. The latter finding was replicated in our study.
Based on the above, we can say that our findings are generally in line with those obtained in 
other studies. In terms of magnitude, the shared savings effect we report (-1.9%), is surprisingly equal 
to what other programs report in their first year, despite some contextual differences. Apart from 
the generally higher productivity levels in the Netherlands257 – suggesting that there is less room for 
improvement – the providers participating under the Menzis shared savings program also differ in 
other respects from some of their US counterparts. First, in creating accountable care organizations, 
several US hospitals started employing primary care physicians by taking over GP practice258. In the 
Netherlands, primary and secondary care providers are generally not financially integrated. Second, 
the participating providers had no experience in managing risk contracts, whereas some of their US 
counterparts do259. Third, the gatekeeping function is not widespread in the US, whereas it is in the 
Netherlands260, suggesting that the participating providers might have had better control over costs 
made outside their practices – everything else equal. 
 Similar to other studies48, 50, we also established that vertical integration with a hospital, is not 
necessary for primary care providers to realize savings. They can even realize substantial savings in 
hospital settings (we could not make a distinction between inpatient and outpatient settings), without 
this (financial) integration. This suggest that, also in fragmented systems, primary care providers can 
realize substantial savings. 
In the above, and in terms of the dimensionality of risk, we linked shared savings models to 
forms of capitation payment. However, important dissimilarities between both payment methods 
remained. Because of these dissimilarities we viewed shared savings models as somewhat less ‘strong’ 
than capitation payments, in the sense that capitation payments are more likely to urge providers to 
generate savings in medical spending. They do so, by shifting a provider’s financial reference point 
upwards. Shared savings models do resemble the risk sharing arrangements in US behavioral health 
care in the 1990s. In the 1990s, insurance plans often carved out the management behavioral health 
to a managed care vendor261. They did so in many different ways262, but risk-based contracting grew 
rapidly, to become the dominant form of carving out behavioral care to managed care, by the end of 
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the 1990s263. These risk arrangements came in many flavors, with different degrees of risk-sharing, 
even without the vendor actually paying for the claims262. In an article over 20 years ago, Frank, 
McGuire and Newhouse261 gave an example of such a risk contract: “If claims costs fall below [target 
costs], vendor profits may increase at a rate of 50 percent of the cost, up to a limit of 5 percent of the 
target amount”. This closely resembles a shared savings model. Strikingly, one of the main insights 
of the empirical literature on risk contracting in behavioral health, was that weak incentives already 
brought about significant changes in spending263, 264. This resonates with McWilliams et al.48, who, 
in evaluating the performance of the first year of the Medicare Shared Savings Program, found that 
the savings of providers participating under this one-sided contract, were close to the savings for 
‘Pioneer’ providers, who were operating under a two-sided, riskier, contract instead. It is also in line 
with chapter 4’s closing remark, stating that, as witnessed by the first-year results of the Menzis shared 
savings program “introducing additional value-based incentives in health care purchasing markets […] 
does not seem to rely on disruptive payment reform”. 
A reflection on patient cost-sharing
Patient responses to cost-sharing schemes
A third aim of this thesis was to model patient responses to cost-sharing schemes. We found 
that patients do respond to cost-sharing schemes. When patients had to co-pay, irrespective of its 
framing, they reduced medical spending. We found this effect for nearly all subgroups that we took 
into account (e.g. age, gender, income quartiles and risk types).
Does the framing of cost-sharing incentives matter?
Our fourth research aim was to test for whether the framing of a cost sharing incentive matters, 
by modeling the price effect, separately for those under a no-claim and a deductible policy. Our main 
finding was that people respond more strongly to a patient cost-sharing scheme, when framed as 
a deductible. Subsequent analyses caused us to pinpoint to loss aversion as the main mechanism 
at work. Quantitatively, we found that this framing effect is almost as important as the economic 
incentive itself.
Our fifth and last research aim was to investigate whether framing effects in patient cost-sharing 
incentives, are more pronounced for particular subgroups in society. We split the sample in different 
groups. As for income, we did not find that individuals with a high income (measured at the 6-digit 
postal code level) respond differently to the current price compared to those with a low income, 
and found that the framing effect is similar across income groups. In terms of age, we found that 
those above and below the age of 65 years respond similarly to cost-sharing incentives. We did find 
differences between men and women, with women responding more strongly to cost sharing (the 
framing effect is similar). In terms of risk scores, we found that individuals with a below-median risk 
score respond stronger to cost sharing than those with a risk score above the median, but the result 
is not statistically significant. We concluded that responses and framing effects are reasonably similar 
across the subgroups in society that we investigated. This result is similar to Stockley265. 
524990-L-bw-Hayen
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 166
Chapter 6
166
Are patients able to rationally weigh costs against the benefits of care?
When confronted with illness, a rational decision would be to undergo treatment in case the 
benefits of treatment outweigh their costs. The idea of patient cost-sharing however, is that we do 
not want individuals to fully internalize the costs of treatment. Under co-payments, individuals may 
pay only a fixed fraction of the true costs of treatment, whereas under a deductible or a no-claim, 
prices for a particular service ultimately depend on past consumption within the year. Therefore, a 
rational consumer lowering consumption in response to a patient cost-sharing scheme, signals that 
these health care services would have been of truly low value to her. In that case, introducing patient 
cost-sharing schemes to trigger this response, can be welfare improving266. 
However, Chapter 5’s findings, which suggested that the mere framing of the cost-sharing incentive 
can be quantitatively as important as cost-sharing itself, adds to the growing body of evidence showing 
that patient responses to cost-sharing schemes are not rational211, 265. Patient treatment decision 
processes seem to be fraught with cognitive biases. Chapter 5, for example, documents loss-aversion, 
which causes individuals to respond more strongly to a deductible than to a no-claim, ceteris paribus. 
Another example comes from Remmerswaal et al.80, who also studied differences in patient responses 
to deductibles and no-claims, using a sample of young adults between 15 and 21 years of age. As cost-
sharing only applies to persons aged 18 and up, they used a sharp regression discontinuity design, with 
‘age’ as the running variable. They integrated the cost-sharing level in to their specification, by adding 
interactions of no-claim and deductible indicators with their respective size, and reported a difference 
in responses of about 18 cents, per euro increase in cost-sharing. This corresponds closely to the 19% 
difference in absolute terms we obtained. These two studies are the only ones in which deductibles 
and no-claim payments are studied. Finally, Stockley265 compared behavioral responses to deductibles 
and co-payments. She used individual spending data under employer-sponsored insurance plans, for 
individuals employed by firms that changed their cost-sharing policy during the observation window. 
She compared responses to the price of care, which she calculated as expected monthly out-of-pocket 
costs (based on the utilization of services of a fixed sample of other individuals, who belong to a 
similar risk group). She found that prices, when presented as co-payments, elicit stronger reductions 
in spending. In a sense, rational behavior could actually explain her results. She noted that, under 
the co-payment plans, the probability of exceeding the out-of-pocket payment limit was very low, 
whereas, under the deductible, this was more likely. The spot price for a person hitting the deductible 
falls to zero, and anticipating this drop in price may cause individuals to increase spending early in the 
year, which drives a wedge between spending under a deductible and under a co-payment scheme. 
Responding to the expected end-of-year price is rational behavior. However, in an additional analysis 
she found that the deductible effect seemed to be largely driven by responses to the spot price, rather 
than the expected end-of-year price. Stockley attributed the difference in spending responses to 
consumers’ lack of understanding how cost-sharing schemes translate into out-of-pocket costs. 
These studies, together with those reporting myopia211, call into question the ability of patients 
to weigh the costs of care in their treatment decisions. As for weighing the value of care, results 
differ between studies. In Chapter 5, we did find significant effects of cost-sharing on prescription 
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drug spending for drugs that are considered as ‘high value’, but they were not significant from an 
economical point of view. In contrast, Brot-Goldberg et al. did find effects of deductibles on spending 
on similar types of medicines211. Stockley’s265 results also differed from ours. For a population of users 
of anti-hypertensives, statins, insulin or oral anti-diabetic medication she did find that cost-sharing 
leads to large drops in consumption. In light of the terms of the cost-sharing schemes that are in place, 
she deems this an irrational response. 
Goldman et al.267, in a literature review of cost sharing on prescription drug use, found that 
cost-sharing lowered the number of new users, and, for those who already use a particular class 
of medicines, may lower adherence, or cause people to quit treatment. Under the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment268, in which different forms of cost-sharing were compared to a ‘free plan’, a 
lower average number of episodes of care was recorded for those assigned to a cost-sharing plan, 
irrespective of whether treatment would be highly or rarely effective. Together, these studies suggest 
that patient have trouble weighing the benefits of treatment as well, as they tend to skip high-value 
treatments for which the clinical benefits would well outweigh out-of-pocket costs. Strikingly, in terms 
of the resulting health status, which, from a clinical perspective, must be lower under patient cost-
sharing, studies tend to report very small or no effects. Shigeoka269, who exploited that in Japan, stark 
differences in patient cost-sharing exists between those right below and above the age of 70, reported 
strong effects on health care consumption, but little effect on mortality and health status. Also, at the 
end of the RAND experiment, there appeared to be little difference between those for whom care 
was free and those who had been under cost-sharing (on average). This led to a somewhat intriguing 
closing remark that “at the margin, the negative effects of unnecessary or inappropriate care tend to 
balance the beneficial effects of appropriate care”268 
In sum, research on patient cost-sharing, including ours, suggests that patients are not well able 
to rationally weigh costs and benefits when making a treatment decision. This raises the issue of 
whether current forms of cost-sharing are welfare improving, or should be considered as a tool to 
merely lower health care expenditures, increase cost-consciousness or to let the sick contribute more 
to the system (thereby keeping insurance premiums lower).
Exploiting cognitive biases to improve the design of patient cost-sharing schemes
Research on the behavioral underpinnings of patient treatment decisions under cost-sharing 
schemes can help improving current schemes. Albeit cost-sharing schemes incentivize patients to 
lower consumption of low-value services, it does so by introducing financial risk or, in case of a no-
claim rebate, an increase in premiums that, at its best, is only refunded in the next year (without 
correction for inflation). A better understanding of cognitive biases can help policy to design 
schemes that elicit the desired spending response, at minimal cost. For example, the loss-aversion 
we documented in Chapter 5, implies that the total increase in premiums necessary to fund the no-
claim rebate, needs to be larger than the size of the deductible to elicit a similar spending response, 
implying that a deductible is to be preferred over a no-claim rebate if we would only look at costs to 
the patient. In turn, Stockley265 found that co-payments elicit an even stronger spending response per 
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dollar of out-of-pocket costs. Co-payments have the additional advantage that they lower financial 
risk, since it requests small payments per episode of care, rather than, potentially, a large payment 
at once. Stockley265 suggested that this effect largely stems from the increased transparency of co-
payments: consumers need to perform less calculations to get an idea about the level of the co-
payment that will be charged when they consume care, as opposed to calculating the level of the 
remaining deductible.  
  An advantage of estimating fundamental choice parameters, instead of the average response to 
a particular policy, is that it allows us to simulate the impact of policies that are not yet in place. In a 
concurrent project, not part of this thesis, we simulate alternative deductible policies, and assess their 
impact in terms of average spending, split out to the risk group to which an individual belongs. This 
gives us information about the redistributional effects of alternative policies as well.
If one thinks, however, that the primary goal of patient cost-sharing is to reduce the use of 
low-value services rather than consumption of health services per se, the question arises whether 
deductibles, no-claim rebates or co-payments are up to the task. The research cited above gives the 
impression that patient cost-sharing, as a demand-side incentive, can be a blunt instrument. 
Weighing costs against benefits might also be a task that is naturally more suited to doctors270, 
but for this to work, we first need to break the connection between costs and provider revenue, in 
order to align interests. In theory, shared savings programs can provide the appropriate incentives, 
by rewarding care providers for savings in expenditures conditional on reaching or improving quality 
targets. In our evaluation of the Menzis Shared Savings Program, we found that providers have 
realized 3,5% in expenditure savings, without having compromised on quality of care – suggesting 
that savings might have been realized by reducing the number of low-value service (which will be a 
topic of future research). Similarly, in the first performance year of the Medicare Pioneer Accountable 
Care Organization Program, in which participating providers were deemed financially accountable 
for both savings and losses against a benchmark, resulting expenditure savings were in part realized 
by decreasing the number of low-value services (even without being specifically targeted by the 
program)271. In terms of high-value care, all cohorts of the providers participating under the Alternative 
Quality Contract, exhibited faster growth in process quality related to chronic disease management, 
adult preventive care and pediatric care, while, at the same time, realizing savings42. Research on this 
topic is relatively scarce however. In a concurrent project, not part of this thesis, we estimate whether 
patterns of moral hazard in health insurance, differ between patients that were registered with a 
provider who participated in the Menzis Shared Savings Program, versus those who were not. This will 
give us a better image of the relative strength of both types of incentives, their desirability, and their 
interaction. The interaction of both type of incentives is a relatively understudied topic, with Asch et 
al.272 being the sole exception we know of.
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Given that a significant portion of medical spending is considered wasteful, the patient value 
per euro spent can be improved by the de-implementation of wasteful care. In this dissertation, we 
discussed two incentives payers can use, that could potentially lower the demand for wasteful care: a 
shared savings incentive (a supply-side incentive), in which care providers are rewarded for lowering 
health care expenditures conditionally on achieving quality targets, and patient cost sharing incentives 
(a demand-side incentive), that let patients pay part of their health care expenditures themselves.
After a general introduction, Chapter 2 described our design of a shared savings model for 
General Practitioners (GPs), piloted by Dutch health insurer Menzis and several integrated primary 
care centers from Arts en Zorg (AEZ). The design of the model consists of 5 building blocks:
1. GPs are held accountable for the costs and quality of care, for patients registered with 
them;
2. GPs are held accountable for total costs, also for the costs that are generated outside 
their own practice, with the exception of dental care; these costs are expressed as an 
average per insurance year.
3. A GP’s average costs per insurance year are evaluated against an expenditure benchmark, 
consisting of a three-year weighted historical average, multiplied by the growth rate of 
a regional control group consisting of GPs not participating in the program;
4. A GP is said to have realized savings in case his average costs per insurance year are 
statistically significantly lower than those of the benchmark;
5. Savings are shared in accordance with a payment maximum and a sharing rate. The net 
sharing rate depends on the achievement of quality targets.
In the same chapter, we discuss and develop methods to lower the uncertainty surrounding the 
incentive – as this is inversely related to its strength – and to improve the accuracy and statistical 
confidence of the model.
In line with improving patient value via the implementation of shared savings models, we 
investigated an often-voiced concern regarding shared savings models (and financial incentives in 
general) in Chapter 3, which is that providers can benefit from risk selection when participating under 
the program. To determine whether this is a mere theoretical threat, we simulated risk selection 
under a generic shared savings program. We considered a hypothetical scenario of a fictional provider, 
who selects his population prior to the start of the performance year. The provider does so based 
on historical expenditure data he owns. We found that for providers that want to select risks, a rich 
risk adjustment model – built using more information than will be typically available to the providers 
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operating under shared savings programs – is highly problematic, because providers will only be able 
to optimize with respect to part of the model’s variables. This does not guarantee success, and may 
even imply a drop in shared savings payments, as we found. This finding implies that the threat of risk 
selection to the financial sustainability of shared savings programs, decreases with the richness of the 
risk adjustment model. We also found that, in practice, a relatively simple risk adjustment is able to 
substantially lower the expected pay-offs to risk selection – taking into account that selecting risks is, 
by itself, a procedure that involves costs.
Chapter 4 reported on the first-year results of the shared savings pilot (chapter 2), in terms of 
both health care expenditures and quality. We used difference-in-difference models to quantify the 
program’s impact on expenditures, and a before-after study to measure changes in quality. We found 
a 3.5% drop in health care expenditures in the pilot’s first performance year, of which the larger part 
was due to a drop in volume. The program led to savings in specialist care, diagnostic care and GP care. 
Furthermore, the causal link between pilot participation and health care expenditures was supported 
by our finding that every participating GP realized savings. We found no structural change in quality.
In chapter 5, we studied patient cost sharing incentives. We showed that the effect patient 
cost-sharing schemes have on a patient’s spending, is determined by the framing of the associated 
economic incentives. We showed that patients react almost twice as strong to a cost-sharing scheme 
when it is framed as deductible as opposed to a no-claim refund of similar size. Having ruled out 
several other explanations for this result, our preferred explanation is that insured are loss-averse 
and respond differently to both schemes because they perceive deductible payments as a loss and 
no-claim refunds as a gain, even though they are quantitatively similar. This finding is in line with 
Prospect Theory.
Conclusion
In this thesis, we investigated two strategies for lowering spending on wasteful care: introducing 
demand- and supply-side incentives. 
Designing patient cost-sharing schemes in health insurance contracts is a complex task. Many 
factors can influence patients’ decision about health care use, and it is important to identify the most 
important factors. Our study shows that the framing of cost-sharing incentives is a factor of first-order 
importance. The irrational response we documented, together with other research done in this area, 
calls into question whether people are truly able to weigh costs (and benefits) in their treatment 
decisions. This assumed trait however, is what would make patient cost-sharing schemes welfare 
improving.
Another strategy to lower wasteful spending is to incorporate shared savings models into 
contracts with care providers. We designed and implemented a shared savings model for Dutch 
primary care providers, and implementing it for a group of GPs in the city of Enschede. We concluded 
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that, also within the context of Dutch primary care, shared savings models can be developed that 
incentivize value-based care. As the shared savings model introduced one-sided only, and acted as a 
mere complement to the existing GP payment model – which remained unchanged – we concluded 
that introducing additional value-based incentives does not rely on disruptive payment reform. In its 
current form, the incentives following from the shared savings model seemed strong enough to realize 
a significant change in its first year.  
524990-L-bw-Hayen
Processed on: 29-10-2018 PDF page: 175
524990-L-bw-Hayen












Om de stijging van de zorguitgaven in te perken, is het van belang om kritisch te kijken naar 
verspilling in de zorg. Uit onderzoek weten we inmiddels dat een deel van de zorguitgaven als ‘verspilling’ 
kan worden aangemerkt. Dit betreft zorg die niet effectief is, of niet efficënt wordt geleverd. Zo komt 
het voor dat bepaalde zorg eigenlijk niet nodig is, dubbel gedaan wordt, of binnen een te dure setting 
plaatsvindt. Een voorbeeld hiervan is de patiënt die naar het ziekenhuis wordt verwezen voor een 
bepaalde behandeling, terwijl de eigen huisarts vakkundig genoeg was om de patiënt zelf te helpen. 
Wanneer we verspilling tegengaan, stijgt de waarde die verzekerden terugkrijgen per uitgegeven euro.
Er bestaan verschillende strategieën om verspilling in de zorg tegen te gaan. In dit proefschrift 
bespreken we de introductie van financiële prikkels, voor zorgaanbieders en verzekerden. Een 
financiële prikkel kan een stimulans zijn om andere keuzes te maken. In dit proefschrift onderzoeken 
we twee financiële prikkels die ‘verspilling’ zouden kunnen tegen gaan. 
Een eerste financiële prikkel die we onderzoeken, is gericht op het bekostigen van zorgaanbieders 
via een ‘shared savings’ contract. Onder een shared- savingscontract, delen zorgaanbieders in de door 
hen gerealiseerde besparingen in zorgkosten. Een voorwaarde is wel dat deze besparingen niet ten 
koste zijn gegaan van de kwaliteit van zorg. In Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift ontwikkelen we een 
shared- savingscontract. Dit contract is door zorgverzekeraar Menzis daadwerkelijk gebruikt, en getest 
in een pilot met een aantal deelnemende huisartsen van Arts en Zorg. Op hoofdlijnen ziet dit contract 
er als volgt uit:
1. Huisartsen worden alleen verantwoordelijk gehouden voor de zorgkosten en kwaliteit van zorg, 
voor verzekerden die bij hen staan ingeschreven;
2. Huisartsen worden beloond voor besparingen op totale zorgkosten, dus ook voor zorgkosten 
die buiten de eigen praktijk worden gemaakt. Deze kosten worden uitgedrukt als een 
kostengemiddelde per verzekerdenjaar;
3. Per jaar wordt dit kostengemiddelde per verzekerdenjaar vergeleken met het kostengemiddelde 
van een benchmark. De benchmark in het contract bestaat uit een gewogen gemiddelde van 
de historische zorgkosten van de praktijk, vermenigvuldigd met de actuele groeitrend van de 
zorgkosten in de regio;
4. Een huisarts heeft ‘besparingen’ gerealiseerd, indien zijn kostengemiddelde per verzekerdenjaar 
statistisch significant lager is dan dat van de benchmark;
5. De mate waarin deze besparingen gedeeld worden met de huisarts, hangt af van de kwaliteit 
van zorg (en afspraken rondom een deelpercentage en een uitkeringsmaximum).
Uit onderzoek weten we dat de kracht van een financiële prikkel, afhangt van de kans dat het 
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gewenste gedrag ook daadwerkelijk wordt beloond. Daarom staan we in dit hoofdstuk ook stil bij 
manieren om die zekerheid te vergroten, en bespreken we statistische methoden die kunnen helpen 
om eventuele besparingen op een nauwkeurige en betrouwbare manier te meten.
Een zorg die veel wordt geuit, is dat zorgaanbieders die onder een shared-savingscontract werken, 
hun patiëntenpopulatie zo zouden kunnen samenstellen dat ze volgens de rekenmethodieken die in 
het shared-savingscontract worden gebruikt, besparingen realiseren. In theorie zouden huisartsen 
dit kunnen doen door patiënten uit te schrijven of te weigeren, waarvan zij weten dat deze het qua 
zorgkosten slechter gaan doen dan de benchmark. Dit wordt ‘risicoselectie’ genoemd. In Hoofdstuk 
3 onderzoeken we deze zorg. We kijken met name of risicoselectie praktisch uitvoerbaar is. Dit doen 
we aan de hand van een simulatiestudie, waarin we een fictieve huisarts aan risicoselectie laten 
doen. De scenario’s verschillen onderling in de informatie die een huisarts tot zijn beschikking heeft, 
en de mate waarin de benchmark wordt gecorrigeerd voor patiëntkenmerken. We concluderen dat 
risicoselectie een strategie is met zeer onzekere opbrengsten. Met de informatie die een huisarts 
doorgaans tot zijn beschikking heeft, blijkt het lastig om aan risicoselectie te doen. Daarnaast is een 
zeer eenvoudige correctie van de benchmark al voldoende om een aanzienlijk deel van de door 
risicoselectie gegenereerde opbrengsten, terug te vorderen. Aangezien risicoselectie zelf een kostbare 
activiteit is, die veel vraagt in termen van data(analyse), concluderen we dat risicoselectie praktisch 
onuitvoerbaar is.
In Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we de effecten van het in hoofdstuk 2 ontwikkelde shared-
savingscontract, op de zorgkosten en kwaliteit van de huisartsen bij wie het contract is ingevoerd. We 
maken gebruik van de zogheten ‘difference-in-difference’ methodiek om de impact van het contract 
op zorgkosten te meten, en bestuderen verschuivingen in kwaliteit met een eenvoudige voor/na 
studie. We vinden dat, in het eerste jaar van het contract, de zorgkosten met 3,5% zijn afgenomen. 
Iedere deelnemende huisarts heeft besparingen gerealiseerd, wat ons sterkt in het leggen van een 
oorzakelijk verband tussen shared savings als financiële prikkel, en de zorgkosten. De besparingen 
zijn vooral gerealiseerd door het terugbrengen van volume. We vinden besparingen in de medisch-
specialistische zorg, diagnostische zorg, en de huisartsenzorg. Er zijn aanwijzingen dat de besparingen 
in de huisartsenzorg zijn gerealiseerd door zorgmijders te excluderen van zorgprogramma’s. Ondanks 
dat er significante besparingen zijn gerealiseerd, vinden we geen structurele verandering in kwaliteit. 
Een belangrijke bevinding is dat de patiënttevredenheid hetzelfde blijft, voor en na het experiment. 
Naast ‘shared savings’ als financiële prikkel voor de bekostiging van zorgaanbieders, wordt in 
dit proefschrift ook de werking van financiële prikkels voor verzekerden onderzocht. In Hoofdstuk 5 
kijken we specifiek naar de vormgeving van een systeem van bijbetalingen. Een dergelijk systeem kun 
je op verschillende manieren vormgeven – ‘framen’. Onder een eigen risico betalen verzekerden de 
eerste zorgkosten zelf, voordat de dekking van de zorgverzekering in gaat. Onder een no-claim betalen 
verzekerden een hogere maandelijkse premie, maar krijgen zij deze verhoging aan het eind van het jaar 
terug indien er geen zorgkosten zijn gemaakt (of zij krijgen een deel terug, indien de zorgkosten onder 
een bepaald bedrag zijn gebleven). De centrale onderzoeksvraag in hoofdstuk 5 is of verzekerden op 
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een eigen risico hetzelfde reageren als een no-claim. Economisch bezien zijn beiden hetzelfde: de 
no-claim bonus aan het eind van het jaar wordt in feite bekostigd door premiestijging. We vinden in 
hoofdstuk 5 echter dat, al het andere constant houdende, verzekerden nagenoeg twee keer zo sterk 
reageren op het eigen risico dan op een no-claim van vergelijkbare hoogte. Verzekerden die moeten 
bijbetalen, hetzij via een eigen risico, of via een no-claim, gebruiken minder zorg, maar gebruiken nóg 
minder zorg wanneer het systeem van bijbetalen wordt vormgegeven als een eigen risico. Nadat we 
enkele mogelijke andere verklaringen voor dit resultaat hebben uitgesloten, concluderen we dat het 
resultaat hoogstwaarschijnlijk komt door de ‘aversie tegen verlies’ , die verzekerden hebben. Deze 
aversie maakt onderdeel uit van de zogeheten Vooruitzichttheorie.
Conclusie
In dit proefschrift hebben we twee financiële prikkels bestudeerd die worden ingezet om verspilling 
in de zorg tegen te gaan: shared-savingscontracten (een financiële prikkel voor zorgaanbieders) en het 
eigen risico (een financiële prikkel voor verzekerden)
Het ontwikkelen van een systeem van eigen bijbetalingen, zoals bijvoorbeeld het invoeren van 
een eigen risico, is een complexe taak. Er zijn veel factoren die het uiteindelijke effect op zorggebruik 
bepalen, en het in kaart brengen van deze factoren is belangrijk voor de werkzaamheid van het 
systeem, en daarmee de wenselijkheid ervan. Onze studie bevestigt dat de vormgeving, meer specifiek 
de framing van de financiële prikkel, een factor is die net zo belangrijk is als de prikkel zelf en daarmee 
veel aandacht behoort te krijgen in het gezondheidszorgbeleid. Het feit dat verzekerden zo sterk 
reageren op vormgeving – een respons die volgens economische maatstaven ‘irrationeel’ te noemen 
is – trekt wel in twijfel of verzekerden überhaupt goed in staat zijn om de kosten (en baten) van een 
medische behandeling wel goed tegen elkaar af te wegen. Wat enigzins zorgen baart, is dat deze 
veronderstelde vaardigheid wel ten grondslag ligt aan de verwachte opbrengsten van het eigen risico.
Net als een systeem van eigen bijbetalingen, kan een shared-savingscontract prikkelen om 
verspilling tegen te gaan, door zorgaanbieders te belonen voor het realiseren van besparingen 
(bij minimaal gelijkblijvende kwaliteit). Uit het proefschrift blijkt dat het mogelijk is om binnen de 
Nederlandse context, in het bijzonder de huisartsenzorg, een shared-savingscontract te ontwikkelen. 
De eerste resultaten van dit model laten zien dat het mogelijk is om via een shared-savingscontract 
de zorgkostengroei te reduceren, zonder daarbij in te boeten op (gemeten) kwaliteit. Aangezien het 
ontwikkelde shared-savingscontract alleen eenzijdig risico introduceerde – huisartsen ‘deelden’ niet in 
verliezen maar alleen in besparingen – en aangezien het contract werkzaam was bovenop de huidige 
manier van bekostigen (abonnementstarieven, consulten, enz.), kunnen we stellen dat voor het 
verhogen van waarde voor verzekerden, geen radicale bekostigingshervorming  nodig is.
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Dankwoord
Eén van de voorrechten van het beroep ‘promovendus’, is dat je na het opleveren van je 
eindproduct de gelegenheid krijgt om publiekelijk, en uitvoerig, de mensen te bedanken die er toe 
doen. Na  uitgebreid alle andere voorrechten te hebben geconsumeerd – jarenlang, mag je wel zeggen 
– mag deze niet in het rijtje ontbreken en ga ik het ook in stijl afsluiten.
Om te beginnen, mijn promotor Gert Westert, en copromotoren Michael van den Berg en Jeroen 
Struijs. 
Gert, vlak nadat ik begon in Tilburg, werd je directeur bij IQ healthcare, en hoogleraar aan het 
Radboud Universitair Medisch Centrum in Nijmegen. Hoewel we elkaar hierdoor wat minder zagen 
dan tijdens onze gezamenlijke periode in Tilburg, hadden we in overleggen maar een paar minuten 
nodig om de draad op te pakken. Je bewaakt op deze momenten de rust, en hebt een erg scherp oog 
voor relaties en verhoudingen. In een project waarin je veel met externen te maken hebt, kan hier veel 
misgaan. In de afgelopen jaren heb je me veel geleerd over hoe je je in dit soort omgevingen beweegt, 
en heb ik ook met een schuin oog gekeken naar hoe jíj dat doet. Hier heb ik nog dagelijks veel profijt 
van! Ook wil ik je bedanken voor het vertrouwen dat je me gaf om zelf veel facetten van het onderzoek 
te ontdekken. Je moedigde me bijvoorbeeld aan bij het schrijven van subsidieaanvragen, en bij het 
leggen van nieuwe contacten in de onderzoekerswereld – ook als dat buiten het begeleidingsteam om 
zou gaan. Dit is een zeldzaamheid, en daar heb ik het erg mee getroffen!
Michael, jij vormde met Jeroen mijn dagelijkse begeleiding. Op de weg terug van één van onze 
eerste bezoeken in Zwolle, vertelde je me wat meer over waar je vandaan kwam. Ik heb een grote 
bewondering voor je carrière pad. Tekenend voor diezelfde drive en nieuwsgierigheid die je jarenlang 
hebt gehad om te komen waar je nu staat, was het moment dat ik op je kantoor binnen kwam en opeens 
allerlei papers over transactiekostentheorie zag liggen. Ik moest plotseling op mijn woorden gaan 
letten! Ik heb enorm gelachen om je scherpe humor; en met dezelfde scherpte becommentarieerde 
je mijn stukken of luisterde je naar mijn verhaal. Waar het ook over ging, met een voorzichtig “nou…”, 
liet je me vaak inzien dat het tegendeel óók waar kon zijn. Om uiteindelijk zelfstandig onderzoeker te 
kunnen worden, heeft iedere promovendus dat inzicht nodig.
Jeroen, jij bent later officieel bij dit begeleidingsteam gekomen, maar eigenlijk al vanaf dag één 
betrokken bij dit proefschrift. Dit is geen cliché! Ik kan me nog herinneren dat je, in 2010, mijn kamer 
binnenkwam op het RIVM en meteen – met je schoenen op mijn bureau – vroeg wie ik was, wat ik 
kwam doen, en, waarom ik datgene dan niet zus en zo deed. Zelf ben ik behoorlijk eigenwijs, en had 
ik al in mijn hoofd zitten welke literatuur belangrijk zou zijn voor het proefschrift. Ik dacht, ik lees eens 
wat over die Accountable Care Organizations van hem, en dan vertel ik hem wel waarom mijn aanpak 
toch beter is. En bij het lezen ging er een wereld voor me open – dit moest inderdaad het uitgangspunt 
van het proefschrift worden. We hebben ontzettend veel gespard, over het proefschrift en privé. Het 
fijne aan de samenwerking met jou is dat je absoluut geen blad voor de mond neemt, maar ook net zo 
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makkelijk incasseert. Onze discussies waren stevig, maar je stond altijd achter mijn beslissing. Ik denk 
dat als je onze karakters op papier zou uitwerken, menig organisatiepsycholoog zou voorspellen dat 
we zouden botsen, maar het tegendeel is waar: we denken met veel plezier terug aan onze ‘ESB’ en 
‘Health Affairs’, werken nog steeds samen, en maken plannen voor de toekomst. 
Graag wil ik de overige leden van de promotiecommissie - Rudy Douven, Misja Mikkers, Mattijs 
Numans, Johan Polder en Erik Schut - bedanken voor de genomen tijd en moeite, en bovenal de 
nuttige feedback die ik al heb mogen ontvangen.
Ook wil ik mijn co-auteurs Martin Salm en Tobias Klein bedanken, met wie ik onderzoek deed 
naar de gedragseffecten van het eigen risico in de zorgverzekering. Tijdens de research master hebben 
jullie mij wegwijs gemaakt in de toegepaste econometrie, en ik vond het fantastisch om tijdens 
mijn promotie samen onderzoek te mogen doen. We zaten geregeld met zijn drieën bij elkaar om 
te praten over het eigen risico. De gesprekken gingen op een zeer hoog tempo, waardoor het bijna 
onvermijdelijk was dat ik hier en daar nog wel eens een minuutje achterliep. En dan druk ik me nog 
voorzichtig uit! Het enthousiasme over dit project was en ís groot. Dit nam ik ook weer terug wanneer 
ik de oversteek maakte naar het Tias-gebouw. Op het persoonlijke vlak zijn jullie een grote steun 
geweest. We hebben een aantal gezellige etentjes en feestjes gehad, en, Martin, één van de zwaarste 
lichamelijke beproevingen van de afgelopen jaren, was om een aantal kilometer naar je appartement 
te lopen met twaalf flessen wijn onder de arm voor een Wine&Cheese party. Ik geloof dat jij de vier 
stukjes kaas voor je rekening had genomen, waarvoor dank, die hadden er echt niet meer bij gekund… 
Ik ben zeer dankbaar voor de financiering vanuit Stichting Menzis/AZIVO RVVZ  (“Samen Sterk”) 
en het Strategisch Programma RIVM ( “Patient Cost Sharing and Medical Care Use”). In het kader van 
dit strategisch programma, wil ik graag Johan Polder bedanken voor de vele inhoudelijke discussies 
die we hebben gehouden, en zeker ook voor de kans om dit project te mogen uitvoeren als relatief 
onervaren onderzoeker en projectleider. Caroline Baan, bedankt dat ik dit project nog een tijd als 
RIVM’er kon doen. Ik ben erg dankbaar voor de extra tijd die het RIVM me heeft gegeven om het 
proefschrift af te maken.
Enkele hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift gaan over het shared-savingsprogramma. Dit is een 
gezamenlijke inspanning geweest met Menzis, zorgverzekeraar, en Arts en Zorg, een landelijk 
opererende organisatie van geïntegreerde eerstelijns gezondheidscentra. De projectgroep bestond 
uit werknemers van beide organisaties. In het bijzonder wil ik Stefanie van Wolferen (Arts en Zorg), 
en Hannes Seesing en Eric Veldboer (Menzis) bedanken voor hun projectleiderschap. Uit deze 
organisaties is ook een stuurgroep geformeerd die toezicht heeft gehouden op de voortgang van het 
project. Hiervoor wil ik Bertien Dumas, Pascale Voermans (Menzis), en Amon van den Borg (Arts en 
Zorg) bedanken. 
In de voorbereiding van het shared-savingsprogramma zijn een groot aantal afdelingen binnen 
Menzis geconsulteerd, variërend van Zorginkoop tot het Business Intelligence Competence Center 
(BICC). In het bijzonder zou ik graag Eric Juffermans, Marten Brittijn (Zorginkoop), Wim Gerritsen, 
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Marcel Telling en Chris Keen (BICC) willen bedanken. De data-infrastructuur en de opgeleverde 
databestanden zijn binnen dit promotietraject een onmisbare input geweest. In het licht hiervan 
wil ik ook de medewerkers van ZorgTTP bedanken voor hun kennis, kunde en uitstekende helpdesk. 
De borging van het shared-savingsmodel binnen het zorginkoopproces van Menzis heeft Hazel Hull 
verzorgd, waarmee dit project kon worden afgerond. Bedankt voor jullie hulp!
Ik heb tijdens mijn promotietraject zowel bij Tranzo gewerkt (Tilburg University) als aan het RIVM. 
Hier heb ik in al die jaren ontzettend veel mensen leren kennen, die werken tot een plezier maakten. 
Een lijst namen is eigenlijk niet te doen en te risicovol, en ik bedank jullie dan ook graag een keer 
persoonlijk. Wel wil ik alvast graag Henk Garretsen (en later ook Dike van de Mheen) bedanken voor de 
fijne en informele sfeer bij Tranzo, en Jacqueline Frijters en Diederik Meijering voor hun inspanningen 
rondom de contracten tussen Tilburg University en Menzis. Graag wil ik ook Bert Meijboom bedanken. 
Bert, jij luisterde naar mijn wensen over een promotieonderwerp, hielp met het leggen van het eerste 
contact met Menzis, en adviseerde me om naar Tranzo te gaan. Zonder deze hulp had ik niet aan dit 
proefschrift kunnen beginnen. Ook werkte je als co-auteur mee aan enkele artikelen in het begin 
van dit traject. Bedankt voor de vliegende start! In dit licht wil ik trouwens ook Stijn van den Hoogen 
bedanken, die mij adviseerde om een research master te gaan doen – iets waarvan ik op dat moment 
dacht dat het ver buiten mijn capaciteiten zou liggen. Inmiddels zie ik dit als één van de beste en 
belangrijkste adviezen die ik ooit gekregen heb.
Mijn vaste kamergenoten bedanken gaat nog nét. Bram, jij bent jarenlang mijn vertrouwde 
kamergenoot geweest, en wat hebben we enorm gelachen. Ik denk dat we qua humor het meest 
donkere en slechtste in elkaar naar boven haalden, en dat gebeurt nog steeds als we een hapje gaan 
eten. Ook bleken we opvallend vaak dezelfde obscure muziek te kennen, te waarderen én te draaien 
wanneer de werkdag tegen het einde liep. Zo hebben we de campus kennis laten maken met enkele 
pareltjes, waaronder bijvoorbeeld de knallende hiphopbeats van Onra’s Chinoiseries pt 2. Miel, jij 
promoveerde als een speer, waardoor we uiteindelijk parallel aan elkaar begonnen te lopen. Hiermee 
ontstond ook een gezamenlijke passie voor propensity score matching. We hebben ontzettend veel 
goede en  vooral ook persoonlijke gesprekken over het leven gevoerd, en het is fijn om iemand 
tegenover je te hebben zitten bij wie je alles kwijt kunt. Een bijzondere herinnering blijft dat we samen 
in de auto sprongen om een trouwpak voor je te vinden, en ik hoop dan ook dat je, tegen de tijd dat ik 
het geluk vind in de liefde, nog mobiel genoeg bent om  mee te gaan! Mocht dat nooit gebeuren, dan 
ben je in ieder geval paranimf geweest bij dit ‘huwelijk’ met de wetenschap.
Hannes, we hebben jarenlang zeer intensief met elkaar opgetrokken in het shared-savingstraject, 
en misschien moet ik je daarom ook maar onder ‘kamergenoten’ scharen, al werkten we niet met 
vaste plekken bij Menzis. Je enthousiasme is aanstekelijk, en dat kwam goed van pas tijdens de vele 
uren sparren over nieuwe bekostigingsmodellen. Ook op het persoonlijke vlak weten we elkaar goed 
te vinden, en houden we elkaar scherp met de nodige humor. Het is erg jammer dat we nu geen 
collega’s meer zijn, al was het maar om nog een keer samen die VBHC Prize op te halen!  
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Arjen, we zijn geen kamergenoten geweest maar flatgenoten en kennen elkaar vanuit de research 
master. Onze avonden bijpraten zijn nu een stuk prijziger, maar toch denken we met weemoed terug 
aan de doos frikandellen en de zak voorgesneden uitjes  – de luxe die we ons toen konden permitteren 
– die we bovenop het dak van de flat opaten. Zonder frituurpan waren we aangewezen op je tosti-ijzer, 
en voor de mensen die nu nog dit dankwoord aan het lezen zijn: een frikandel kun je prima in een tosti 
-ijzer klaarmaken, maar het gaat wel ten koste van de zo authentieke vorm van de frikandel. Op de 
squashbaan trokken we veel bekijks, waarvan ik nog steeds niet weet of het nou door het hoge niveau 
kwam of door het taalgebruik, de vliegende rackets, en de ballen die af en toe onhandig op mijn oog 
werden gespeeld (leve de huisartsenpost). Je kun wel stellen dat onze squashpartijen nog letterlijk en 
figuurlijk op mijn netvlies staan gebrand. Toch ben ik blij dat we elkaar nog regelmatig opzoeken in 
Amsterdam, Tilburg of Wageningen voor een avondje onvervalste mannenpraat. Bedankt dat je mijn 
paranimf wilde zijn!
Niki, na het uitwisselen van al die Spotify-nummers, kunst, gedichten, boeken, foodscapes, 
soundscapes.. wist ik dat ik jóu moest zien te strikken voor een cover. Je hebt me al veel moois laten 
zien en ook deze cover past moeiteloos in dat rijtje. Erg leuk om een keer van dichtbij mee te mogen 
maken hoe je ontwerpt, en ik ga zeker eens een wandelingetje maken door de eerste complete 
landschappen van jouw hand!
Uiteindelijk ben ik dan aangekomen bij mijn familie. Simone, toen je, als mijn zus, óók begon 
met promoveren, had ik echt verwacht dat je vaak bij je oudere broer kwam aankloppen voor advies. 
Maar wat zat ik er naast. Je bent ontzettend snel gegaan, en er was zelfs een kans dat je eerder zou 
promoveren dan ik. Zoals je weet heb ik daar een keer een erg vervelende droom over gehad, en ben 
ik de ochtend er na écht de laatste puntjes op de i gaan zetten. Uiteindelijk is mijn verdediging maar 
11 dagen eerder…  Ik ben erg trots op je, en hoop altijd dat wanneer ik anderen over jouw sterke bèta 
kant vertel, dit ook een beetje op mij zal afstralen. Sjoerd, tussen schoonbroers bestaat altijd een 
zekere concurrentie, en ik dacht even de toon te zetten door een publicatie van me nonchalant te laten 
slingeren op de tafel tijdens Kerst  – over de transactiekostentheorie. Als mensen me vragen waarom 
ik geen proefpromotie heb gedaan: die heb ik dus al gehad, en het klikkende geluid van de stekker 
van de gourmet was pas mijn ‘hora est’. Vanaf toen besloot ik om maar gewoon dankbaar gebruik te 
maken van je talenten, en drink ik zo nu en dan thuis jouw zelf gebrouwen bier met prachtig uitzicht 
op de door jou gemonteerde eettafellamp.    
Pap, mam, waar zal ik eens beginnen? 
Ook tijdens de promotie kon ik altijd rekenen op jullie steun, vertrouwen, aanmoediging, een 
luisterend oor, hulp, en vooral ook op jullie humor en gezelligheid. Als ik jullie in één beeld moet 
vatten denk ik aan onze tuin, het watertje, de ondergaande zon, een fles rode wijn, en nog één, en de 
urenlange gesprekken die we hadden, vaak tot middernacht. 
Mam, je hebt aan een simpele blik genoeg om me aan het lachen te maken, en waar ik van de 
lange verhandelingen ben kan bij jou een enkele opmerking al raak zijn. Naast dat kunnen we nog 
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steeds áltijd op je rekenen voor de meest uiteenlopende problemen. Niks is je te gek, ook al kost het 
je uren. Een Italiaans overhemd dat volgens een professionele kleermaker ‘onherstelbaar beschadigd’ 
is, kun je het beste gewoon aan jou geven. Samen met wat lekkers.. 
Pap, we hebben samen ontzettend veel kilometers in de benen, en minstens zoveel ‘gemengde 
hapjes’. In veel cafés zijn we inmiddels graag geziene gasten, en een enkele keer komt het zelfs al voor 
dat de koffie wordt ingeschonken als ze ons zien aankomen. We hebben bijzondere gesprekken gehad, 
en kennen elkaar door en door. Een mooie herinnering blijft dat we begin dit jaar samen naar ADO Den 
Haag gingen, en helemaal uit onze plaat konden gaan omdat El Khayati in de 92e minuut de winnende 
penalty erin poeierde. 
Aan jullie draag ik dit proefschrift op. Bedankt voor alle zorg!
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